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ABSTRACT
My dissertation evaluated whether the palaces built in Florence, Italy during the
Renaissance are a form of costly signaling. Costly signaling theory was developed to
explain why organisms have attributes and behaviors that appear to defy basic Darwinian
logic by having costs that are not offset by obvious benefits. The theory proposes that
such attributes and behaviors persist because they are reliable signals of information
about the signalers. Signal audiences use the information content of signals to rank
signalers and to modify their interactions with signalers in ways that benefit signalers.
These interactions can involve mate choice, predation avoidance, status competition, or
any other interactions that improve the likelihood that signalers have offspring that
survive to reproduce themselves.
My research collected information on 206 standing palaces built during the
Florentine republic of 1282 to 1532 and during the first several decades of the succeeding
Medici Duchy. My research also used primary documentary records of elections to
government and guild offices, with political success used as a proxy measure for overall
status. I also used electoral records as a source of demographic data. The elections
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records were then used to evaluate the reproductive and political success of palace
builders, their families, and their contemporaries.
My research found that palaces are consistent with expectations for costly signals,
especially during the period of de facto Medici rule from 1434 to 1494. My research also
found that palace builders had much higher than average reproductive and political
success. However, they built their palaces after they had completed their reproductive
lives and when they were halfway through their political careers. This timing means that
palace construction did not benefit palace builders. The benefits of palace building appear
instead to have been intended for the eldest sons of palace builders, who were able to
maintain their fathers’ high levels of political and reproductive success. I conclude that
palaces were a costly signal of families’ ability and willingness to invest resources in
their inheriting sons to ensure that those sons could preserve families as demographic
entities and as members of the sociopolitical elite.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
“I think that I have given myself more honor, and my soul more
satisfaction, by having spent money than having earned it, above all, with
regard to the building I have done.” Giovanni Rucellai (Goy 2002, italics
mine).
A hugely successful merchant in a city-state dominated socially, politically, and
economically by merchants, Giovanni Rucellai was a member of an elite that completely
reshaped the urban fabric of Florence, Italy over the course of the Renaissance. With
money earned from international banking, cloth manufacture, and other businesses,
Florentine elites spent lavishly on public buildings, churches, and palaces between the
late 1200s and early 1500s, producing a city that is today a UNESCO World Heritage
Site. Rucellai’s contribution was the façade of the church of Santa Maria Novella and
construction of an architectural landmark of a palace that is still owned by the family
today. But these buildings are more than just landmarks of Renaissance architecture.
They are also the most durable and costly element of an explosion of consumer goods
that made the cities of the Italian Renaissance—especially Florence—the birthplace of
modern consumer culture (Jardine 1996).
As international trade began to resume in the 1200s, Florentine merchants and
bankers invested in manufacturing, international finance, transport, and other activities.
By late in the century, these merchants and bankers had become wealthy enough to
challenge Florence’s noble rulers for power. In 1282, the city-state radically revised its
government, adopting a republican constitution that gave political power to merchants
1

and bankers and barred member of the hereditary nobility from most elected offices. This
republican political system would survive 250 years of warfare, populist revolts, and
financial and demographic upheaval. Republican government ended in 1532, when the
Medici were constitutionally recognized as the city-state’s hereditary rulers. Republican
rule and economic expansion in Florence produced a remarkable level of socioeconomic
opportunity and a distribution of wealth as equal as that of the United States today
(Goldthwaite 1995). Armed with this new wealth, Florentines of all classes bought huge
amounts of art, books, clothing, and other consumer goods.
One of the most lasting aspects of this consumer culture was monumental
architecture. In the late 1200s, the new republic began several huge publicly funded
construction projects, including the cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore (beginning 1296),
the Palazzo della Signoria (beginning 1299), and new city walls (beginning 1299).
Meanwhile, private funding allowed for the construction or extensive renovation of some
140 churches between 1348 and 1648 (Goldthwaite 1995). Palaces formed another
manifestation of this trend. Elite Florentine domestic architecture changed considerably
over the republican period. In the 1100s and early 1200s, elite urban domestic
architecture consisted of sprawling, haphazardly designed houses that integrated
defensive towers and that were built by hereditary noble lineages to house multiple
nuclear families; towers were also constructed by non-kin mutual protection societies
(Lansing 1991). Hundreds of these towers overlooked the city in the early 1200s (Villani
1906 [1348]). After the shift to republican government, the merchant elite began to build
homes with a very different character, houses commissioned by individual heads of
household for individual nuclear families. The earliest palaces of the republic period
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incorporated defensive features, but also included storefronts and warehouse space with
large street-level doors. These early palaces were stylistically severe, with little or no
elaboration of their stone facades. But by the late 1300s, palaces became increasingly
elaborate structures designed by professional architects inspired by new treatises on
architectural style, including Leon Battista Alberti’s 1450 De re aedificatoria.
Contemporary accounts report that palace construction surged in the 1400s, when more
than 100 palaces were built or extensively renovated, at least 30 between 1450 and 1478
alone (Wirtz 2000).
But why did elites build these palaces? What benefits did builders receive for
their colossal outlays of resources on these outsize family homes? Archaeologists
consider palaces as a key component of socio-political complexity. Increasing variation
in house size, culminating in the appearance of palaces, is seen as indicating increasing
differences in individual status and resource control (Feinman, et al. 1998; Maisels 1999;
Trigger 1990). While this interpretation explains why palaces appear, it does not explain
why they persist through time. Resource control is necessary for palace construction—no
individual can build a palace without controlling the requisite labor and materials.
However, resource control is not sufficient to explain why individuals committed those
resources to buildings that grossly exceed the requirements of sheltering a household.
Moreover, most archaeological examinations of palaces consider case studies where these
buildings are a small portion of the total built environment. The palace at Knossos is
almost a self-contained village; a city like Florence with hundreds of palaces is the
product of a very different cultural, economic, and political context.
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In this sense, Renaissance Florence, with its palaces and other consumer goods,
stand at the midpoint between ancient complex societies with their relatively limited
array of consumer choices and modern industrialized western society with its nearendless array of consumer products. Palaces, as an exemplar of Renaissance consumer
behavior, are therefore a useful case study for how we choose to commit our time,
energy, and other resources on goods that grossly exceed our basic functional needs. In
short, the palaces of the Renaissance are a case study not only of the long elite practice of
building giant houses, they are also the most lasting remnant of the deep roots of the
massive consumer culture that today represents roughly 70 percent of U.S. economic
activity.
This dissertation takes costly signaling as its theoretical starting point. Costly
signaling theory was developed to answer why organisms have behaviors and physical
attributes that have high costs in terms of time, energy, and other resources but that lack
any apparent benefits that would justify those costs. Costly signaling can be thought of as
the biological equivalent of conspicuous consumption as first systematically described by
the economist Thorsten Veblen (1973 [1899]). Veblen’s greatest insight was explaining
why people purchase goods that don’t make any sense in pure economic terms—why
drive a Rolls Royce when a Honda works just as well? He said the answer is that people
use observable traits, such as clothes or choices of leisure activity, to demonstrate their
status, which you can’t see. He said that variation in specific types of goods allows
people to rank each other’s status. Conspicuously consumed goods and services therefore
convey information about an individual’s control of resources and thus of their status.
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Costly signaling asks the same question for all biological organisms—why do
organisms have behaviors and attributes that don’t make sense in Darwinian terms? An
outgrowth of evolutionary ecology, costly signaling theory was formulated to explain
characteristics that appear to have high costs and no obvious benefits and that therefore
violate Darwinian logic. The theory proposes that these traits persist because they have an
underlying function—they serve as honest signals of hidden qualities and allow
individuals to evaluate and rank each other and thereby pick the best interaction partners.
That can mean the best mate, the best ally in a fight, the weakest prey—anything that
benefits health or reproductive success. Costly signaling has been documented in dozens
of species (Johnstone 1995; Searcy and Nowicki 2005), including experimental studies
(Matyjasiak, et al. 2000; Moller and de Lope 1994). Although not always apparent from
the bulk of the literature, female organisms can and do signal in competitions for status
and territory (Bywater, et al. 2008; Emlen 2008; Polo and Veiga 2006). Although
generally examined for its role in differential reproductive success, costly signaling may
also be part of predator-prey interaction (Vega-Redondo and Hasson 1993). It has even
been documented in plants (Blas, et al. 2006; Lev-Yadun 2005). It has been applied to
human behaviors as diverse as religious practices (Sosis and Alcorta 2003), altruism
(Gintis, et al. 2001), status acquisition (Boone 1998), and the effectiveness of television
advertising (Ambler and Hollier 2004). What has received comparatively less attention is
the role of costly signaling in pre-modern complex societies and the possibility that costly
signaling might change over time.

5

The Data Sets
My choice of Florence during the republic as a test case was very deliberate.
Preliminary research suggested that if costly signaling were to be testable anywhere with
positive results, it would be in Florence during its Renaissance-era period of republican
government between 1282 and 1532. As Rucellai’s diary entry demonstrates, Florentines
of the time were highly aware of the use of material goods as measures of social status. In
other words, the utility of conspicuous consumption in status competition was a concept
emic to the society. Florence was also interesting for not having an entrenched elite—
instead of the elites being hereditary aristocrats as was the case almost everywhere else in
Europe, the Florentine elite was more like elites today—membership was fluid and open
to change. Under those conditions, it seemed extremely likely that hypotheses based on
costly signaling theory were likely to be relevant.
Preliminary research found that Renaissance Florence also offered two ideal data
sets. The first data set was at least 100 Renaissance-era palaces that had been extensively
documented by architectural historians. I expected that I could locate many additional
palaces that had been largely overlooked by historians who had focused on the most
architecturally interesting and best-preserved palaces. This data set meant that I had a
source of information on a potential costly signal. The second data set was an incredibly
fine grained original documentary record of thousands and thousands of Florentine men
competing for dozens of republic-era government offices over the entire 1282-1532 span
of the Florentine republic. This data set meant that I had data on signalers and their
peers—approximately 20 percent of Florentine men participated in government office,
meaning the election data encompassed not only the upper end of the elites but also a
6

significant portion of the middle class. Because of the way this election data was
assembled by Florentine record-keepers, it also provided demographic data that could be
used to reconstruct male life histories and familial relationships. The elections data were
ideal because being considered for office and being elected to office was both a reflection
of existing status and a source of future status for Florentine men and their extended
families. The elections data meant that I had data on the signalers—the palace builders—
and their peers. The bulk of the study period was determined by the temporal range of the
elections data (1282-1532), but I also included the first several decades of the postrepublic Medici Duchy to evaluate the effects of dramatic social and political change on
palace construction.

Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation begins in Chapter 2 with an extensive discussion of costly
signaling theory and two alternative theoretical explanations for costly behaviors and
attributes that serve as alternative hypotheses in the data analysis. Chapter 3 is an
overview of Florentine history, focusing on the late 1200s to mid 1500s and paying
particular attention to economic history. Chapter 4 is an overview of the Florentine
republic’s election system and the related election data, important given the centrality of
election data to my research. Chapter 5 describes the Florentine palace data set, focusing
on the stylistic variation in these buildings. Chapter 6 describes the specific hypotheses I
test using the data described in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 7 presents the results of analysis
of the palace data and whether those palaces appear to be costly signals. Chapter 8
examines the elections data to determine whether palace builders benefited in
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reproductive or political terms by building their palaces. Chapter 9 presents the overall
conclusions, including the relevance of my findings to modern U.S. consumer behavior.
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CHAPTER 2. COSTLY SIGNALING AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
Human behavior that appears to defy basic cost-benefit logic, including building
enormous houses, is made possible by control of resources in excess of the raw minimum
needed to survive to reproductive age and ensure that offspring themselves survive. In
human populations where individuals vary greatly in their control of resources, a small
subset will control the resources that make monumental architecture and other grandiose
outlays of time, energy, and material possible. Although some monumental architecture
may be truly communal, the majority appears to have been constructed by societies in
which some individuals control much more resources than others, allowing them to
commission monumental constructions for their own use (Trigger 1990). Monumental
architecture is therefore “the most public material embodiment of the power of the upper
classes” (Trigger 1990:126) and one of the key identifying traits for socio-politically
complex societies with permanent, ingrained differences in status. But why do powerful
individuals need to do anything to demonstrate their ability to control resources? My
research is intended primarily as a test of one explanation—costly signaling theory. To
better understand my results, I compare hypotheses derived from costly signaling theory
with hypotheses derived from two alternative explanations also drawn from Darwinian
theory: waste behavior and indices. This chapter first discusses costly signaling, then
describes indices and waste behavior and how they differ from costly signals.

Costly Signaling
Costly signaling theory offers an explanation for the evolutionary logic behind
phenotypic attributes (whether physical characteristics or behaviors) that appear to lack
9

benefits that justify their costs to an organism’s energetic budget (Bleige Bird and Smith
2005; Bleige Bird, et al. 2001; Boone 1998, 2000; Gintis, et al. 2001; Grafen 1990a;
Johnstone 1995, 1997; Johnstone and Grafen 1992, 1993; Searcy and Nowicki 2005;
Zahavi 1975; Zahavi and Zahavi 1997). The question such attributes raise is why they
persist. From a Darwinian perspective, attributes must offer a selective benefit or be
selectively neutral, on average, to persist across generations. Costly signaling theory
proposes that some costly attributes persist because they serve to convey reliable
information about individuals’ underlying characteristics and because the information
benefits both the signaler and the signal’s audience. If delivering signals that convey
information has a cost, then that cost ensures that the signals are honest. In short,
costliness makes deception impossible or at least highly unlikely.
What this means in practice is exemplified by one of the clearest and bestdocumented cases of costly signaling, peacock tail feather displays (the following
example draws on research by Loyau, Saint Jalme, Cagniant, et al. 2005; Loyau, Saint
Jalme and Sorci 2005; Petrie and Williams 1993). These displays are costly to individual
peacocks—they require considerable energy to produce and maintain, and they impair
flight, exposing individuals to predation. Tail feather displays therefore appear to defy
basic Darwinian logic. Like all sexually reproducing organisms, male and female
peacocks have competing interests, as reproduction is much less costly in time and
energy for males than females. In theory, peacocks should therefore attempt to have as
many offspring as possible, while peahens should attempt to have the highest-quality
offspring possible. Costly signaling theory proposes that peacock tail feather displays
serve as “honest” signals of individual peacocks’ fitness-related qualities that cannot be
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directly observed. In the case of peacocks, the degree of elaboration of tail feather
displays correlates with individual peacocks’ genetic quality and their past and current
health state: the healthier an individual peacock, the longer his tail feathers and the more
eyespots in his display. In addition, the number of eyespots appears to correlate with
genes that provide the ability to maintain good health despite parasite infestation. The
information content of a costly signal helps both the signaler and the signal audience by
allowing both parties to rank interaction partners for the purpose of mate choice, alliance
formation, predation avoidance, or other interactions that result in the differential survival
of individuals in a population. For peahens, variation in peacock eyespots and tail feather
length allows females to rank males as potential mates. Males with more eyespots and
longer tail feathers benefit from their investment in tail feathers by attracting more
females and fathering more offspring—peahens that mate with peacocks with longer tails
have more offspring than peahens that mate with lower-quality males. Peahens benefit by
selecting peacocks with phenotypic and genotypic qualities that translate into healthy
offspring.
The Origins and Development of Costly Signaling Theory
Costly signaling was formalized in the 1970s through the work of the economist
Michael Spence and the biologist Amotz Zahavi, but the theory’s real creator may be
Thorstein Veblen, whose Theory of the Leisure Class proposed that wealthy individuals
consume goods and services conspicuously to demonstrate that they have sufficient
wealth to fund conspicuous spending (Veblen 1973 [1899]). Veblen noted that
conspicuous consumption was particularly important during periods of high social and
economic mobility, which made information on individuals’ status unreliable and subject
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to change, and that conspicuous consumption of goods was more important than
consumption of services among highly mobile populations because of the greater
visibility of material displays compared to behavioral displays. By analyzing the intensity
of conspicuous consumption, observers could rank the unobservable wealth of individual
consumers in much the same way that costly signals allow signal recipients to rank the
underlying qualities of signalers (Bleige Bird and Smith 2005).
The first formal description of costly signaling was Spence’s job market signaling
model, which addressed the problem of how employers can hire workers with the highest
future productivity when employers lack reliable information about prospective
employees’ future productivity on the job (Spence 1973). His model proposed that level
of education is a signal that a prospective employer can observe of an employee’s future
productivity, which a prospective employer cannot observe. The model says that
education is less costly in time and effort for high-productivity employees than for lowproductivity employees, making it an honest signal of an employee’s future productivity
on the job. This signaling model therefore explains why job applicants will invest in
education in keeping with their future productivity in the workplace. It also explains why
employers hire educated employees at high wages and less-educated workers at lower
wages. Spence’s model further says that the level of education that employers expect of
prospective employees must be low enough that high-productivity individuals will not
choose to forego that level of education but high enough to bar low-productivity
individuals from achieving the expected education level. The result is two “social”
equilibriums in education level: high-productivity individuals will opt for the minimum
level of education that is beyond the capabilities of low-productivity individuals, while
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low-productivity individuals will invest in the absolute minimum level of education
needed to get any job at all. The overall result is that the population of job seekers will
have a limited number of levels of education instead of a continuous distribution of
education levels.
Costly signaling as a biological theory was originally conceived by Amotz
Zahavi, who proposed that a signal will vary in intensity depending on the quality of the
signaler such that a signal is a “handicap” that only a high-quality individual can afford
(Zahavi 1975). Zahavi focused in large part on signals in mate choice situations.
Handicaps could appear and persist in mating situations if both the male signalers and
female signal recipients benefited from males’ ability to demonstrate their differences in
quality using signals.
Zahavi’s original conceptualization of “handicaps,” where only high-quality
males could afford them, received mixed support from models of the theory. These early
models found that handicap traits were unlikely to spread in a population if only highquality males could afford the handicaps. However, handicaps could evolve if the
intensity of the signal was linked to both the underlying quality being demonstrated by
the signal and to the viability of the signaler (for a review, see Searcy and Nowicki 2005).
This integration of handicaps and mating strategies made Zahavi’s handicap
principal an alternative to Fisher runaway processes (Fisher 1930) as explanations for the
evolution of elaborate phenotypic features. Unlike Fisher processes, Zahavi’s handicap
principle allows for long-term evolutionary stability of extravagant male displays and
female preference for elaborate males, while Fisher “runaway” processes do not explain
the evolution of evolutionarily stable outcomes (Eshel, et al. 2002). It is theoretically
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possible in costly signaling theory for high-quality males to signal so much more
intensely than lower-quality males that higher-quality males see a net reduction in
viability, but in such cases females will avoid mating with these over-signaling males and
the trait will not persist, preventing costly signals from reaching the extreme outcomes
possible with Fisher runaway processes (Noldeke and Samuelson 2003). Overall,
therefore, Fisherian runaway processes and costly signaling of good genetic quality may
be endpoints in a continuum (Kokko, et al. 2002). Bleige Bird and Smith note that Fisher
runaway processes may also apply to cultural evolution (sensu Boyd and Richerson
1985), although the existence of such processes has little empirical support (Bleige Bird
and Smith 2005).
Zahavi’s original “handicap” principle was not widely accepted until it was
formally proven in two papers by Alan Grafen demonstrating that costly signaling could
be an evolutionarily stable solution—in other words, that costly signaling could persist in
a population (Grafen 1990a, b). Grafen’s model predicts how the costs of signaling will
vary across individuals in a population. This variation stems from the benefits of
signaling to signalers’ reproductive fitness and from the negative effect of the cost of
signaling on signalers’ viability, or fitness exclusive of reproductive success (per
Maynard Smith 1985). Grafen’s model says that some individuals will be of high quality
such that they have large energetic budgets that allow them to signal at a high absolute
cost and to receive the greatest benefits. However, because these high-quality individuals
have large energetic budgets, high-cost signals represent a comparatively small portion of
their total energetic reserves. Costly signals for high-quality individuals are thus very
expensive in absolute terms but less expensive in relative terms. Low-quality individuals
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produce the least costly signals in absolute terms because of their smaller energetic
budgets, but they need signal only at a low level to distinguish themselves from even
lower-quality individuals and thus have a low proportional cost for signaling. These
variations in costs ensure that the magnitude of an individual’s signal correlates with that
individual’s unobservable quality and therefore that the signal is honest. The result on a
population level is that signal intensity will increase continuously with signaler quality—
every individual’s signal will be only slightly more intense than the signals made by the
next-highest-quality individual.
Grafen distinguishes between different types of handicaps. The construction of
palaces and most other behavioral signals are probably what Grafen calls a “strategic
choice handicap” (Grafen 1990a p. 539). In strategic choice handicaps, organisms decide
their level of signaling. Marginal costs for a particular level of signal are higher for lowquality than high-quality individuals. Alternately, palaces may be condition dependent
handicaps, but those are “approximations of strategic choice handicaps” (Grafen 1990a p.
540)
One limitation of Grafen’s original models is that they failed to recognize the
possibility of perception error by signal recipients. A later paper by Johnstone and Grafen
found that costly signaling could still be an evolutionarily stable solution if signalers who
signal at higher intensities will be accurately perceived as signaling at higher intensities
while signalers who signal at lower intensities may be misinterpreted as signaling at
extremely low levels (Johnstone and Grafen 1992). Johnstone later expanded this
model—still based on the original Grafen model—to treat signal intensity as a discrete
variable instead of a continuous variable (Johnstone 1994). The revised model’s intent
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was to determine whether the possibility that signal recipients could misinterpret signals
due to perception error could produce results analogous to the “all or nothing” displays
that are often observed in real behavior (Cullen 1966).
Johnstone’s all or nothing model predicts that signal intensity will not vary
continuously by signaler quality as predicted by Grafen’s original models, but will
instead increase in a series of steps or tiers. Below a particular quality level, individuals
will not signal at all because of the likelihood that their low-intensity signals will be
misinterpreted. As a result, those low-quality individuals’ absolute cost for signaling will
be at or near zero. Signal intensity jumps sharply for the middle-quality individuals who
are able to afford the minimum threshold cost of a signal that can be reliably interpreted.
The increase in absolute signal cost flattens out for high-quality signalers, presumably
because these individuals see a diminishing return on signals because of the small
number of even higher-quality signalers with whom they are in competition.
Johnstone’s model for the role of error has received empirical support from
findings indicating that exaggeration of signal intensity prevents misinterpretation and
beta error and is especially important when there are many signals in close proximity
(Wiley 1994). Another model supports Johnstone’s stepped distribution in its finding
that evolutionarily stable solutions are possible for situations in which costly signals
transmit partial information (not perfect information) with the outcome that signalers
display in particular ranges of values, not precise and continuously distributed values
(Enquist, et al. 1998). Johnstone’s model is also interesting for its similarity with
Spence’s job market signaling model, which finds stability for a binary system in which
low-productivity applicants invest almost nothing in education and high-productivity
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applicants invest the minimum needed to indicate high productivity and not more,
resulting in two tiers of signal intensity and making education an “all or nothing” display
(Spence 1973).
Grafen’s handicap model and therefore Johnstone’s error-prone signaling model
rested on a problematic assumption that was described in a series of papers by Thomas
Getty (Getty 1998; Getty 2006). Getty said that Grafen assumed that signalers trade the
viability costs of signaling for fitness benefits in a simple additive fashion—basically, a
unit of viability is exchanged for a unit of fitness. Getty said this assumption fails to
recognize that viability has continued benefits over an organism’s life history. If the costs
of signaling to viability are too high, the resulting reduction in the signaling organism’s
fitness can drop to zero—a dead organism cannot have offspring. Getty showed that
Zahavi was basically correct about the importance of signal costs in ensuring signal
honesty, but that the differences in costs between high and low quality signalers should
be decreasing proportional marginal costs.
Getty said instead that signalers might pay higher absolute costs for big signals
than lower-quality signalers pay for small signals. Alternately, higher-quality signalers
may receive greater fitness benefits from a given signal intensity, effectively reducing the
viability cost per increased unit of fitness. In either case, this approach essentially means
that high-quality individuals are high quality because they are more efficient at obtaining
and using resources (time, energy, etc.) more efficiently than low-quality individuals.
Higher-quality signalers do not “waste” more than low-quality signalers (Getty 2006).
Getty’s criticisms have been confirmed by mathematical analyses finding that
signaling does not need to be wasteful to be honest and that any trait may be exaggerated
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when other individuals use that trait to assess condition; what matters, therefore, is the
marginal cost of the signal for individual signalers (Bergstrom, et al. 2002). The
secondary sexual traits that dominate theoretical and empirical tests of costly signaling
theory often reflect both nutritional status and health, meaning that females who choose
males with costly secondary sexual traits may be selecting high viability, not high genetic
quality (Andersson 1986). Similarly, Nur and Hasson’s models of handicaps found that
“in nearly all plausible situations… those individuals displaying the greatest handicap
[and therefore receiving the greatest fitness benefit] will at the same time survive best,
and vice versa” (Nur and Hasson 1984). If signaling has too great an impact on viability
it may lead to the signal disappearing from a population—females will not mate with
males who signal at such high intensities that they dramatically reduce their viability
(Noldeke and Samuelson 2003). These findings mean that costly signals do not require a
tradeoff between fitness and viability in the way Zahavi originally predicted in order to
be costly or honest.
A final lesson of Getty’s reevaluation of signal costs is that signalers do not need
to increase their fitness via signaling to its theoretical maximum in order for signaling to
persist in a population. Instead, all signalers in a population only need to receive
increasing benefits as a function of increasing signal intensity or signals must be
exaggerated to account for receivers’ sensory bias or perception error (Getty 1998). This
conclusion fits nicely with my emphasis on Johnstone’ error-prone signaling model. For
the purposes of my research, I assume that Getty’s reevaluation of signal costs does not
invalidate Johnstone’s error-prone signaling model, but Getty’s work does indicate that a
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direct viability-fitness tradeoff may not be necessary and that signal intensity reflects
individual efficiency, not “waste.”
The Conditions of Costly Signaling
The theoretical work on costly signaling has shown that there are four conditions
necessary for costly signaling to appear and persist in a population of organisms. The first
condition is that individuals must vary in underlying and unobservable fitness-related
characteristics. In practice, these characteristics can be any attribute that relates to
resource holding potential (Boone and Kessler 1999) and differential efficiency in the
ability to obtain and use resources (Getty 1998; Getty 2006). In human beings, the
fundamental underlying quality may be general intelligence, which studies suggest
correlates very well with fitness (Luxen and Buunk 2006)1. General intelligence underlies
individual differences in social and career success and overall ability to navigate complex
daily tasks (Gottfredson 1997). General intelligence may be the root cause of differences
in health, and in modern societies may explain the correlation between health and socioeconomic status (Gottfredson 2004). Altruism has been suggested as a costly signal
specifically of general intelligence (Millet and Dewitte 2007). Ultimately, however, it is
theoretically valid to assume in keeping with Getty that the specific underlying trait being
signaled is not important so long as that trait is beneficial and inheritable and can produce
differential efficiency at obtaining and using resources. This approach to analysis allows
me to sidestep one of the consistent challenges for studies of costly signaling, the
difficulty of measuring quality in a given test case (Irschick, et al. 2007).

1

Luxen and Bunk (2006) further suggest that general intelligence may actually be a costly signal of fitness.
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Second, information about these characteristics must be valuable to interaction
partners and conveyable via perceptible signals. Costly signals must therefore be
phenotypic expressions and can thus include behaviors and physical attributes and, in the
case of human beings, artifacts (Dawkins 1982; Dunnell 1989b; Zahavi and Zahavi
1997). Costly signals can consist of multiple behavioral and physiological components—
they need not be limited to a single behavior (Hebets and Papaj 2005). These behaviors or
attributes are not necessarily present in organisms exclusively as signals. Many signals
are high-intensity versions of routine behaviors or attributes, although in some cases
selection leads to the evolution of distinct morphological or behavioral traits that serve an
almost entirely signaling function (Lotem, et al. 1999). Organisms can also use a range of
different signals for different situations, or can preferentially use a particular signal based
on their individual phenotypic strengths and the underlying quality they are signaling
(Johnstone 1996).
Third, individuals must have competing interests, such that false signals would
benefit the signaler but not the audience. To ensure that signals are honest, signal cost
and underlying individual quality must correlate such that high-quality individuals can
signal at higher intensity than low-quality individuals. The need for signaling in a
population and the intensity of the lowest-quality signals are determined by the quality of
the lowest-quality signalers, with higher-quality signalers adopting levels of intensity out
of reach of those lowest-quality signalers. Interestingly, Veblen viewed the system as
working the other way, with each socioeconomic class attempting to emulate the class
above such that conspicuous consumption was ultimately driven by the highest
socioeconomic class (Trigg 2001). However, high-intensity signals do not need to be
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extremely costly for high-quality signalers, as individuals with higher underlying quality
may pay lower marginal costs per incremental unit of signaling than those of lower
quality (Johnstone, et al. 1997). Moreover, signals need only to be reliable on average,
and occasional deception in a particular organism does not rule out the overall honesty of
a particular costly signal (Johnstone and Grafen 1993; Kokko 1997).
Signal intensity is defined as the total energetic cost of a signal to an individual’s
total energetic budget. A signaler’s energetic budget is determined by the sum effect of
genotypic or phenotypic attributes that contribute to differential individual ability to
obtain and control resources. This broad definition of quality follows from Getty’s
observation that costly signaling is driven not by the amount of “waste” involved in
producing a signal, but rather by the differential overall efficiency with which individuals
can obtain, use, and control resources that can be allocated to self-preservation, mating,
and other fitness-related tasks (Getty 2006). This definition differs from earlier
formulations of costly signaling, which stated that signals must be functionally related to
the qualities being signaled (Johnstone 1995). The actual costs of costly signaling can be
difficult to measure, and empirical tests have found the cost of many potential costly
signals to be insufficiently high to adversely affect fitness (Kotiaho 2001). In addition,
the tendency to conduct population-level evaluations of signal costs limits many
empirical studies’ validity because the tradeoff between costs and benefits operates on an
individual level (ibid.). In addition, signaling responds to changes in organisms’ ability to
extract and use resources as a result of fluctuations in their ecological, cultural, and social
environment. If these changes are frequent enough or rapid enough, they may complicate
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empirical analyses of signal costs. The use of individuals’ ability to obtain and use
resources as a source of energetic reserves for signaling therefore simplifies analysis.
The fourth condition is that signal audiences must use the information content of
signals to modify their behavior in ways that benefit themselves and the signaler. This
modification can involve mate choice, alliances, predation avoidance, or any other
change that increases the likelihood that the signaler has offspring and that those
offspring survive to reproductive age. Among human beings and other social animals,
one likely payoff for costly signaling may be increased status. Status is ultimately a
reflection of individuals’ social power to impose costs and dispense benefits to
conspecifics (Boone and Kessler 1999). Because of their social power, higher status
individuals or families have greater food security and are therefore better equipped to
survive downturns (Boone 2000). In human societies, high-status individuals tend to be
healthier than low-status individuals, even in comparatively simple societies, leading
some researchers to suggest that there is no basis for the long-held assumption that
human beings traditionally lived in egalitarian societies and that status differentiation has
considerable time-depth in human behavior (Ames 2010). Experimental results indicate
that individuals arbitrarily labeled as “high status” are able to obtain more resources from
others than individuals arbitrarily labeled “low status” (Ball, et al. 2001). Similarly,
experiments by Nelissen et al found that individuals wearing luxury brand-labeled
clothing received increased compliance, higher preference, and financial benefits relative
to individuals wearing label-free but otherwise identical clothing (Nelissen and Meijers
2011). In other words, status has a direct payoff in individual fitness and viability.
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The importance of individuals’ variation in their efficiency of resource acquisition
and control helps clarify the linkage between Veblen’s conspicuous consumption and
costly signaling (Veblen 1973 [1899]). Status is a reflection in part of individual resource
holding potential and the possession of inalienable commodities (Noë, et al. 1991), but
status must be earned by demonstrating that resource holding potential. Veblen
recognized that the conspicuous consumption of non-utilitarian goods could serve as a
status marker and allow observers to identify distinctions among individuals competing
for status. Costly signaling expands on this concept by linking status ranking and fitness
(see Bleige Bird and Smith 2005 for discussion).

Costly Signaling in the Social Sciences
Anthropology and Archaeology
Although generally considered to be the development of evolutionary ecologists
working on non-human organisms, costly signaling theory is in large part the result of
work in the social sciences (Cronk 2005). Costly signaling has been evaluated in a large
number of anthropological case studies and research questions (Bird and O'Connell 2006;
Bleige Bird, et al. 2001). Miller has proposed that costly signaling is responsible for the
evolution of some human cognitive capabilities and physiological attributes (Miller
2000). The theory has proven useful in interpreting male hunting practices in huntergatherer societies, both modern (Bleige Bird and Bird ; Bleige Bird, et al. 2001; Hawkes
and Bliege Bird 2002; Hawkes, et al. 2010; Smith and Bleige Bird) and prehistoric
(Hildebrandt and McGuire 2002; McGuire and Hildebrandt 2005). These researchers
have used costly signaling to explain hunters’ pursuit of prey with a low caloric return
relative to the time and energy needed to capture that prey and have quantified the
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benefits of costly hunting strategies among modern hunters in terms of reproductive
success and the ability to form alliances with high-status individuals. This relationship
between food sharing and costly signaling is not universal, however, suggesting that
human signaling behavior is culturally and environmentally mediated (Gurven 2005).
Costly signaling may be one mechanism that results in cooperation (Gintis, et al. 2001)
and altruism (Roberts 1998), with studies finding that individuals who share “selflessly”
often receive very tangible rewards (Rao 2001). In research on archaeologically and
historically known complex societies, Boone suggests that costly signaling is the
mechanism underlying Kwakiutl potlatch ceremonies (Boone 2000), Neiman has
examined Maya stelae and pyramids as costly signals of elite resource holding potential
(Neiman 1997), and Neiman and his colleagues have also applied the theory to the
archaeology of enslaved individuals in 18th century Virginia (Galle 2006; Neiman 2006).
Glatz and Plourde used costly signaling theory to explain how Bronze Age Anatolian
monuments functioned in competition between early states (Glatz and Plourde 2011). In
modern complex societies, researchers have used costly signaling to explain religious
behavior (Henrich 2009; Sosis and Alcorta 2003).
My case study differs in several ways from this previous work. The most
important difference is that my data sets allow me to evaluate individual-level signaling
behavior and individual-level benefits, something obviously impossible with prehistoric
studies. In addition, my data sets allow me to evaluate costly signaling in a large, highly
complex, market-based culture that more closely approximates our own modern
industrialized conditions than do case studies involving small hunter-gatherer groups.
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Economics and Market Research
Costly signaling has gained a large and growing following in economics and
market research (for overviews of recent research, see Connelly, et al. 2011; Kirmani and
Rao 2000). Below, I mention several examples to indicate the breadth of this research.
Costly signaling has been shown to explain why conspicuously expensive to produce
advertisements are more successful than less conspicuously expensive advertisements,
particularly in crowded and highly competitive markets such as soft drinks (Ambler and
Hollier 2004). Costly signaling theory has also been used to explain so-called Veblen
effects, when demand for goods increases because those goods are more expensive, not
because they are greater in quantity or quality (Bagwell and Bernheim 1996). Veblen
effects emerge when there are both inexpensive and expensive versions of the same
durable good; consumers able to afford the higher-price version will choose it rather than
a large quantity of inexpensive versions or higher-quality versions. This type of demand
makes taxes on luxury goods especially useful for revenue purposes, as the higher cost of
a heavily taxed product will only increase demand for that product (Miller 1975). Costly
signaling also explains the prominence of brand names in consumer goods. Low-cost and
high-cost consumer goods are less likely to have obvious branding than middle-cost
goods; subtle high-cost goods are preferred only by consumers seeking in-group status;
and people prefer obvious brands when in highly public contexts (Berger and Ward
2010). Similarly, experimental research finds that consumers use price and brand name to
evaluate the prestige of consumer goods, not their quality (Brucks, et al. 2000). Market
research based on costly signaling has also found that different subgroups within a
broader population choose to consume conspicuously—for example, different ethnic
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groups in the United States consume different conspicuous goods, although these
differences disappear when adjusted for income (Charles, et al. 2007). Economic models
indicate that the demand for conspicuous consumption goods may be driven by
individuals’ desire to distinguish themselves from the poor, not by a desire to appear to
be rich (Corneo and Jeanne 1997).
What these studies lack is measurements of Darwinian benefits—they do not
evaluate whether costly signaling paid off in terms of fitness. Individuals in highly
industrialized, media-saturated modern consumer societies may behave as if their
purchases operate as costly signals, but those purchases may have virtually no actual
benefit (Miller 2009). My data sets allow me to evaluate whether costly signaling had
benefits in a society that had some characteristics in common with modern cultures but
that had far fewer consumer goods and much less pervasive branding and advertising.

Alternatives
Costly signaling does not explain all costly attributes—not all signals are costly
(Maynard Smith 1994), and not all costly attributes are signals. By explicitly recognizing
the possibility of alternative hypotheses, I hope to produce more interesting and useful
results than simply rejecting the null hypothesis (Stephens, et al. 2007; Towner and
Luttbeg 2007). I can produce answers other than “costly signaling” and “not costly
signaling.” I consider two alternative explanations to costly signaling as an explanation
for palace construction: that palaces are indices, or that palaces are a form of waste or
conservative bet-hedging behavior.
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Indices
One alternative of considerable significance to the proposed research is that some
costly attributes are indices, a category of behaviors and attributes first defined by John
Maynard Smith (Maynard Smith and Harper 1995). Indices are physical or behavioral
attributes that are directly tied in a hardwired fashion to the trait of interest to observers
(Maynard Smith and Harper 1995), a definition that Maynard Smith himself recognized
as vague and requiring additional thought (Harper 2006). One example is roaring by red
deer, the loudness of which may be linked to body size (see Searcy and Nowicki 2005 for
discussion). More broadly, indices may be thought of traits that scale allometrically with
other traits in the same way that some ornaments scale allometrically with body size
(Kodric-Brown, et al. 2006) or how specific portions of the brain scale with body size
(Finlay and Darlington 1995). The intensity or cost of the index trait is only high enough
to convey the information the trait needs to convey (Maynard Smith and Harper 1995).
Because indices are directly physiologically linked to the trait of interest, they cannot be
deceptive. In contrast, costly signals involve traits where deception is a possibility, and
the costs of costly signals are therefore higher than necessary for purely information
purposes because the additional cost guarantees their honesty (ibid.). To evolve, costly
signals would have been selected for at some point by signal observers changing their
behavior toward signalers in response to the signal (ibid.).
Although indices are sometimes defined as being cost-free because of their
hardwired relation to other attributes (Hasson 1997), another definition sees the costs of
indices as being purely developmental (Vanhooydonck, et al. 2007; Vehrencamp 2000).
This latter definition requires that costly signals have a viability cost in exchange for their
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fitness benefit while requiring that indices have costs that contribute to viability and
fitness (Vanhooydonck, et al. 2007). For example, red deer pay a cost to be large and
therefore to roar loudly, but that cost is purely developmental and is therefore spread out
over their early life history and does not reduce individuals’ viability.
Interestingly, Spence’s model of job-market signaling also discusses indices. In
Spence’s definition, indices are observable and unchangeable, where signals are
observable and changeable, albeit at a cost (Spence 1973). Spence says that indices have
information content only if regularities emerge in repeated observations of correlations
between an index and another quality. In Spence’s example, if high-productivity women
tend to have higher educations than high-productivity men, then "women" becomes an
index of higher productivity. Indices thereby create the possibility for multiple signal
equilibria across a population due to combination with signals.
Although indices are generally conceived of as being physiologically constrained
(Vanhooydonck, et al. 2007), indices could, in theory, include traits that are
environmentally or socially constrained. One example may be the practice in India of
brides wearing dowries in the form of gold jewelry (Roulet 1996). In this case, the signal
(the jewelry) is not a proxy indicator of the quality being displayed (the family’s
investment in the bride); instead, the jewelry and the quality being signaled are
effectively the same.
Indices are poorly defined, a fact admitted by Maynard Smith (Harper 2006).
There are two primary problems with the index concept, and I believe the lack of a solid
definition may be the root cause. The first problem is that there is no good reason to
distinguish between developmental costs and other costs (Searcy and Nowicki 2005).
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Moreover, signals may have both a developmental cost—the cost involved in producing
the physical attribute used to make the signal—and a cost of the signaling behavior itself
(Dawkins 1993). Both types of costs could come at the expense of fitness or viability,
depending on the organism, attribute, and behavior in question.
That potentially false distinction in types of costs is related to the second problem
with the index concept. A good phenotypic trick (sensu Dennett 1995) can undo the
direct linkage between an index and its related attribute. In the case of the red deer
example, researchers have found that individual deer can manipulate their vocal chords to
maximize roar volume, albeit at an energetic cost, thereby creating a disconnect between
roar volume and body size and therefore bringing deer roars more in line with
expectations for costly signaling (Searcy and Nowicki 2005).
“Waste” or Bet Hedging
Another important alternative explanation of costly human behavior is Robert
Dunnell’s theory of waste, which posits that actions such as the construction of
monumental architecture lower population size by reducing fecundity and provide a pool
of time and resources that can be reallocated to subsistence or reproduction under less
than ideal conditions (Dunnell 1999). Dunnell’s basis for the theory was the question of
whether it was possible for short-term reductions in reproductive success to translate into
improved long-term fitness. Dunnell suggested that all human activity could be classified
as directly connected to reproduction and survival, waste, or biological or cultural storage
(Dunnell 1989a) . He suggested that engaging in non-reproductive “waste” behavior
(defined as any behavior that did not contribute to reproduction or survival) would keep
population sizes below carrying capacity by diverting time and energy from reproduction
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and into “waste” activity. This waste activity would then provide a pool of “excess” time
and resources that could be reallocated to subsistence, reproduction, or storage when
necessary to ensure survival.
Dunnell further posited that waste would be most beneficial and therefore most
likely to appear and persist in environments with large scale and unpredictable
environmental variation caused by variation in resources themselves or by changing
intensity of competition for those resources. Note that “large scale” and “unpredictable”
are meaningful only in comparative terms. It is therefore probably more useful to see this
component of the waste theory as stating that in a given area, populations in portions of
the area with relatively less predictable or larger-scale environmental variation are more
likely to engage in waste behavior than populations in portions of the area with more
predictable and/or smaller-scale environmental variability. Waste behavior will only
spread later to areas with more predictable environments and regularly high overall
productivity (Aranyosi 1999).
This model has been applied primarily to public ritual facilities (for example, see
Aranyosi 1999). Graves and Ladefoged expanded Dunnell’s theory to the role of
intergroup aggression and integration, suggesting that waste behavior that focuses on
integrative ritual architecture will tend to occur in areas that have sponsored intergroup
aggression and that provided leadership for integration (Graves and Ladefoged 1995).
Such ritual facilities symbolize, create, and maintain social structures and, perhaps most
important for my research, benefit individuals who have access to the pooled labor
needed to build ritual facilities. This relationship between ritual facilities and symbols of
social structures means that waste can have an information component, like costly
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signals, although in the case of waste the information is not the point but rather a
secondary feature.
Note that Dunnell’s bet hedging is in part a reaction to the oversimplification of
classic cultural evolution, which suggested that monumental architecture was a reflection
of increased productivity (Graves and Ladefoged 1995); In contrast, the waste hypothesis
is a more nuanced response to finer-grained fluctuation in productivity (Shepardson
2006).
Dunnell drew theoretical support for waste from the biological literature on bet
hedging (Dunnell 1999). In biology, researchers distinguish between two types of bet
hedging, conservative and diversified (Philippi and Seger 1989). Both types are strategies
that reduce variance in the fitness of offspring when organisms live in unpredictable
environments that lead to widely varying juvenile mortality. Diversified bet hedging
involves having a large number of offspring to maximize genotypic and phenotypic
variation in the hope that some variants will be well equipped to survive unpredictable
environmental conditions (Donaldson-Matasci, et al. 2008; Ellis, et al. 2009).
Conservative bet hedging involves reducing the total number of offspring in favor of
having a smaller number of higher-quality offspring who are then better equipped to deal
with a range of environmental conditions (ibid.). Both strategies have been proven
experimentally to work in bacteria populations (Beaumont, et al. 2009)
Selection favors diversified bet hedging when environments are variable across
individuals and favors conservative bet hedging when environmental conditions can
affect entire populations and occur on generational time scales (Ellis, et al. 2009). To
offset this lower yearly reproductive success, species in highly variable environments
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often have longer lifespans (Nevoux, et al. 2010). Interestingly, a computer simulation of
Dunnell’s waste hypothesis found that populations in highly variable and unpredictable
environments that engage in waste behavior will have longer lives than populations that
do not engage in waste behavior (Madsen, et al. 1999). Genetic and behavioral evidence
suggests that both conservative and diversified bet hedging have considerable time depth
in human beings, possibly emerging as much as 200,000 years ago (Ellis, et al. 2009).
Boone and Kessler suggest that conservative bet hedging could benefit human
populations even if environmental crises are infrequent but severe by allowing individual
lineages to obtain more status and use that status to provision offspring during famines
(Boone and Kessler 1999). Researchers in biology have made the similar observation that
the costs of costly signaling may be in reduction in future reproductive success rather
than in viability (Kotiaho 2001). This theoretical tack links costly signaling and
conservative bet hedging into a single package of related behaviors involving a tradeoff
between maximizing the number of offspring and maximizing status that can be used to
provision offspring (Shepardson 2006).
The conservative and diversified strategies are not mutually exclusive. In theory,
the relative frequency of diversified and conservative strategies in a population may
oscillate in response to very long term changes in environmental conditions that favor
one or the other (ibid.). However, this theoretical oscillation raises another possibility: it
may be possible for bet hedgers to be outcompeted by non-bet hedgers in a process
similar to a Hawks and Doves game, rendering bet hedging evolutionarily unstable
(Grafen 1999).
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The utility of indices and “waste” or conservative bet hedging is in pointing to
alternative hypotheses for use in interpreting the pattering in in my data sets. I will
evaluate the goodness of fit of the data with hypotheses based on costly signaling versus
indices and with hypotheses based on costly signaling versus waste. Those hypotheses
will be detailed in chapter 6, but I first turn to the historic context, a detailed discussion
of the Florentine election system and how that data will be used, and a detailed discussion
of the record of standing Renaissance palaces and how that data will be used.
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CHAPTER 3. THE HISTORIC CONTEXT
Over the course of the middle ages and Renaissance, Florence experience
dramatic economic, social, political change and transformed from a small remnant of the
Roman empire to the locus of a new Mediterranean world economy, then to a marginal
player in a new world of nation-states. This chapter is intended as a very high-level
summary of the city’s history, particularly its political and economic history. Doing real
justice to the period’s complexities would require hundreds, if not thousands, of pages.
This summary is drawn from many sources (Brucker 1969, 1977; Cochrane 1973; Hale
1977; Hearder and Morris 2006; Hibbert 1994; Schevill 1961). Because of the
importance of the political system in understanding the data on palace builders, the
government’s offices and electoral procedures during the republic era are covered in
detail in the next chapter.
Florence was founded in the final decades of the Roman Republic, around 59 BC.
The city measured less than .8 kilometers east-west and less than .8 kilometers northsouth, and included baths, temples, capitol, forum, and an amphitheater, all in a standard
Roman grid. The population is estimated at 10,000 in the second century AD. Due to
plague, political instability, invasions, and other factors, the population dropped to about
1,000 in the 500s, when the Lombards invaded northern Italy and established a military
ruling class. Although Venice, Naples, and the Exarchate of Ravenna (which would
become the Papal States) remained independent, Florence became part of a Lombard
duchy. In the 750s, the Franks invaded Lombard Italy. In 756 the Frankish king Pepin
gave the Exarchate of Ravenna to Pope Stephen II, and in 774 Pepin’s successor
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Charlemagne confirmed Pepin’s decision, making the Papal States officially independent
but in fact control by the Frankish throne. In 781, Charlemagne named his son Pepin
"King of Italy," starting the imperial practice of crowning their sons as rulers of the
peninsula. In 800, Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne Holy Roman Emperor. After
Charlemagne’s death, his heirs divided the empire and never fully integrated Italy with
the rest of their territories. Local Italian rulers were then drawn into the frequent
competitions between French and German claimants to the Imperial crown. The Papacy
was a constant player in these contests. Pope Gregory VII, who took office in 1073,
sought to expand Papal authority, leading then-Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV to depose
the pope. In turn Gregory VII excommunicated Henry, in part with support from
Countess Matilda of Tuscany, who made Florence the official seat of the Tuscan
government. "A pattern was beginning to emerge in Italian history as rulers from beyond
the Alps used Italy as a battleground, but through their rivalries created a power vacuum
in which cities could acquire autonomy and grow in size as refugees entered from the
countryside. And in the cities dynamic the life of the commune was beginning to develop
as de facto republics emerged." (Hearder and Morris 2006, p. 53-54).
Matilda's successors as ruler of Tuscany proved unpopular with Florentines, who
ignored their Imperial overseers and established de facto independent rule. The city was
transformed, increasing in population from about 2,500 in the 700s to about 20,000 by
the mid 1000s and 30,000 by 1170s, when new city walls were built to incorporate the
expanding suburbs. Powerful noble families began to move from estates outside the city
to the city itself, building the towers that would characterize the skyline until the late
1200s. These urban nobles began to use their private armies to attack rural Tuscan nobles
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and even small Tuscan towns. They also began to intermarry with the emergent class of
wealthy merchants. This mixed noble and merchant elite soon took complete charge of
the city’s government, including military affairs and guilds.
In response to this and other Italian mischief, Emperor Frederick I “Barbarossa”
invaded Italy in 1154. His forces were defeated in 1176 by the Lombard League of Italian
states, which did not include Florence. As part of the terms of defeat, in 1187 Frederick
formally recognized the independence of several northern Italian city-states, including
Florence. Frederick died in 1190, and was replaced by Henry VI, who died seven years
later. Henry’s succession was disputed between his Hohenstaufen house represented by
Constance of Sicily and the rival Welf (or Guelph) house represented by Henry’s son
Frederick. With papal support, Frederick II eventually became Holy Roman Emperor in
1215. The Guelf party therefore became the Papal party in Italy, while the Hohenstaufen
house represented Imperial interests and was known as the Ghibelline faction for the
family’s rally cry, “Hie Weibling.” Florence became one of several proxy battlefields for
competing Guelph and Ghibelline interests. Villani (Villani 1906 [1348]) attributes the
beginning of Florentine violence associated with the broader conflict to the assassination
in 1216 of Buondelmonte dei Buondelmonti, an urban noble. When Frederick II was
crowned emperor by Pope Honorius III, he named his illegitimate son Frederick of
Antioch the empire’s overseer of Florence. This act made the Ghibelline faction
ascendant over the Guelph faction. In 1248, Guelph families left Florence for their rural
castles, and the Ghibellines pulled down 36 Guelph towers. However, Frederick II was
soon excommunicated for his failure to organize a crusade, then died in 1250, destroying
Ghibelline power in Italy. The Guelph faction returned to Florence, defeated and exiled
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Ghibelline forces, and destroyed more than 100 palaces, almost 600 houses, 90 towers,
and many businesses, according to contemporary Florentine historians (Machiavelli 2010
[1525]; Villani 1906 [1348]). The Guelph party then established a new Florentine
government headed by a foreign Capitano del Popolo and a council of 12 anziani, two
from each district of the city. The new Florentine government attacked Siena, which had
become a Ghibelline refuge, but lost the war, allowing the Ghibelline faction to retake
power in Florence. Meanwhile, Pope Clement IV refused to recognize the new emperor,
Manfred, instead favoring his Guelf rival Charles of Anjou. In 1266, Charles defeated
Manfred at the Battle of Benevento, making the Guelf party ascendant in Florence and
elsewhere and allowing the Florentine Guelf party to expel the Ghibellines party from the
city.

The Republic Era, 1282-1532
Pre-Reform Republic Period, 1280-1343
Under Guelph government, Florence gained the basics of the political, economic,
physical, and demographic conditions that would persist until the Medici duchy. The
city’s streets were paved with stone, replacing the earlier brick, the population reached
about 45,000 by the end of the 1200s, and banking and wool dominated the economy. In
1282, the Guelph government formally instituted guild-based government by electing the
first six Priori delle Arti, with each Prior representing a different district of the city and a
different one of the seven major guilds. Most of the previous governors of the city had
been nobles, not guild members. For the first decade of republican government, Priors
were elected in large part by the outgoing Priors in consultation with the major guilds. In
1292-1293, the government instituted the “Ordinances of Justice,” which enfranchised
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some of the minor guilds and created the position of Gonfaloniere di Giustizia
("Standard-bearer of Justice") to execute judicial sentences pronounced by the Podestà
(the chief judicial official, who was always a foreigner) and to lead the guild militia. The
ordinances also barred the hereditary nobility (or “magnates”) from office, although the
truth may be more accurately stated as being that families associated with internal
warfare were declared magnates to justify their banning from political life (Becker 1965).
The “magnates” formally identified in 1343 and in other years included a mix of ancient
feudal noble lineages and new families that had grown wealthy through trade, suggesting
that designation as “magnate” was a means of marginalizing specific individuals
(Klapisch-Zuber 1997). This use of the magnate designation continued until 1434.
The nobility and some members of the guild of lawyers and notaries almost
immediately began a campaign to overturn the Ordinances of Justice, but were opposed
by the militia, workers, and members of lesser guilds. The effort also failed because of
competing interests between two factions within the alliance of nobles and the guild of
lawyers and notaries; the “White” faction of nobles (which included Dante and Petrarch)
and the “Black” faction of merchants and bankers. These factions engaged in running
street battles until the Blacks drew on their alliance with Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303)
to have the Whites exiled. Boniface had allied with Charles of Valois, brother of the
French King Philip IV. Boniface’s successors, Clement V (1303-1316) and John XXII
(1316-1334) moved the Papacy to France, where it would remain until 1377.
Hoping to end Guelf-Ghibelline conflict in Italy, Emperor Henry VII launched an
expedition to Italy in 1310-1313. Although the Pope initially endorsed the campaign, he
soon shifted his alliance to Florence and the other Italian cities that resisted the imperial
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assault. When Henry VII attacked Florence, the city was prepared for a siege, and
Henry’s assault collapsed due to disease and a lack of food. Henry withdrew to Pisa and
died of malaria in 1313. The remnants of Ghibelline power in Italy sought to capitalize on
Henry’s death by planning an attack on Florence, which responded by temporarily
accepting oversight of the city government by the Kingdom of Naples in exchange for
military assistance. When the Neapolitan overseer left in 1328, Florence returned to
republican government. In 1342, republican government was again interrupted when the
city’s army commander, Count Gauthier di Brienne of France, the Duke of Athens, was
voted Lord of Florence for a year to address the economic crisis created by the collapse
of the Bardi, Peruzzi, and Acciaiuoli banks. Although the Duke of Athens had originally
drawn on popular support, this support vanished when he imposed new taxes and he was
forced to flee the city. However, the lesser guilds retained some of the power they had
gained through their support of the Duke of Athens after his departure. In response, the
greater guilds imposed several limits on political office-holding: officers had to be born
in the city of fathers also born in the city and they had to be free of Ghibelline sympathy,
a rule that could in practice be used to eliminate any perceived enemy of the state who
could not be barred for other reasons.
Post-Reform Republic Period, 1343-1433
In the early 1340s, the population of Florence reached as high as 100,000 to
120,000 people, and work began on a new line of city walls that would ultimately stand
into the mid 1800s. But much of this newly enclosed space would remain empty for
centuries: the Black Death reached Italy in 1347 and Florence in 1348, followed by
severe outbreaks in 1363, 1374, 1383, and 1400. The population was devastated,
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dropping to approximately 42,000 individuals by 1348. Like other Italian governments,
Florence froze most wages, doubled doctor’s salaries, imposed new limits on
immigration and emigration, and increased penalties for crime. These measures were
intended to control the disease itself and to reduce the risks of political instability. Note
that there is considerable scholarly debate on the actual pre- and post-plague population
of Florence, producing a wide range of estimates (Day 2002).
In 1375, mercenaries under Sir John Hawkwood entered Florentine territory to
extract bribes in exchange for promises not to pillage cities. Florence believed
Hawkwood's actions to be at the behest of his former employer, the Papacy, and declared
war on the pope, in part because dissident alleged “Ghibelline sympathizers” believed
that war would hurt the pro-Papacy Guelph party. In response, the Guelph party planned
to stage a coup and seize control of the Florentine government, but the Ghibelline faction
and lower-class supporters discovered the plans and attacked Guelph party members’
palaces. This strife culminated in 1378 with the Revolt of the Ciompi, when lower-class
wool workers (ciompi) demanded the right to form a guild and forced the officials of the
existing government out of the city.
Under the guild regime of 1378-1382, office was open to all guilds (not just the
major guilds and a small number of minor guilds as was previously the case), and the
government worked closely with guilds on policy decisions. However, the regime placed
limits on membership—cloth laborers were excluded despite (or because of) their role in
the Ciompi revolt, and the small number of magnates who were allowed to participate in
government were barred from many offices. In 1379, the sons of foreign-born fathers
were barred from office. Thus, despite initial promises of greater openness, the
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government after the Ciompi revolt quickly came to be dominated by a small number of
individuals—Bendetto Alberti, Tommaso Strozzi, Giogio Scali, Uguccione de' Ricci,
Bettino Covoni, Bernardo Velluti, Giovanni Dini, Paolo Malefici, Donato Ricchi, and
Tommaso Guidetti. In January 1382, reports of a possible coup against these individuals
led to yet another period of intra-city conflict between competing interest groups. When
resolved, this political infighting once again left the greater guilds in power. However,
eligibility requirements for government office were loosened, allowing more artisans and
craftsmen to enter office, and the years from 1382 to 1433 are considered to be the most
broadly democratic in the republic’s history.
By the early 1400s, a new group of powerful individuals—especially Niccolo da
Uzzano (who built a palace in 1415), Gino Capponi, and Maso degli Albizzi—gained
behind-the scenes influence over political office. At Maso degli Albizzi's death in 1417,
power passed to his son Rinaldo degli Albizzi, who built a palace in 1418. However,
Rinaldo’s lack of political skill led to accusations that he mishandled a military campaign
in 1428. Support began to build for a competing faction that included the Medici,
particularly Cosimo de Medici.
Cosimo was born in 1389 to Giovanni di Bicci de Medici, who founded a bank
and owned a wool manufacturing business. Giovanni held political office several times
and was considered a supporter of the lower classes. Under his guidance, the Medici bank
became incredibly successful, in large part by capturing all Papal business under Pope
John XXIII (1410-1415) and his successors after the end of the Avignonese “captivity” of
the Papacy and the reunification of the Papacy in Rome in 1420. When Giovanni died in
1429, he left his business to Cosimo and his brother Lorenzo. Cosimo married a member
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of the powerful Bardi family, and was also allied with the Portinari, Malespini,
Cavalcanti, and Tornabuoni families. In 1433, Rinaldo Albizzi brought charges of treason
against Cosimo, who bribed his jailers and fled to Venice. When the Albizzi and their
associates Rindolfo Peruzzi and family, Palla Strozzi and family (who built a palace in
1420), and Giovanni Guicciardini and family (the owners of a palace built in around
1380) banished Agnolo Acciaiuoli, a member of another old family, upper-class support
began to shift to the Medici and their allies. In 1434, the ruling class assembled to appoint
a new Balia to eliminate anti-Medici forces from political office, end Medici exile, and
banish members of the Albizzi, Peruzzi, Guasconi, Strozzi, Guadagni, Guicciardini, and
other families.
Medici Oligarchy Period, 1434-1494
On his return, Cosimo de Medici became de facto ruler of the city, and by the mid
1450s (after the Medici palace was built) all government decisions underwent Medici
vetting. The taxation system was used to ruin, then banish, critics. However, the
constitution and political institutions were largely unchanged, and several political
challengers emerged during the period. Medici support for Francesco Sforza’s claim to
the Duchy of Milan proved extremely costly to the Medici and required new taxes in
Florence. Efforts by Neri Capponi and Gianozzo Manetti (both from palace-owning
families) to back Sforza’s enemies in Italy failed, however, and the Medici were not
ousted. Similarly, during a recession in 1458, Lucca Pitti launched efforts to reduce
Medici power (interestingly, the same year as he began work on his palace). However,
the effort actually increased Medici power by leading to the exile of some of the family’s
opponents.
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When Cosimo died in 1464, his son Piero retained power, but with new
opposition from Niccolo Soderini, who used his time in political office to have some
Medici controls over the government eliminated. After Soderini left office, support built
for a more aggressive assault on Medici power led by the Party of the Hill, so called for
their association with Luca Pitti and his enormous palace. Leading members included
Agnolo Acciaiuoli (whose family had owned palaces since the 1300s or even earlier) and
Diotsalvi Neroni (a former Medici confidante who built a palace next door to Cosimo in
1446). When Duke Francesco Sforza of Milan died and named his son Galeazzo Maria as
successor in 1466, the Party of the Hill called for ending alliance with Milan in favor of
alliance with Venice. When Piero Medici learned of these plans, he borrowed 10,000
florins from a cousin to buy bread, wine, and weapons to arm a mob to defend his palace.
Francesco Sassetti, a business associate of Piero’s, met with the Party on the Hill
members and arranged a deal under which they could remain in the city and eligible for
office.
Piero died in 1469, and Medici authority and business operations passed to his son
Lorenzo. In 1473, Lorenzo signed an alliance with Galeazzo Sforza of Milan and broke
up a Papal-Neapolitan alliance against Florence by forming a political relationship with
the Neapolitan despot Ferrante. Meanwhile, Lorenzo delayed responding to a loan
request from Pope Sixtus IV because of Lorenzo’s concern about Papal territorial
ambitions. The Pope turned instead to the Pazzi bank. The Pazzi bank’s representative in
Rome told Jacopo de' Pazzi, the head of the family, that he had created an anti-Medici
conspiracy that included the pope's nephew Girolamo Riario, Lord of Imola, as well as
Francesco Salviati, the Pope's nominee as Archbishop of Pisa who has been barred entry
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to Tuscany by Lorenzo de' Medici. The conspirators attacked the Medici at the cathedral
of Florence on 26 April 1478 (two years after construction of the Pazzi palace), killing
Lorenzo's brother Giuliano, but failing to assassinate Lorenzo. The conspirators also
seized the Palazzo della Signoria, but the city hall was quickly retaken by the city militia.
Francesco and Jacopo de' Pazzi were executed, Pazzi property was seized, and Pazzi
family men and men married to Pazzi family women were barred from office. In
response, the Pope excommunicated the Medici and their supporters. In 1479, Lorenzo
negotiated peace, and his success allowed him to create a new council to supersede the
existing city government. Pope Sixtus IV was replaced in 1484 by Innocent VIII, who
allied with Lorenzo. Distracted by politics, Lorenzo let Medici banking operations falter,
reducing the family’s wealth.
Late Republic Period, 1494-1532
Lorenzo died in 1492 and was replaced by his son Piero. In 1494, the French king
Charles VIII invaded Italy to attack Naples. Piero met with Charles and negotiated
neutrality for Florence. On his return to Florence, his appeasement of France led to the
Medici being exiled; Piero died in exile in 1494. The radical cleric Girolamo Savonarola,
who had moved to Florence in 1481, negotiated neutrality for Florence and seized control
of the city’s government. Under Savonarola, the city’s government was reformed to add a
new sovereign body, the Consiglio Maggior of 3,000 members, some of whom also sat
on an 80-member Consiglio Minor. Savonarola advocated against luxury and against
merchant activity, eventually alienating large portions of the Florentine population. He
also made enemies with Pope Alexander VI, who opposed the French presence in Italy.
Alexander VI formed a league including Venice, Milan, and Spain, but Florence refused
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to participate. In 1498, Savonarola was hanged due to Papal condemnation. Piero
Soderini was selected as Gonfaloniere for life. In 1503, Pope Alexander VI died, and his
replacement Julius II started wars against Bologna, Perugia, and Venice in an effort to
expand Papal power. Julius II initially asked for French and Spanish support, but later
called for the expulsion of foreigners from Italy. The Papal army was decimated by
French forces in 1512, but the French then retired from the field due to threats of invasion
of France by Spain and England. The Pope's forces were left free to march on Florence
with an army that included Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, the 36-year-old second son of
Lorenzo. When Papal forces neared Florence, Medici supporters in the city demanded the
resignation of Gonfaloniere Soderini. Cardinal Giuliano de' Medici entered Florence in
September 1512, disbanded the city militia, and placed Medici supporters in office. Three
years later, Cardinal Giovanni de Medici was named Pope Leo X.
Meanwhile, Medici supporters appointed Lorenzo, the son of the Piero Medici
who died in exile in 1494, as the unofficial head of government. Lorenzo became
increasingly authoritarian, requiring that government meetings take place at the Palazzo
Medici, not Palazzo della Signoria. Lorenzo died in 1519 after marrying a cousin of
Francois I, King of France. His heir was his daughter Caterina, so the Archbishop of
Florence, Giulio de Medici, the pope's cousin, was made head of the Florentine
government. When Giulio left for Rome on Leo X's death in 1521 (where he remained
after becoming Pope Clement VII in 1523), two Medici bastards were placed in charge of
Florence: Ippolito, the illegitimate son of Giuliano de Medici, and Alessandro, who was
officially the illegitimate son of Lorenzo but who was rumored to be the son of
Archbishop Giulio de Medici and a slave or cousin.
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Pope Clement VII antagonized Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, who attacked
Rome in 1527. Florentines then exiled the Medici, reestablished the militia, and named
Niccolo Capponi as Gonfaliniere for a year. However, Clement VII negotiated peace with
Charles V and agreed to crown him in Rome; in exchange, Charles V agreed to reinstall
the Medici in Florence. Niccolo Capponi argued for appeasement of the Papacy, but his
proposal was rejected and he was replaced by Francesco Carducci, who bolstered
defenses, increased the size of the militia, and placed Michelangelo in charge of
designing defenses. Charles V’s forces besieged Florence in 1529 and the city
surrendered in 1530. Historians view Charles’ invasion as a critical milestone in the
history of the modern nation-state: his huge army was beyond the financial means of
Florence and other small states, which would never again be able to play the pivotal roles
they had before the 1500s.

The Medici Duchy Era and Beyond, 1533-1860
In 1533, Francesco Guicciardini, the pope's representative, appointed Alessandro
de' Medici (one of the Medici bastards) as head of government with the title Duke of
Florence. Alessandro became increasingly authoritarian, ordering construction of a fort
designed to both defend the city and to suppress rebellion and impounding all privately
owned weapons. Alessandro was assassinated in 1537 by his distant cousin and carousing
partner Lorenzino de' Medici. Francesco Guicciardini recommended that succession go to
Cosimo de' Medici, a direct descendant of Giovanni di Bicci de’ Medici. Cosimo was
named Duke of Florence in 1537, and immediately eliminated all traces of republican
government. In 1569, Cosimo was named Grand Duke of Tuscany. Hereditary Medici
rule lasted until 1737, when the family died out and power was seized by the Hapsburgs
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of Austria. The Duchy of Tuscany joined Italy in 1860, and Florence was capitol of Italy
from 1865 to 1871, when parts of the city were modernized, the city walls largely torn
down, and the population finally returned to pre-plague levels.

What the Historic Context Means
History as generally written involves only the most powerful members of the most
powerful families. However, my research cuts across the artificial line of men who
appear in the historiography of Renaissance Florence and the men who appear only in the
details or original historic documents. While many powerful individuals built palaces, not
all did. My analysis largely ignores global political history and its players, instead
focusing on the decisions made by dozens of palace builders, many of who left little trace
in Florentine historiography. Where all these men did appear is in the election records,
which I describe in detail in the next chapter. At the level of the election data, the status
of the most powerful member of the Medici does not receive any greater a priori
analytical weight than any other member of the politically active class. At the level of my
palace data, the Medici palace has no greater a priori analytical weight than any other
palace. Instead, my data focuses on the individual election results, individual life
histories, and individual decisions regarding palace construction to understand the day-today history that underlies the sweeping Europe-wide history of invasions, dynasties, and
geopolitics. My data therefore are about the essential stability of the republican
government, sociopolitical fluidity, and economic opportunity that characterized Florence
during my study period.
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Economic History
The republic era in Florence was accompanied by structural changes in the
economy. The old nobility had drawn its wealth from rural landholdings, ensuring
economic stability for noble families from year to year and across generations. Wealth for
the newly wealthy merchant class was far more volatile. Mercantile wealth was a product
of individual skill, business contacts, and luck, and a series of bad decisions or bad luck
could quickly destroy a merchant’s fortune. But the payoff for those who succeeded
could be enormous. The obvious standouts were the Medici, who went from new
immigrants to the city in the 1200s to the city’s de facto rulers in the 1400s to rulers of a
territorial state with marriage ties to the French throne in the 1500s.
In broad terms, the Florentine economy can be characterized by explosive growth
mixed with sharp recessions from the mid 1200s to about 1500, followed by a period of
economic maturity and slow growth that continued well past 1600. In the 1200s,
Florentine merchants began to expand their economic reach to Tuscany and later to
northern Italy and the western Mediterranean, and focused on raw materials and new
markets for the nascent wool industry, as well as imports of wheat and other food.
Beginning in the mid 1200s, merchants dramatically expanded their international activity,
building extensive trade networks that reached as far as the Levant and England for raw
materials, southern Italy for food, and northern Europe for sales of wool cloth. Florentine
bankers began to loan enormous sums to foreign rulers, and the Florin became the de
facto international currency in Europe soon after the first coins were minted in 1252.
From an ecological or geopolitical perspective, this expansion of trade and finance
transformed Florence’s effective catchment area—the area from which the city drew
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resources—from Tuscany to the entire Mediterranean. In other words, the wealth of
Renaissance Florence came not from a small region, as it had in the 1100s and earlier, but
from most of the known world (Baccini 1996). In essence, Florence imported carrying
capacity from its trading partners (Rees 1996).
The banking industry suffered a massive crisis in 1344, when the English King
Edward III defaulted on loans made by the Bardi and Peruzzi banks. The economic
situation deteriorated further in 1348, when the plague reached Florence and the
population collapsed. Trade recovered after 1350, fueled by the expansion of the wool
cloth industry and the new silk industry to new markets in France, the Papal States, the
Ottoman Empire, and Germany. Meanwhile, Florentine bankers created the world’s first
large international exchange markets in Geneva and Lyons and became the primary
bankers to the Papacy during and after the schism of 1378 to 1420.
Beginning around 1500, Florentine merchants and bankers began to lose ground
to foreign rivals as Northern European economies expanded. The Genoese dominance of
Spanish finances beginning in 1492 pushed Florence out of important trade and banking
markets in Naples and Northern Europe. Meanwhile, Genoa and other Italian cities began
to mint their own gold coins, ending the dominance of the florin in international finance.
However, individual Florentine families and companies remained economically powerful
in the 1500s, and many sixteenth century Florentine businesses were much larger than
their fifteenth century predecessors. Although the 1500s have not been studied as
thoroughly as the 1400s, there is evidence that the late years of the republic and early
years of the Medici duchy are better considered a period of economic maturity rather than
economic decline (Goldthwaite 2009). The economic stability of the early 1500s came in

50

spite of warfare on the Italian peninsula. In particular, the poor may have fared especially
well by exploiting new job opportunities made possible by a wartime economy. Elites
may also have benefited from war, using insider information about foreign and domestic
policy and international diplomacy that they gained while holding political office to
manipulate the market for government bonds; however, this strategy also would have
meant less investment in industry (Lachmann 2003).
Despite these fluctuations, republican rule and economic expansion in Florence
produced a level of socioeconomic opportunity rare by the standards of late Medieval and
Renaissance Europe. Even the poor experienced economic opportunity, with wages for
unskilled laborers increasing significantly after the plague of 1348 (Brown 1989).
Overall, wages increased dramatically after the plague, remained high into early 1400s,
then increased sharply again between 1420 and 1460. After 1460, wages began to drop
slowly, then declined sharply after the 1520s. General economic prosperity and the
benefits of post-plague wage rates for the poor produced a remarkably equal distribution
of wealth. The Florentine tax assessment of 1427 suggests that wealth may have been
more equitably distributed in Florence than in the United States in the 1990s
(Goldthwaite 1995; Goldthwaite 2009; Herlihy, Klapisch-Zuber, et al. 2002) (Table 1).
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Table 1. Distribution of wealth, Florence in 1427 and the United States in 1995.
Wealth
Top 1%

Florence 1427

U.S. 1995
27.0

38.5

Top 5%

54.1

60.3

Top 10%

68.9

71.8

Top 20%

84.2

83.9

Top 40%

99.7

95.3

Source: (Goldthwaite 1995; Goldthwaite 2009; Herlihy, Klapisch-Zuber, et al. 2002).
The 1427 tax assessment, which recorded extensive data on household wealth,
suggests that many Florentine households were quite comfortable, with 63 percent of
households falling in Goldthwaite’s middling or higher brackets before deductions, a
figure that included dependents, debts, and other exemptions from household wealth for
taxation purposes (Table 2). The catasto also exempted personal dwellings in calculations
of total wealth before deductions. Goldthwaite estimates that the catasto did not record
approximately 6000 to 7000 desperately poor households, including servants, the
homeless, and residents of religious orders. Even with that expanded number of
households, 37 percent of all households fell in the middling or wealthier brackets. Note
that Goldthwaite’s “poor” and “propertyless poor” categories consist of households with
less wealth than an unskilled construction worker could earn in a year. I assume that all
palace builders were part of the upper rich bracket.
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Table 2. Distribution of wealth in 1427 catasto.

Class

Range of Wealth
(Florins)

Upper rich
5001+
Upper middling 1001-5000
Middling
101-1000
Lower middling 36-100
Poor
1-35
Propertyless
0
poor
Total
Source: Goldthwaite 2009.

Wealth Before Tax Deductions
Percentage of
Number of Percentage of
Total Wealth Households
Households
45.93
372
3.8
37.24
1,747
17.86
15.91
4,027
41.18
.75
1,172
11.98
.18
1,031
10.54
0
1,431
14.63
9,780

It should be noted that the 1427 catasto was unique in its breadth of data
collection. Earlier tax assessments were unduly influenced by individual assessors’
personal evaluations of household wealth (a problem the 1427 catasto attempted to
address), and later tax assessments evaluated only real estate held for investment
purposes. Unfortunately for my purposes, this means that it is impossible to assess the
household wealth of the vast majority of palace owning households. Only three palaceowning households in my data set can be found in the catasto, one Albizzi household
with 17,864 florins in total investments and a palace I estimate to have cost 7,412 florins,
one Da Uzzano household with 50,869 florins in total investments and a palace I estimate
to have cost 8,735 florins, and one Strozzi household with an absurd 162,906 florins in
total investments and a palace I estimate to have cost 5,941 florins. These three
households were the 60th, 8th, and 1st wealthiest households in the 1427 catasto.
However, 1427 was well before palace building increased dramatically.
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For most of the merchant elite, success was unstable from year to year or
generation to generation. Business investments were by nature volatile. For example, the
Bardi family never regained its financial prominence its bank collapsed in the 1340s.
Florentine parents from all classes paid large dowries for their daughters and split their
remaining estates roughly evenly among their sons, requiring sons to build fortunes of
their own. Constant intermarriage broke down barriers between the merchant elite, the
old aristocracy, and newly arrived families. Fluidity also resulted from the linkage
between business success and elite. Membership in the financial elite was therefore
tenuous, with considerable turnover. Between 1352 and 1480, only about 25 to 40 percent
of Florentine families persisted in the wealthiest top 10 percent wealth bracket from one
twenty-five-year census to the next, and only about 40 to 55 percent of Florentine
families persisted in the top 25 percent (Padgett 2010).
Women were marginalized, both economically and socially. However, women did
have some control over family fiscal policy, including the transfer of money and real
property, through a combination of legal statutes, family influence, and the ability to
convert dowries into gifts for their offspring (Kuehn 1996).
This fluidity in the elite was the result in part of the constant influx of new
residents to the city, including many immigrants who became guild members and
therefore eligible to participate in politics. The result was a steady increase in the number
of individuals in the pool of potential office holders, from 5,350 in 1382 to 8,000 in 1484
(Herlihy, Litchfield, et al. 2002).
The business relationships that fueled Florentine economic growth were less
strictly commercial than business ties today. Letters written by Florentine merchants and
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bankers make frequent references to the importance of two-way flows of products and
finances and of mutually beneficial trade relationships between Florentine businessmen
to such an extreme that Padgett says the relationships sound almost like competitive gift
giving, but “Unlike the potlatch, this economic-cum-social exchange behavior did not
lead to ruin” (, p. 6Padgett and McLean 2003). The creation of commercial credit
relationships generally preceded election to high government office, such that business
success and financial status translated into political success and political status (ibid.)
The elite began to close doors to new members during the Late Republic and
Medici Duchy, when the adoption of primogeniture increased the concentration of wealth
in a smaller number of individuals (Emigh 2003). The increasingly wealthy rich also
began to set themselves apart in other ways, such as by founding private schools and
avoiding professional activity that involved manual labor, including retailing.
The wealth of the Florentine Renaissance fueled a surge in the purchase of
consumer goods, a phenomenon that appears to be a hallmark of the appearance of cities
that dominate world trade (Braudel 1984; Fisher 1948; Schama 1988). Many middle- and
lower-class Florentines purchased paintings, and the 15th century painter Neri di Bicci
recorded selling nearly a quarter of his products to members of the artisan class (Antal
1986; Goldthwaite 1995; Goldthwaite 2009). Sculptors made copies of their works in
multiple materials for sale at different price points (Goldthwaite, 1995). Books became
increasingly affordable in the late 1400s (Jardine 1996). Imports of oriental rugs, Moorish
and Spanish pottery, and other goods increased in the 1400s. Over the course of the
1400s and early 1500s, middle-class households saw an increase in home ownership
(reaching at least 73 percent), savings, employment of servants, consumption of meat,
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and consumption of durable goods, all suggesting increased wealth (Goldthwaite 2009).
Clothing appears to have been a particularly significant area of consumer spending. A
total of 96 sumptuary laws were passed between 1281 and 1531, with sharp increases
from about 1360 to 1420 (probably in response to higher wages and thus greater spending
by the lower classes following the plague) and again from about 1470 to 1480. The vast
majority of sumptuary laws targeted women’s clothing, although some were also
designed to limit spending on funerals and other public family rituals, and these laws
were enforced equally against all classes, even the wealthy and feudal nobles (Killerby
2002; Rainey 1985). This spending has led some researchers to call the Renaissance the
birthplace of modern consumer culture (Goldthwaite 1995; Jardine 1996). It also helped
to fuel economic growth in Florence, as the majority of artistic output was purchased
from Florentine artisans by Florentine buyers.
But while Florentines of all socio-economic levels bought art, the artisan
economy of the 1400s and 1500s was driven primarily by increasing consumption of
durable goods by the wealthy. After the first part of the 1400s, tax burdens decreased and
political situation stabilized, confirming merchant elite domination of government. The
1427 catasto and associated procedures produced a tax system that focused on objective
valuations of investments, not wages or salaries and not personal assessments of
individuals’ taxable wealth. This tax system “may have played a part in freeing the rich
from the fear that conspicuous consumption made them vulnerable to taxation”
(Goldthwaite 2009, p. 378).
Merchant elites did buy land, but they appear to have used this land as a business
investment, not as a strategy of emulating noble feudal landowners. Rural villas were
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rare, and land was managed in ways to maximize profits and minimize owners’
management burden (Emigh 2003). The Florentine elite did not hoard cash or easily
convertible luxury goods like jewels and plate. For example, a colossally expensive suit
of parade armor made by Benedetto Salutati in 1469 that was worth about 4,500 florins
(as much as a small palace) was melted down immediately after it was used and
converted back to money. Instead, elites consumed massive amounts of clothing and
furnishings for altars. “The rich spent even more on personal adornment than on
furnishings for their homes, and the difference becomes ever more notable through the
sixteenth century” (Goldthwaite 2009 p. 381). Men began to wear clothing as luxurious
as women, a point where Florence differed from Venice, where elite men wore uniforms
reflecting their political office (Wills 2002).
The demand for private chapels led to the construction or extensive renovation of
some 140 churches between 1348 and 1648, and church construction projects were
increasingly designed to maximize the number of chapels that could be sponsored by
wealthy donors (Goldthwaite 1995). These chapels were incredibly expensive—in 1464,
Bongianni Gianfigliazzi estimated his chapel in Santa Trinita could be built and
decorated for 2,600-2,700 florins, half what he thought his palace was worth (ibid.).
But as Gianfigliazzi’s estimate suggests, it was palaces that constituted the
ultimate in elite conspicuous consumption. In very broad terms, palaces appeared in the
late 1200s, became slowly more common over the course of the 1300s, then became a
fixture of the urban landscape in the 1400s, especially after Cosimo de Medici built his
palace in 1444. The rate of construction of elite palaces dramatically reshaped large parts
of the city. For example, the Palazzo Strozzi replaced four small houses, nine shops,
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some with living quarters, and two large buildings, one with three shops and the other
with a tower (Goldthwaite 1995). Construction labor became difficult to find as workers
took jobs on palace projects, and so many palaces were built that contemporaries
expressed concerns about the availability of housing for the lower classes. It is these
palaces that my research focuses on, and I discuss them in detail later in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 4. THE FLORENTINE ELECTION PROCESS
The Florentine republic chose its officials through a mix of a democratic electoral
system and a random drawing of lots that was overseen by—and sometimes manipulated
by—the politically powerful. The process produced a remarkable documentary record
that made my analysis possible. The richness of that documentary record is a reflection in
large part of the openness of the Florentine political system. Political office in the
Republic was open to adult male guild members who held a share of the public debt, a
system of forced loans to the state in exchange for interest payments. This portion of the
population has been estimated at 5,000 to 6,000 individuals in the late 1300s, or roughly
8-10 percent of the population (Brucker 1969, 1998). The government had dozens of
executive offices, and these positions changed hands every few months. Guilds had their
own governing officials. These government and guild bodies remained in place and
politically important even during the republic’s dominance by the Medici from 1434 to
1494. Indeed, selection for office may have been more a reflection of approval during
these periods, when election procedures came under indirect Medici control (Hale 1977).
Florentines viewed holding office and even being evaluated for eligibility to be marks of
social status (Herlihy, Klapisch-Zuber, et al. 2002), making the election records a critical
data set in my analysis by serving as a measure of individuals’ status. This chapter
therefore presents a grossly simplified overview of the political process; vastly more
detail can be found in the extensive literature on the subject (Najemy 1982; Padgett 2000;
Rubinstein 1997; Stephens 1983).
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Government Offices
Prior to the establishment of de facto self government in the 1200s, Florence and
many other Italian cities were ruled by consuls who shared power with local bishops.
These consuls were selected by a variety of methods, including by councils, by general
assembly, and in some cases by lot, a system intended to reduce the risk of corruption.
Consuls co-ruled with podestas, the first of whom were appointed by Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa in 1162. The office of podesta was usually filled by a non-native of the city
and was expected to oversee justice and internal security.
Florence’s republican guild-based government that was created in 1282 to replace
the consul and podesta was led by the three executive branches of the tre Maggiori. In the
government’s original form, the top offices were the six priors, each representing one of
the six divisions of the city (the Sestieri) and each representing a different major guild
(the guilds of lawyers and notaries, merchants, money changers, wool masters, silk
masters, doctors and apothecaries, and furriers and leather masters). For the first decade
of the republic, Priors were selected through consultations between the outgoing Priors,
senior members of the major guilds, and other influential parties. Priors held office for
two months, during which time they were required to live in the Palazzo della Signoira.
The priors were assisted by a notary who was selected using the same procedures. The
Priori initiated all legislation, which was developed with the advice of two councils, the
Buonuomini (who numbered 12 and who held three-month terms) and the Gonfalonieri di
Compagnia (who numbered 16 during most of the Republic and who held four-month
terms). In some cases, legislation was given final approval by very large Consiglio del
Popolo or Consiglio del Comune consisting of hundreds or thousands of adult male guild
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members. In certain circumstances special temporary ad-hoc commissions were created
to oversee specific political issues. In 1293, the political system was revised slightly to
include some minor guilds in political life and to bar all nobles from office. The 1293
reforms also created a seventh prior, formally called the Gonfaloniere di Giustizia
(Standard-bearer of Justice), who led the guild militia and was responsible for executing
judicial sentences pronounced by the Podestà, who as under the pre-republic system was
a foreigner and the chief judicial official. The Gonfaloniere di Guistizia held office for
two-month terms.
In 1328, the system of drawing lots for office was created. Under this system,
adult male guild members voted by neighborhood for who would be eligible to
potentially serve in government office. Candidates had to be enrolled in one of the guilds
and (at least initially) to actually exercise a trade. This step was called the scrutiny, which
was supposed to take place every five years. The names of the individuals with the most
votes were then placed into bags, the “borse.” The actual timing of new scrutinies and
assembly of new borse was subject to political manipulation—it could be to the
advantage of the group in power to delay holding a scrutiny and creating new bags of
eligible names. However, political crises generally led to new scrutinies. For example, a
new scrutiny was held and new borse created immediately after Cosimo de Medici was
recalled from exile in 1434.
The borse containing the name slips were stored by monks in the sacristy of the
Basilica of Santa Croce. Every two to four months, depending on the office, the borse
were taken to the Palazzo della Signoria and opened in the presence of the Gonfaloniere
di Giustizia, the Priors, and other officials. Extractions of names by the Notaio of the
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Riformagioni, an administrative official, began with the oldest existing borse. Names
were drawn and their current eligibility for office was determined. Initial extraction from
the bags meant that a man had been "seen.” To be “seated” in office, the “seen” man had
to be reviewed for several criteria: he could not have held office too recently, he could
not have immediate family members currently in office, he had to be at least 40 years old
for the office of Gonfaloniere di Guistizia and at least 30 years old for other offices, he
had to be physically in the city, and he could not be in tax arrears. Names were also
drawn of dead men, who were not seated but whose names were often retained in the
borse. Names were drawn until the right number of office holders was "seated."
Although designed to prevent corruption and abuse, the process of selecting office
holders by lot was subject to a certain amount of interference. By the 1340s, candidates
were sometimes pre-selected prior to the neighborhood-level elections, thereby limiting
the pool of potential office-holders to individuals considered loyal to the de facto ruling
party. The use of these measures increased under Albizzi dominance in the late 1300s and
further still under the Medici oligarchy.
In 1343, following the attempt of Walter of Brienne to assume the Lordship of
Florence, the groups who defeated him implemented several reforms of the system of
selection for the highest offices. They removed the prohibition against nobles holding
office, although the change lasted less than a year, continuing magnates’ increasing
political and social marginalization (Klapisch-Zuber 1997). The new power brokers also
redistricted the city from six Sestieri into four Quartieri, each subdivided into four
Gonfaloni, which helped to organize the populations living in land newly enclosed by the
walls completed in 1334. Finally, they settled on the number of office holders that would
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remain in place until the end of the republic: one Gonfaloniere di Giustizia; one Notaio;
eight priors, two from each quarter; election of priors both from both the Arti Maggiori
and Arti Minori; 12 Buonuomini, and 16 Gonfalonieri di Compagnia, one from each of
the four Gonfaloni.
The power of the tre Maggiori began to decline in 1480, when some executive
power shifted to a new Council of Seventy. The tre Maggiori’s power further declined
with the creation in 1494 of the Consiglio Maggiore, a body with more than 3,000
members that suspended the old electoral system and instead substituted a system of
selection by the Consiglio through Electors (who were themselves ineligible to hold
office). The Consiglio Maggiore was disbanded in 1512 when Cardinal Giovanni de’
Medici entered Florence. The political system was restored to its pre-1494 form, although
with de facto control of elections again in the hands of the Medici party as it had been
during the Medici oligarchy from 1434 to 1494. The Consiglio Maggiore was replaced by
a Senate of 70 and a Council of 100. It was restored during the brief period of non-Medici
government between 1527 and 1530. When the Medici were restored and named
hereditary rulers in 1532, elections ceased and the old political offices were replaced by a
Magistrato Supremo that reported directly to the Duke and that stood over a Senate of 48
members and a Council of 200 members.

Guild Offices
The government during the republic ultimately rested on a base of trade guilds
and their members. The city’s first guild, the Arte di Calimala (the merchants’ guild) was
founded sometime between 1150 and 1200. The remaining guilds were founded in the
1200s. After guild government emerged full-force in the 1300s, guilds lost most of their
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traditional economic functions and instead became mostly political entities. Many
members had no actual related business activity, and many individuals were members of
multiple guilds.
The city had seven major guilds and 14 minor guilds. Unlike most Italian cities,
guilds were not created to oversee new professions and industries; instead, existing guilds
were broadened. For example, the silk guild grew to include upholsterers, embroiderers,
mercers, feather merchants, and goldsmiths. The seven major guilds were the Arte dei
Giudici e Notai (lawyers and notaries); the Calimala or Mercatanti (merchants); the Arte
del Cambio (money changers); the Arte della Lana (wool masters); the Arte della Seta or
Por S. Maria (silk masters), the Arte dei Medici e Speziali (doctors and apothecaries); and
the Arte dei Vaiai e Pellicciai (furriers and leather masters). The fourteen minor guilds
were the Arte dei Beccai (butchers); the Arte dei Calzolai (shoemakers); the Arte dei
Fabbri (blacksmiths); the Arte dei Linaiuoli e Rigattieri (linen drapers and used clothes
dealers); the Arte dei Maestri di Pietra e Legname (builders); the Arte dei Vinattieri (wine
sellers); the Arte di Albergatori (innkeepers); the Arte di Oliandoli e Pizzicagnoli (oil
dealers and sausage and cheese sellers); the Arte dei Cuoiai e Galigai (minor leather
masters); the Arte dei Corazzai e Spadai (armorers); the Arte dei Coreggiai (belt makers);
the Arte dei Chiavaioli (locksmiths); the Arte dei Legnaioli (carpenters); and the Arte dei
Fornai (bakers).
As with guilds elsewhere in pre-modern Europe, the guilds in Florence enforced
manufacturing and production standards and settled internal disputes. The guilds were
governed by a group of consuls who were drawn by lot—using basically the same
scrutiny and lottery process as political offices—from the pool of eligible guild masters.
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Consuls served for four-month terms; the number of consuls varied from guild to guild.
Because Florentine guilds were so intertwined with political office, guild membership did
not necessarily reflect an individual’s profession. The Medici and other families were
members of multiple guilds. The nobility joined guilds in increasing numbers in the
1400s to participate in government. Many guild members had interests in multiple
professions, and their membership in a particular guild was therefore a matter of choice
and politics.
In addition to guild consuls, guild election records include the six members of the
Mercanzia, or commercial court. Magistrates were drawn from the five most commercial
major guilds (the Mercatanti, Cambio, Lana, Seta, and Medici e Speziali) with a sixth
member from one of the minor guilds. The Mercanzia participated in the drawings for the
tre Maggiori. It also oversaw bankruptcy, fraud, commercial dealings with foreign states,
and other economic and legal issues, and enforced guild consuls’ judgments against their
members and oversaw the selection of those consuls. In the late 1400s, the Mercanzia lost
importance due to changes in the election system promulgated by Lorenzo de Medici.

The Scope of the Electoral Data
My analysis uses the election data encoded by David Herlihy beginning in the
1960s and since recoded for dissemination via the Internet (Herlihy, Litchfield, et al.
2002). For several reasons, Herlihy’s election data for the tre Maggiori is not complete.
The names of individuals seen but not seated for the positions of Gonfalonieri di
Giustizia, Notai, and Prior before 1345 are not included. The names of men seated on the
Buonuomini and Gonfalonieri di Compagnia are missing for the years before 1329, for
the years 1348-49, and for some years from 1355 to 1404. Men seen but not seated for tre
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Maggiore offices between August 1497 and October 1512 are missing due to the
suspension of old procedures in favor of the Consiglio Maggiore. Herlihy’s guild election
data starts for the year 1393. Due to lost volumes of original records, election results are
complete only for 1393 to 1421, 1429 to 1443, 1465 to 1474, 1480 to 1497, and 1507
through 1532. Birth records start in 1429, the year the Florentine government began
requiring all potential office holders born after 1381 to register their year of birth.
Because the tre Maggiori, guild, and birth records include first name, multiple
patronymic names, and surname, it is possible to use the elections data to create rough
genealogies—all but a tiny fraction of the records include the father’s name and usually
the grandfather’s name as well. The demographic data that appears later in this
dissertation use the election records to determine the number of sons fathers had and the
ages at which those fathers’ had sons. The election records are admittedly spotty, but they
still contain some 166,000 records of individual births and individual draws for guild and
government office (Table 3). They are most complete for the Medici oligarchy period and
least compete for the pre-reform republic period. Fortunately, they are not incomplete for
particular families or individuals, and I believe that my analysis would not be
dramatically altered if more complete records existed. To overcome potential issues with
missing data, my analysis using election records evaluates counts of tre Maggiori office
draws and seats separately and overall draws and seats separately, and breaks the analysis
down into subperiods to allow for comparisons of palace builders and palace builder
families with their temporal peers.
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Table 3. Number of records in election data.
Election Data Set

Number of Records

Tre maggiori

c. 82,000

Guild elections

c. 63,000

Birth records

c. 21,000

Source: Herlihy, Litchfield, et al. 2002.

The Significance of Being Drawn and Being Seated for Office
Participation in tre maggiori and guild offices was both a reflection of existing
status and a source of future status. Because it required popular approval from residents
of the neighborhood, being placed into the bags for tre maggiori office was a mark of
high status at the neighborhood level, even if that person’s name was never drawn for
high office. Similarly, being drawn for guild office even without being seated was a mark
of high status in a professional organization. In the case of both guild office and tre
maggiori office, popular approval of eligibility for office on the neighborhood or guild
level was a result in part of patronage relationships. Candidates who were successful at
the neighborhood level were probably successful because they had existing small-scale
patronage relationships and had promised once in office to provide their supporters with
additional patronage that had real financial value, such as favorable tax assessments
(Padgett 2000).
Being elected to government office was also a reflection of past business
relationships, according to an extensive statistical analysis of election and economic data
(Padgett and McLean 2003). That study found that the more likely men were to have
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commercial credit relationships, the more likely they were to have served together in high
government office. In most cases, these commercial credit relationships were formed
before men served together, such that election to office followed several years of active
business activity. “Indeed election to political office was the republican method for
translating economic wealth into public recognition and status. Through this electoral
method, economic and political elites, while not at all identical, became correlated. This
electoral connection was one institutional device that ensured that Florentine
businessmen behaved in social-exchange as well as economic-exchange terms….
Otherwise, they would not get elected to political office, with all the status consequences
for them and for their family which that implied.” (Padgett and McLean 2003, p. 27-28).
Once seated in government office, men could use their positions to make good on
their promises of patronage for their supporters; they could also use their positions to
create patronage relationships with Florentines from the lower and middling classes
(Goldthwaite, 2009). While in office, government and guild officials would have created
new social and business networks with their peers, particularly when serving as priors,
who were required to spend their two-month terms housed together in the Palazzo della
Signoria. But most importantly, office holders would have been in control of Florentine
government policy. Lorenzo de’ Medici said that public finance and taxation were the
primary issues of state policy and therefore the primary concern of office-holders (Kent
2004). Office-holders could shape policy to benefit themselves and their allies. For
example, Florentine state finances depended in large part on a series of forced loans that
paid very high interest rates, making them safe and valuable investments. By setting state
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policy regarding the size, timing, and source of these loans, office-holders could provide
direct financial benefits to particular groups or individuals.
Not surprisingly, Florentines viewed election to office as a critical element in
family status. Families kept lists detailing which members had served in which offices,
and extended families considered the year when the first family member served as a prior
to mark the family’s entry into the ranks of the city’s elite, and they often referred to
offices as “honors” (Kent 2004). My use of the elections data as a measure of social
status would therefore be recognizable to Florentine elites.
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CHAPTER 5. AN OVERVIEW OF FLORENTINE PALACES
The shift in Florence to republican government coincided with a massive
construction spree. The new republic began several huge publicly funded construction
projects, including the cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore (beginning 1296), the Palazzo
della Signoria (beginning 1299), and new city walls (beginning 1299). Roughly 140
churches were built or extensively renovated between 1348 and 1648. Religious,
government, and other public construction projects were overseen by committees of
private individuals, including individuals who had contributed funding to the projects.
While sitting on these committees, individuals learned about project management,
architecture, style, and architects, and they used that knowledge to produce another
architectural legacy of the Florentine renaissance, palaces (Goldthwaite 1995). Palaces
changed stylistically over the course of the republic era. Those stylistic changes and their
temporal pattering were the starting point for my research; this chapter discusses the
changing face of Florentine elite domestic architecture between the foundation of the
Republic and into the early years of the Duchy.
In broad terms, palaces first appeared in the mid to late 1200s as simple stonefaced structures with little obvious “style.” Prior to the appearance of the recognizable
palaces that stand today, elites lived in rambling urban compounds that consisted of
multiple, barely integrated structures. The early palaces were characterized by features
designed as much for function as for aesthetics: many early palaces incorporate clearly
defensive features such as towers, and all palaces built before the late 1300s have
multiple ground-floor doorways that opened onto warehouse and storefront space.
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Despite their functionality and stylistic simplicity, the early palaces were still recognized
as such when they were built—early chroniclers made a distinction between domestic
architecture as a whole and “palazzo” (for example, see Villani 1906 [1348]). In the late
1300s, palaces began to change dramatically. In place of multiple warehouse or storefront
doorways, palaces began to be designed with a single main entrance. Façades became
more elaborate, and interiors gained formal colonnaded courtyards. The best-known
palaces of the 1400s expand on the basic stylistic elements of the late 1300s but were
much more elaborate, with far more complex stone façades, greater variety in the
treatment of details such as window surrounds and string courses, and more symmetry.
But beyond the best-known palaces of the 1400s, entirely new styles appeared that used
stucco in place of costly stone for façades. These simpler and less-expensive styles came
to dominate construction in the late 1400s and early 1500s, but they were still considered
palaces when built: Francesco Baldovinetti, in his list assembled in the mid 1500s of
landmark structures built between 1487 and 1520, calls several of these stucco-façade
structures “palazzi” but says that many would “now be considered merely large houses”
(Ginori Lisci 1985; von Fabriczy 1905). In other words, “palazzo” was a term that
described buildings that contemporaries considered the most opulent dwellings. Stylistic
diversity increased again in the 1500s, when the comparatively sober Renaissance styles
began to be supplemented by Mannerist aesthetics that emphasized experiment and
variety.

Identifying the Palaces
My first step in identifying palaces was the extensive architectural historical
literature on Florentine palace construction (Bucci 1971; Carlini, et al. 2001; Ginori Lisci
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1985; Mandelli, et al. 1989; Vannucci 1995; Wirtz 2000). I also referred to contemporary
accounts that described palaces in sufficient detail to determine their address; particularly
useful was a list of the ownership and location of palaces that was assembled in the early
1500s by Francesco Baldovinetti, who lived from 1477 to 1545 (von Fabriczy 1905).
Using these sources, I was able to identify 135 palaces built between the late 1200s and
1600. I suspected that these palaces were the best-preserved and most architecturally
significant examples and that most modern authors overlooked palaces that were in poor
condition or architecturally uninteresting. I also suspected that these identified palaces
were the structures with the best-documented history—their dates of construction are
well known, as are their owners, architects, and other details. These 135 palaces were
plotted on aerial photographs using ArcGIS software; Ginori Lisci’s maps of the exact
spatial extent of palaces he described were particularly useful. The result was a GIS
polygon shapefile of all palaces identified by previous architectural history research.
Each GIS record was associated with a spreadsheet record with the building’s
construction date, its owners, its renovation history, its stylistic details, and its size. I also
used the work of architectural historians to build a catalog of stylistic attributes that
architects have identified as being associated with specific ranges of construction dates.
I then overlaid the GIS-based aerial photographs with an axonometric map of
Florence drawn in 1584 by Stephano Buonsignori, a monk employed as a map maker by
the Florentine Grand Duke Francesco I (Figure 1). Buonsignori’s map is astonishingly
precise and accurate. On a building-by-building level, however, it is only precise and
accurate for the 228 landmark structures Buonsignori labeled (a list that includes 28
palaces). For example, Buonsignori’s depiction of the Palazzo della Signoria, the Uffizi,
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and the Ponte Vecchio shows the details of the landmark buildings to be basically correct
and the relationships between blocks to be basically correct (Figure 2). Part of the
difference between Buonsignori’s map and aerial photographs is due to a slight difference
in perspective—aerial photographs are taken from a nearly vertical position over the city,
while Buonsignori drew his map from a hill south of the city. However, the largest
difference is between the widths of streets as depicted by Buonsignori and as they
actually exist. Buonsignori drew streets wider than they actually were, I suspect as a way
of ensuring that those streets were visible in his map, as many streets in the city are so
narrow that they are invisible even on modern high-resolution aerial photographs.
Buonsignori was also inaccurate in his depictions of individual non-landmark buildings.
Buonsignori’s map therefore proved less than useful in identifying individual buildings as
“palaces,” but it was essential in identifying land that was not developed in 1584 and in
identifying the land associated with monasteries and convents. This information allowed
me to identify city blocks that were built up by 1584 and that therefore potentially
contained palaces that were not documented by architectural historians.
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Figure 1. Stefano Buonsignori's 1584 map of Florence.
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Figure 2. Detail of Buonsignori's 1585 map overlaid on a modern aerial photograph.
Buonsignori’s map was also used in conjunction with aerial photographs and
architectural historical research to create GIS polygon shapefiles of the boundaries of
monasteries, convents, churches, blocks of mixed residential and business properties,
government buildings, and undeveloped land (Figure 3, which shows the same area as in
Figure 2 with the Ponte Vecchio in light green and the Uffizi and Palazzo della Signoria
in brown). This shapefile allowed me to determine the footprint (length, width, and area)
of the built environment and of individual structures.

76

Figure 3. Detail of building polygons constructed using Buonsignori's 1584 map and
modern aerial photographs.
I then used Google Street View to examine the blocks that I had identified as
being built up in 1584, using the Google photographs to identify blocks that contained
only comparatively recent buildings based on the lack of stylistic attributes observed on
recorded palaces. Some of these buildings probably have very old roots despite their
modern appearance. For example, I’m reasonably certain that the coin-operated laundry
by my hotel is in a medieval building, judging from the interior construction, but the
exterior appears to have been heavily modified in the 1800s. I also consulted historic
photographs to identify possible palaces that were visible in the 1800s but that are no
longer apparent (Bargellini and Pucci 1969). Several events have considerably altered the
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city since the early 1800s. Florence was the capitol of Italy from 1865 to 1871, when
parts of the city were massively renovated. For example, the old market and the former
Jewish ghetto southwest of the Duomo were torn down to create a new plaza and to build
new buildings. This renovation led to efforts to preserve medieval and renaissance
buildings in the city. Several buildings—including at least one palace—were destroyed
by German forces during the Second World War. The examination of Google Street View
photographs and historic photographs resulted in a map of blocks requiring closer
inspection.
The final step, close inspection of blocks that potentially contained intact
Renaissance-era palaces, was conducted on foot in March 2010 by myself and Anne
Compton. We used high-resolution aerial photographs with labeled streets to navigate
and survey every block in the city that I had previously judged likely to preserve
recognizable palaces built during the study period. We extensively photographed all
palaces from the study period that had been identified by architectural historians. We also
extensively photographed all buildings with stylistic attributes consistent with palaces
built during the study period. We also took notes on the aerial photographs regarding
buildings’ spatial extent. Information on spatial extent was then added to the GIS polygon
shapefile. During survey we also estimated palace heights. These heights were later
cross-checked against published architectural drawings and elevation data available
through Google Earth software.
Background research, analysis of aerial and Google Street View photographs, and
pedestrian survey identified 206 palaces. Of those 206 palaces, I was able to find
published information on the original family name of the builders of 153 palaces and the
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specific individual name of the builders of 94 of those 153 palaces. I should note that this
sample of 206 palaces does not represent all standing Renaissance-era palaces in
Florence. I initially recorded another dozen or so palaces during pedestrian survey, then
later removed them from my sample due to stylistic anomalies suggesting that they might
have been built after my study period, possibly even as Renaissance Revival structures in
the 1800s. I overlooked several other Renaissance-era palaces due to their subsequent
modification. For example, Mandelli (1989) describes a palace that I saw absolutely no
trace of due to later renovation. I also have rough documentary and photographic records
of several palaces near the bridges over the Arno that were destroyed during the Second
World War by retreating German forces; these palaces are not included in my sample
because of the difficulty of determining their precise location and spatial extent. Finally,
Machiavelli and other contemporary historians describe many incidents of palaces being
destroyed by mobs, and I have not made any effort to include those structures. The 206
palaces discussed here should therefore be considered a representative sample of palace
architecture built between about 1280 and 1600. My hunch is that I mostly overlooked
palaces that were built in the early 1500s; the stylistically simple palaces built in these
years would have been comparatively easy to modify.
My next task, once these 206 palaces were identified, was to determine the date of
their construction. Only 86 of the palaces had specific documented years of construction
based on original records. The remainder I dated based on their stylistic attributes. To
assess style, I began with the 86 most precisely dated palaces (those dated to a specific
year, not a range of years) and architectural historians’ descriptions of critical stylistic
trends to define attributes that were temporally sensitive and consistent across individual

79

palaces. I then used those attributes to identify and assign date ranges to nine stylistic
types (Table 4). I assumed that the earliest precisely-dated example of a type was the
earliest example and that the latest precisely-dated example of a type was the latest
example. When evaluating building style, I used the façade as it currently appears.
Several palaces were heavily renovated during the study period or after the study period,
and I did not use renovated palaces to determine the date ranges for specific stylistic
elements except where documentary evidence was strong regarding the specific dates of
specific components that were renovated. For example, the Palazzo Medici-Riccardi was
modified in 1517 to enclose an open loggia using kneeling windows with pediments.
These nine styles overlap temporally but can be sorted to show broad stylistic change
over time (Figure 4). Unless otherwise noted, all construction dates refer to the year when
construction began, not when construction was completed. These styles were developed
for their utility in grouping palaces and in determining their rough ages. They are also
relative categories of façade cost, a subject I discuss in detail in the next chapter. The 16
palaces described as “post study period styles” are palaces for which I have extensive
documentary evidence indicating that they were built between 1280 and 1600 but then so
extensively renovated that their original façades cannot be seen.
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Table 4. Count of palaces by style.

Medieval Styles

Early and Middle
Renaissance Styles

Late Renaissance Styles

Style

Date Range

Count

Medieval Plain
Medieval Rusticated
Transitional Rusticated
Renaissance Rusticated
Sgraffito
Corner Ashlars
Stucco
Mannerist Rusticated
Mannerist Stucco

*1260-*1420
*1310-*1400
*1350-1475
1444-1489
1446-*1575
1470-*1575
*1475-1575
1520-1600
1520-1600
1600-present

33
14
10
11
20
25
46
7
24
16
206

Post-Study Period Styles
Total
*Indicates approximate dates.
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Figure 4. Box plots of date ranges for palace styles.

Medieval Styles, 1260-1475
The palaces that are the subject of my research appeared roughly the same time as
the foundation of the republic in 1282. The earliest well-dated example is the Palazzo
Mozzi, built in approximately 1260 or possibly a couple of decades later. Prior to the
republic, the landmarks of Florentine domestic architecture were stone towers. At the end
of the 11th century, historical sources attest to only five towers in Florence, but records
indicate that there were at least 35 by the late 1100 and more than 150 by the end of the
1200s as Florence became a battleground between competing Guelf and Ghibelline
parties (Grimaldi 2005; Mercanti and Straffi 2003; Villani 1906 [1348]). These towers
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are unquestionably defensive and utilitarian structures, featuring small windows,
crenellated roofs, few doors and sometimes no ground-floor doors at all, and interior
wells. When originally built, they were very tall—the Monaldi tower is still 50 m tall—
but in 1250, as part of efforts to control elite internecine warfare, towers were limited in
height to 50 braccia, or about 29 meters. Towers were owned by two groups. The first
group was alliances of hereditary noble families, which often integrated towers into
residential compounds that were basically aggregations of preexisting houses. These
tower-houses are largely gone, although the city still preserves a handful of palaces that
look like towers that have been stretched sideways to make more living space. Towers
were also owned by non-kin mutual protection societies (Lansing 1991). At least 54
towers still stand. Many are now integrated into palaces and other large buildings, with
modifications to make them more usable as living space. For example, the Palazzo degli
Albizzi was extensively renovated in the 1600s, including the construction of a plaster
façade, but the medieval tower that makes up part of the palace is still clearly visible
(Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Albizzi tower integrated into the plaster façade of the Palazzo degli
Albizzi.
In the late 1200s, families began to build the palaces that still stand today,
including the Mozzi palace built in the 1260s or possibly as much as a few decades later
and the Spini palace built in 1289. My sample includes 57 palaces that can be classified
as broadly medieval in style, almost all of which are within the area enclosed by the city
walls that were completed in 1260 (Figure 6). Contemporary documentary evidence,
especially Machiavelli’s history of Florence, suggest that other early palaces probably
stood into the 1300s, but the ease with which they were destroyed by armed mobs, fires,
and floods suggests that these now-vanished palaces were probably built of wood or other
less durable materials (Goldthwaite 1972). In their original form, many of the palaces of
the 1200s and early 1300s that have since been destroyed or renovated out of existence
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were barely recognizable as single structures—contemporary accounts describe buildings
that were internally divided into stores, warehouses, and apartments in a fashion so
random as to have individual households living in rooms that were connected internally
but actually part of neighboring structures (ibid.). I have subdivided the 57 medieval
palaces into three stylistic types, Medieval Plain, Medieval Rusticated, and Transitional
Rusticated.

Figure 6. Medieval style palaces in the study sample.
Medieval Plain Style Palaces—1260-1420
Medieval plain style palaces, the earliest style I identified, have very simple,
undecorated stone façades. These palaces have ground-floor façades constructed of stone
ashlars—stones cut to fit, like bricks—while upper floors have rubble façades,
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constructed of more or less unshaped stone. In some cases, the upper floors have brick
façades. These palaces all had multiple ground-floor openings for warehouses and
storefronts. Many of these warehouse or storefront openings are surmounted by small
windows, which provided ventilation for interior rooms. They lack formal courtyards,
instead having spaces that are little more than shafts for air and light. Stone carved crests
appeared by the 1300s, and consist of rectangular stone slabs with coats of arms. Also
characteristic are wrought-iron fixtures such as torch supports, brackets to hold cloth
standards, and rings for horse leads; some of the ironwork still visible on palace façades
is original. Many have defensive features such as crenellated towers, and their façades are
usually pierced by holes that originally held supports for external wood balconies that
served at least partially as defensive features. The windows of these early palaces are
single-light and surrounded by simple arches that are flush with the surrounding façades.
Façades often have string courses between floors; these string courses are very simple but
do help to reinforce the visual impression of horizontality (most towers had no string
courses, reinforcing their verticality). Finally, while difficult to quantify, these early
medieval palaces have little “style” other than an impression of mass and stone. These
attributes are all visible on the Palazzo Acciaiouli built in the 1280s, which has a façade
that combines ground-floor ashlar construction and upper floor rubble construction,
multiple storefront openings, warehouse ventilation windows, balcony support holes, and
an incorporated tower (Figure 7). The Acciaiouli palace also has a carved stone coat of
arms on the façade. This design element, which is common among all palaces in my
sample, would have identified the owner to passersby.
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Rubble facade

Single-light windows
with flush arches
Warehouse ventilation windows

Simple string course

Tower

Coat of arms

Multiple warehouse doors

Figure 7. Palazzo Acciaiouli, 1280s.
About 1350, ashlars began to replace rubble façades on above-ground floors
(Figure 8). About the same time, the alignment of storefront openings and windows on
vertical axes became more regular, possibly to align private architecture with the style
established by Arnolfo di Cambio in his designs for renovations of buildings near the
Palazzo della Signoria (Ginori Lisci 1985).
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Figure 8. Casa Ridolfi, built after 1350; the stucco top floor is later.
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My sample includes 33 Medieval Plain style palaces. Where more precise
construction dates were not available, Medieval Plain style palaces were assumed for
analytic purposes to date to 1280 if they had above-ground rubble façades and to 1350 if
they had above-ground ashlar façades. Well-dated examples of the style are almost all
from the late 1200s to mid-1300s, but one example may have built as late as the 1420s.
Medieval Rusticated Style Palaces—1310-1400
Beginning in approximately 1310, façades began to appear with rusticated ground
floor ashlars, in which stones are cut to highlight their edges or cut with false joints to
make large blocks appear to be multiple smaller blocks of stone (Figure 9). These
Medieval Rusticated style palaces are otherwise identical to Medieval Plain style palaces.
Rusticated ashlars would later become common on palace façades and almost a defining
element of the largest Renaissance palaces. Where more precise construction dates were
not available, palaces of this style were assumed to date to 1350 for analytic purposes.
My sample includes 14 Medieval Rusticated style palaces. The style persisted until about
1400.
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Figure 9. Rusticated ashlar ground floor façade, Palazzo del Bembo.
Transitional Rusticated, 1350-1475
In the mid 1300s, three stylistic traits appeared that represented a dramatic change
from the medieval plain and medieval rusticated styles. The first new attribute, and one
that was unfortunately difficult to observe on aerial photographs and during survey, was
formal courtyards in place of the haphazard air shafts found in some earlier palaces. The
second attribute was the appearance of main entries in place of the earlier banks of
warehouse or storefront openings. The third stylistic trait was the use of elaborately
rusticated ashlars on ground floor façades and smooth ashlars on above-ground façades.
All three of these stylistic attributes are present on the Palazzo Capponi delle Rovinate,
built starting in 1415 with a single main entrance in a rusticated ashlar façade with a
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heavy emphasis on the horizontal axis (Figure 10) (note that the large windows by the
door are later additions). The palace is considered the stylistic ancestor of the landmark
palaces of the 1400s (Ginori Lisci 1985). The palace has interior warehouse space,
indicated by the small square windows high in the first-floor façade, but this storage
space was not on display as it was in earlier styles, and most of these palaces’ owners
probably conducted most business at dedicated warehouses, not at their houses
(Goldthwaite 1972). The Palazzo Capponi delle Rovinate is also significant for being the
first palace in the city whose architect is known—Filippo Brunelleschi, who later
designed the dome for the cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore. I have also included the
Palazzo Davanzati, built about 1350, in my transitional rusticated style; although that
palace has multiple warehouse style doors, it has the first documented formal courtyard
and an unprecedented smooth rusticated ashlar ground-floor façade (Figure 11). In
broader terms, these transitional rusticated palaces are significant for their emphasis on
unified design, stylistic distinction from neighboring structures, and systematically
planned private interior space, and they probably represent the first palaces that
approximate the feel of a modern private residence (Goldthwaite 1972).
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Rusticated facade
Warehouse ventilation windows

Single main door

Figure 10. Palazzo Capponi delle Rovinate, built beginning in 1415.
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Figure 11. Palazzo Davanzati, built approximately 1350.
My sample includes 10 transitional rusticated style palaces. All 10 have
documented construction dates, or at least documented construction decades. All but two
were built between 1372 and 1415. The two stylistic holdouts built in the second half of
the 1400s may reflect some of the decision making steps in palace design. The Palazzo
93

Neroni, built beginning in about 1460, was unfinished when parts of the family were
exiled due to their opposition to the Medici; the palace was subsequently finished in a
simpler than planned style. The other is the Minerbetti palace, built in 1475 by unifying
two medieval structures; its design may reflect a desire to limit construction costs by
preserving existing façade stonework.

Early and Middle Renaissance Styles, 1444-1575
The Medici, Strozzi, Pitti, and other landmark Renaissance palaces that stand out
today and doubtless stood out when built appeared in 1444, a decade into the Medici
Oligarchy period, and drew stylistic inspiration from the transitional rusticated palaces of
the late 1300s and early 1400s. But these landmark palaces were not the only stylistic
variant to appear during the Medici oligarchy—they were accompanied by palaces that
share some stylistic traits but that were much simpler and doubtless much less expensive
to build. I have grouped these early and middle Renaissance palaces into four styles:
Renaissance rusticated, sgraffito, corner ashlar, and stucco. My sample includes 102
palaces built in these four styles. Compared to the medieval palaces, the palaces of the
early and middle Renaissance are much more likely to be situated beyond the 1260 city
walls (Figure 12). Contemporary evidence suggests that many of the palaces of the
Medici oligarchy period, when these styles appeared, were built with the overt support of
the Medici family (including design advice, aid in buying properties, and transfers of
ownership between families) (Kent 1987).
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Figure 12. Early to middle Renaissance style palaces.
Renaissance Rusticated Palaces, 1444-1489
The Palazzo Medici-Riccardi, built beginning in 1444, established the style for a
small number of very large and highly visible palaces built in the 1400s2 in what I have
called the Renaissance rusticated style. In place of the simple rusticated ashlars of the
transitional rusticated palaces, the Medici palace has three tiers of different types of
rustication (Figure 13); other palaces of the style have similarly mixed rustication. The
style is also characterized by elaborate cornices, windows, and string course. This
extensive stonework would have required far more skilled labor than the comparatively
simple details of the earlier palace styles. Many of these carved details incorporate family
2

The Palazzo Borghese was built in 1437 and may have been roughly similar to the Palazzo MediciRiccardi, but the palace was massively renovated in 1632 and its original appearance is not documented.
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emblems or crests. For example, the upper-floor windows of the Medici palace all
incorporate family emblems in addition to the large family coats of arms on the corners
of the building. This extensive identification of palace façades marks a change from the
simple coats of arms of earlier palace styles. The two-light mullioned windows are also
an important element. They are found only on Renaissance rusticated palaces and on a
handful of public buildings, most significantly the Palazzo della Signoria, which has been
modified since its construction in ways that reduce its symmetry and therefore make it
look less like the palace designs it inspired (Trachtenberg 1999). The benches lining the
façade are found on several Renaissance rusticated palaces and are almost exclusive to
that style, although a small number of stucco and corner ashlar palaces have similar
benches. They probably served as outdoor waiting areas for people hoping to become part
of the palace owners’ patronage networks. These palaces are also truly vast—note the
size of the pedestrians relative to the size of the door of the Medici palace. My sample
includes 11 Renaissance rusticated style palaces, all of which have well-documented
construction dates. It is also significant that eight of the 11 Renaissance rusticated palaces
also have known architects—Filippo Brunelleschi, Giuliano da Maiano, Leon Battista
Alberti, Michelozzo di Bartolomeo Michelozzi, Giuliano da Sangallo, and Simone del
Pollaiolo (Il Cronaca). The Renaissance rusticated style lasted only from 1444 to 1489.
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Figure 13. Palazzo Medici-Riccardi, built beginning in 1444.
The massive rough-hewn ground-floor ashlars of the Medici palace are found on
seven of 11 Renaissance rusticated style palaces. The other four have smooth groundfloor rusticated ashlars. The best known of these palaces, the Palazzo Rucellai (Figure
14), is also significant for being designed by Leon Battista Alberti. Between 1443 and
1452, Alberti wrote the Renaissance’s first theoretical book on architecture, De re
aedificatoria (On the Art of Building) (Alberti 1452). Written expressly for connoisseurs
as well as architects, the book became something of a cultural touchstone for educated
elites when it was printed in 1485 (earlier editions were reproduced by hand), and
Lorenzo di Medici is known to have read it (Goldthwaite 1980). The Palazzo Rucellai
also highlights several important elements in palace design. First, although the palace is
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on a street corner, only the main façade is decorated with rusticated ashlars, while the
side street façade is covered by vastly less costly stucco with haphazardly arranged
windows (Figure 15). Presumably, Giovanni Rucellai felt that building a costly façade on
a 3 meter wide side street was not a good use of money; instead, he commissioned stone
façade for the side of his palace facing a small plaza as much as 25 meters across. The
Palazzo Rucellai is also interesting for having an incomplete façade. The adjacent
property’s owner refused to sell, forcing the builders to end the façade partway through a
column of window arches (Figure 16). The façade of the Palazzo Rucellai is also a useful
example of how the dramatically increased elaboration of Renaissance rusticated façades
compared to transitional rusticated façades allowed for much more advertisement of the
builder’s identity. As noted above, coats of arms are found on palace façades beginning
in the late 1200s (and possibly earlier). What distinguishes the Renaissance rusticated
façades is that family emblems are found on string courses, window arches, and other
design elements (for example, the billowing sails on the string course in Figure 16).
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Figure 14. Palazzo Rucellai, built starting in 1446.
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Figure 15. Palazzo Rucellai, undecorated side street façade.
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Figure 16. Palazzo Rucellai, detail of incomplete façade.
Lower-Cost Styles, 1446-1575
Only two years after construction started on the Renaissance rusticated Medici
palace, a new stylistic variant emerged. This new variant, the sgraffito-covered façade
style, was one of three new palace styles that were almost certainly far less expensive to
build than the Renaissance rusticated style with its elaborate stone façades. These three
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lower cost styles—sgraffito, corner ashlars, and stucco—were built in small numbers
during the Medici oligarchy but dominated palace construction after the Medici were
expelled in 1494 (my data also suggest no palaces were built between 1494 and
Savonarola’s execution in 1498). These lower-cost, less-elaborate palaces were designed
by professional architects (especially Simone del Pollaiolo, aka Il Cronaca (1451-1508)
and Bartolommeo di Angiolo Baglioni, aka Baccio d'Agnolo (1462-1543)) who were
well known in Florence but lacked the international fame of Alberti. An increasing
number of these sgraffito, stucco, and corner ashlar palaces were built with four floors,
with the top floors open loggia. Although most palaces continued to be built in the urban
core, in 1520, the Palazzo Pandolfini was built in what was a semi-rural part of city, the
first of what would become a minor trend in palace construction. Perhaps due to the
lower cost of these simpler styles, palace construction appears to have surged in the late
1400s and early 1500s (Varchi and Razzi 1721; von Fabriczy 1905), displacing many
workshops. Palace construction dropped after 1520 due to political instability and war
before resuming in the 1550s after the Medici dukes had solidified their power as
hereditary rulers of the city.
These three less elaborate styles have several attributes in common. Their façades
are covered almost entirely with stucco, not stone. Stone façade decoration is limited to
door and window arches and in one style the corners of buildings. Two-light windows
disappeared completely, while ground-floor windows gradually became larger and lower
and began to have surrounds with pediments in place of the earlier arched windows.
Many of these palaces have small ground-floor windows that were used to sell wine.
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Although beyond the scope of my research, interiors also changed in the 1500s.
Rooms became smaller and more specialized and contained more furniture. However,
rooms still had far fewer contents than would be normal today. An inventory of Giovanni
di Bartolommeo Bartolini’s possessions at his death found that his bedroom contained a
four-poster bed with a mattress, quilt, bed cover, sheets, and hangings (Ginori Lisci
1985). The bed was surrounded by benches with cushions. The room also contained a day
bed on a large chest and two paintings, one in a gold frame. His antechamber (probably
the center of his social interactions and the most important room in the house) contained
a bed with two mattresses, a quilt, sheets, and a bedcover; various gold and silver leather
hangings, a walnut wardrobe, five paintings, a mirror, a box containing coins, two prayer
books, a chest containing coins, a gold ring, a cameo, a copper bowl, and 12 antique
silver medallions; a box containing a medal depicting Alexander the Great; several
glasses; and at least five pieces of majolica pottery. This small inventory would have
barely made a dent in the floor space of a room that probably measured at least 40 square
meters.
Sgraffito, 1446-1558
Sgraffito façades appeared immediately after Renaissance rusticated style
appeared. The same year as work began on the Palazzo Rucellai (1446), construction
started on the first well-documented sgraffito-covered palace, the Palazzo di Montuauto
(Figure 17). Sgraffito is a form of stucco inscribed with designs to produce monochrome
decoration. The early version of sgraffito appeared in 1446 but was rare until the 1470s; it
disappeared around 1510. The early version of sgraffito is relatively simple, consisting of
false architectural detail, including false rusticated ashlars, string courses, and pilasters,
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surrounded by floral patterns. The use of sgraffito to mimic rustication is significant, as it
makes these palaces similar in appearance to Renaissance Rusticated palaces. The
Palazzo di Montuauto façade seems, incidentally, to be similar to the Palazzo Rucellai—
compare, for example the sgraffito pilasters and wide, elaborate string courses with the
stone analogues on the Palazzo Rucellai. In fact, sgraffito palace façades may have been
the model for the Palazzo Rucellai, not vice versa (Forster 1976). My sample includes 13
examples of these early sgraffito façades. A more baroque style with greater emphasis on
figures and somewhat less depiction of architectural elements appeared in 1510 and
lasted until 1558 (Figure 18). Over the life of the sgraffito style, ground floor windows
became larger and extended closer to ground level. My sample includes seven later
sgraffito façades. Despite years of exposure to the elements, these sgraffito façades have
held up well—my sample includes a very poorly maintained palace that still preserves
bits of sgraffito. On other palaces, the sgraffito façades have probably been restored.
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Figure 17. Early style sgraffito on Palazzo di Montuauto, built 1446.
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Figure 18. Detail of sgraffito on the Palazzo Coverelli, built approximately 1520.
Corner Ashlar, 1470-1575
In about 1470, another palace style variant appeared, stucco façades with ashlars
only on building corners. My sample includes 25 of these corner ashlar style palaces. The
style persisted until approximately 1575, but it was most common during the late republic
period. The three earliest examples are poorly dated and include one palace that was not
finished for more than 25 years after it was started, and the style was probably very rare
until after 1490. These palaces have very severe, simple façades, with rusticated ashlar
decoration only around their windows and doors and on the corners of the buildings
(Figure 19). These ashlar corners are clearly similar to the corners of the Palazzo Medici
façade but without the costly ashlars on the rest of the façade. Like the sgraffito style, the
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corner ashlar style appears to be a low-cost alternative style inspired by the key elements
of the Renaissance rusticated style.

Figure 19. Palazzo Martellini-Rosselini del Turco, a corner ashlar style palace built
in approximately 1500.
Stucco, 1470-1575
All-stucco façades, with rusticated ashlars only around windows and doors,
appeared in about 1475 and lasted until 1575 (Figure 20). My sample includes 46 such
palaces, which doubtless represent the least expensive façade treatment in my sample.
Largely ignored by architectural historians due to their lack of stylistic details, some of
these palaces may have been somewhat more interesting when new, when several were
covered with frescoes (Figure 21). One author (Forster 1976) has suggested that stucco
façades (including those on my corner ashlar style) would have served as a blank slate
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that could be decorated and redecorated quickly and at low cost to meet changing
fashions.

Figure 20. All stucco façade of the Palazzo Berti, built approximately 1500.
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Figure 21. Detail of mid 1500s frescoes on the Palazzo Mellini-Fossi.

Mannerist Styles, 1520-Later
The year 1520 saw construction of the first two Mannerist palaces to be built in
Florence. The style, already popular in Rome, featured new types of elaboration such as
balconies, less emphasis on symmetry, and a much greater willingness to experiment. My
sample includes 24 Mannerist palaces with façades covered mostly with stucco (a style I
refer to as Mannerist stucco) and 7 Mannerist palaces with façades covered with
rusticated ashlars (a style I refer to as Mannerist rusticated). Other than the two early
exceptions, all of these Mannerist palaces were built after the 1533 foundation of the
Medici Duchy, and many were built well out from the city center in what was then
undeveloped land (Figure 22). Not surprisingly, the façades of these early ducal era
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palaces often have Medici coats of arms and busts of Medici dukes to commemorate
families’ ties with the ruling dynasty. The style persisted well into the 1600s. I have
included the 31 Mannerist palaces in my data set as a way of capturing the post-republic
patterning in palace style and related variables.

Figure 22. Palaces built in the Mannerist style.
The first Mannerist stone façade, the Palazzo Bartolini-Salimbeni, was built
beginning in 1520. The niches, mix of window treatments, and columns by the main door
all distinguish this palace from the comparatively simple and severe stucco and corner
ashlar palaces that were much more popular at the time (Figure 23). The façade features a
Latin inscription aimed at critics of the style, “it is easier to criticize than imitate.” Other
110

Mannerist palaces feature the city’s only Renaissance-era brick façade (Figure 24) and a
façade decorated with dozens of busts of famous Florentines (Figure 25). These examples
summarize well the style’s lack of consistency—in a very real way, Mannerist palaces are
identifiable because they look very different from one another and very different from the
earlier styles.
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Figure 23. The Mannerist façade of the Palazzo Bartolini-Salimbeni, built starting
in 1520.
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Figure 24. The Mannerist façade of the Palazzo Grifoni, built in 1563.
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Figure 25. Several of the busts on the façade of the Palazzo Valori-Altoviti dei
Visacci, built in 1587.

The Costs of Construction
The creation of distinct palace styles allowed me to assign rough dates to these
structures, including the palaces for which I lacked documented years of construction.
These styles also helped me to estimate how much the different palace styles cost to
build. Surprisingly for a society of bookkeepers, businessmen, and obsessive personal
record keepers, Florentine elites appear to have kept few records on what their palaces
cost to build. The most precise, detailed accounting is for the Palazzo Bartolini
Salimbeni, built beginning in 1520 by Giovanni Bartolini (Ginori Lisci 1985). Total
spending on the palace, not including furniture or architect’s fees, was 38,823 lire (or
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approximately 5,546 florins). Of that total, 11,998 lire were spent on masonry (31
percent), 8,044 lire on timber (21 percent), and 12,803 lire (33 percent) were spent on the
spectacular and, for the time, unusual Mannerist rusticated façade. Only 1,929 lire, or 5
percent of the total cost, was spent on acquiring land. The remaining 10 percent of
construction costs went to metalwork and other expenses. Of the total construction cost,
13,760 lire, or about 35 percent, went to labor expenses.
The Palazzo Bartolini-Salimbeni occupies a 671 square meter footprint and is 21
meters tall, for a total volume of 14,091 cubic meters of built space. The decorated
portion of the façade measures 1,071 square meters. Using the construction cost figures
detailed above, the palace cost Giovanni Bartolini 3.28 florins for each cubic meter of
built space and .893 florins for each square meter of decorated façade. There are three
other data points for palace construction costs. The Palazzo Strozzi cost roughly 35,000
florins to build (Goldthwaite 2009), 6.3 times as much as the Palazzo BartoliniSalimbeni. However the Palazzo Strozzi is much larger, occupying 81,230 cubic meters
and having 4,896 square meters of decorated façade. Using the construction figures
indicated by the Palazzo Bartolini-Salimbeni accounts yields a total cost for the Palazzo
Strozzi of 32,062 florins; a difference of less than 9 percent from the actual cost. I suspect
that the 35,000 florin cost of the Palazzo Strozzi may have included the cost to acquire
properties that were converted into the plaza immediately east of the palace. Two other
extant records of palace construction costs are somewhat less precise. Extensive
renovations at the Palazzo Bardi-Busini to turn the existing palace into the sgraffito-style
structure visible today cost about 3,700 florins in 1483; the project included construction
of an entirely new façade as well as interior renovations (my estimate for the total cost of
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the palace is 7369 florins) (Goldthwaite 1980). In the mid 1500s, construction of a stucco
façade and associated interior work to merge a newly acquired structure with an existing
palace cost the Da Gagliano family 2,200 florins (ibid.). These figures suggest that the
costs of building the Palazzo Bartolini-Salimbeni are roughly comparable to the cost of
building other palaces.
The figures of 3.28 florins for each cubic meter of built space and .893 florins for
each square meter of decorated façade are based on the cost of a palace with an elaborate
stone façade. I believe that construction costs would have been much lower for a less
elaborate façade. In current construction, stone façades cost two to four times as much as
stucco façades. Using this starting point, I ranked the façade styles in terms of the amount
of elaborate stone work and assigned a façade cost modification value of .5 for stucco
palaces, .6 for mannerist stucco and corner ashlar palaces due to their greater amount of
stone work, .7 for sgraffito palaces, .8 for medieval plain palaces, .9 for medieval
rusticated and transitional rusticated palaces, and 1 for Renaissance and Mannerist
rusticated palaces, the most elaborate styles. These cost modification values are
deliberately conservative. My hunch is the range of façade construction costs was
actually much broader, but experiments with more widely dispersed variables did not
significantly alter the results of palace analysis that I present in chapter 7.
This equation does not consider the difference in the cost of building a palace in
an empty lot compared to tearing down existing buildings or compared to merging
existing buildings into a larger structure. Bartolini’s accounting suggests the costs of
acquiring property for redevelopment were a small portion (5 percent) of the total cost of
construction. I have also made no attempt to consider the costs of interior decoration, and
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my cost equation therefore assumes that palace interiors of all periods and all styles were
equally costly to complete. I also assume that the number of floors did not affect palace
construction costs—my calculations assume that buildings of similar heights and volumes
but with different numbers of floors were equally costly to build.
I discuss the calculated costs for the palaces in my sample in chapter 7. But the
two data points for palace cost discussed above—the 35,000 florin cost of the Palazzo
Strozzi and the 5,546 florin cost of the Palazzo Bartolini-Salimbeni—show that these
structures were extraordinarily expensive. Unskilled laborers earned about 20 to 40
florins per year, while junior staff in the large banking and merchant businesses earned
12 to 200 florins per year (Goldthwaite 2009). These palaces were also costly even
relative to the value of Florentine companies. Filippo Strozzi, builder of the 35,000-florin
Palazzo Strozzi, left an estate that included 35,000 florins in investments excluding his
palace (ibid.). In 1451, the Medici business conglomerate was worth almost 91,000
florins; my equation estimates that the family’s palace cost about 30,000 florins to build
(ibid.).
These costs were not an investment, as palaces lost value dramatically when
resold. The Da Gagliano palace sold in 1579 for 5,410 florins, only about 2.5 times the
cost of just building the façade and associated interior renovations (ibid.). In 1489, the
Alberti were ordered by the Florentine government to transfer a palace to the Corsi
family in exchange for forgiveness of an 830 florin debt (Ginori Lisci 1985), far less than
the roughly 4,140 florins I calculate the palace to have cost to build. The massive 1400s
core of the Palazzo Pitti palace was sold in 1589 to Duke Cosimo I's wife Eleonara di
Toledo for about 9,000 florins (ibid.), much less than the roughly 30,000 florins I
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estimate it cost to build. They were also poor investments as rental properties, yielding
approximately 3 percent of their value per year (Goldthwaite 1972). Significantly,
Florentine palaces were rarely designed to be subdivided, unlike contemporary Venetian
palaces (Goldthwaite 1980; Wills 2002).
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CHAPTER 6. HYPOTHESES
Are palaces costly signals or indices or a form of waste behavior? Answering that
question involves the intersection of resource control, palace cost, and reproductive and
political success and analyzing how the patterning in those variables relates to the four
conditions necessary for costly signaling to persist in a population. Those four conditions
can be recast as specific hypotheses that can be tested using the data on palaces, political
success, and demographics discussed in the previous chapters. This chapter describes
those hypotheses; the hypotheses are then tested in chapters 7 and 8.

First Condition
The first condition necessary for costly signaling to persist is that individuals must
vary in underlying and unobservable fitness-related characteristics. As I explained in
chapter 2, it is theoretically valid to assume that the specific underlying trait being
signaled is not important so long as that trait is beneficial and inheritable and can produce
differences in individuals’ ability to obtain and use resources. This analysis follows from
Getty’s finding that high-quality individuals are high quality because they are more
efficient at obtaining and using resources (time, energy, etc.) more efficiently than lowquality individuals (Getty 2006), and it avoids the difficult process of directly measuring
individual quality (Irschick, et al. 2007).
For analytic purposes, I assume that wealth is a valid proxy measure for
differential ability to obtain and use resources and that wealth (and therefore resource
control) cannot be directly observed. Florentines obviously varied in household wealth.
What matters is how household wealth varied across the population. I use a fitted growth
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curve of household wealth versus rank of household wealth from the 1427 tax assessment
to evaluate the shape of the distribution of differences in wealth. My analysis assumes
that the distribution of household wealth in 1427 was representative of the study period as
a whole. In other words, I assume that the shape of the wealth distribution did not change
over the course of my study period despite constant shifts in the specific identities of the
wealthiest households and of the actual cash value of their wealth. It is the shape of this
distribution of household wealth that serves as the source of hypotheses regarding the
relationship between palace cost and household wealth, which I discuss in detail later in
this chapter.

Second Condition
The second condition necessary for costly signaling to persist is that information
about individuals’ underlying characteristics must be valuable to interaction partners and
conveyable via perceptible signals. Given the social and economic importance of wealth
in Renaissance Florence, I assume that information on signalers’ control of resources is
useful to signal recipients. As costly structures paid for with cash, palaces obviously
conveyed information about builders’ wealth. What is more important is the specific
nature of variation among palaces in attributes that would convey information about their
cost and therefore about the resources needed to build them. I hypothesize that if palaces
were costly signals, they will vary dramatically in cost and in the attributes that
contribute to cost, especially footprint, height, volume, and decorated façade area. The
case for costly signaling will be strengthened if specific stylistic elements appear to
convey information beyond information about palace cost. If palaces are indices, they
will emphasize information linked only to cost. If palaces are costly signals, then costly
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signaling-related stylistic attributes should become more common, while “nonfunctional” attributes should vary stochastically in frequency (Dunnell 1978; Neiman
1995). For example, particular types of window decoration might show essentially
random variation across time. Finally, if palaces are costly signals they will also have
considerable stylistic variation within particular periods. If palaces are indices, they will
vary in cost but will have comparatively little stylistic variation.
In addition to assuming that palaces are perceptible signals of wealth, I also
assume that the costs of palaces were subject to perception error. Most of the palaces in
Florence were not side by side, they vary stylistically, and they can be hard to see due to
narrow streets, making direct comparisons impossible. Moreover, human beings are poor
at judging size visually without a scale, and the error increases as the object’s size
increases (Coren, et al. 1979; Teghtsoonian 1971). The total size of individual palaces
would be particularly hard to ascertain for palaces not located on corner lots, as their
depth from the street would have been impossible to see. This risk of signal perception
error leads me to use Johnstone’s error-prone signaling model described in chapter 2
(Johnstone 1994).

Third Condition
The third condition necessary for costly signaling to persist is that individuals
must have competing interests, such that false signals would benefit the signaler but not
the audience. To ensure that signals are honest, signal cost and underlying individual
quality must correlate such that high-quality individuals can signal at higher intensity
than low-quality individuals. To evaluate this correlation, I determine the cost of
individual palaces then use those costs to produce a fitted growth curve of palace cost
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versus rank of palace cost. This process brings palace costs into a form consistent with
Johnstone’s error-prone signaling model, which assumes a fixed number of discrete and
evenly spaced quality levels, signal levels, and perceived advertising levels (Johnstone
1994). For my purposes, signal levels are equivalent to palace costs and quality levels are
equivalent to rank of palace cost. This curve for palace costs will be compared to a fitted
curve for the distribution of household wealth versus rank of household wealth.
I expect that if palaces were indices, all builders would spend a roughly equal
proportion of their wealth on palace construction. If palaces were costly signals, builders
should spend much more variable proportions of their wealth on palace construction. In
other words, if palaces are an index of wealth, then the fitted growth curve for palace cost
versus rank of palace cost should match the beta term for wealth versus rank of wealth.
The greater the difference between the beta term for the fitted growth curve for wealth
and the fitted growth curve for palaces, the better palaces fit with an interpretation that
palaces were costly signals. The smaller the difference between the beta term for the
fitted growth curve for wealth versus rank of wealth and the growth curve for palace cost
versus rank of palace cost, the better palaces fit with an interpretation that palaces were
an index.
To determine the wealth curve, I used the total household wealth data in the 1427
catasto (Herlihy, Klapisch-Zuber, et al. 2002). Household tax assessments fitted
comparison of fitted regression curves for household wealth versus rank of household
wealth for all 9,780 households in the in 1427 catasto finds that a growth curve
relationship has much more explanatory power than a linear relationship: the R square
value for a fitted growth curve is .925, compared to an R square value of .151 for a linear
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relationship. The shape of the curve is driven by a small number of very wealthy
households at the top of the income distribution. That the number of very wealthy
households is a small percentage of the total number of households is indicated by the
very small beta term (.001) for the growth curve—the curve would be steeper if
household wealth were more tightly clustered. I therefore use a growth curve for wealth
versus rank of wealth as the baseline instead of a linear relationship.
Of course, the majority of those households were not in any position to build a
palace. What is important is the regression of wealth versus rank of wealth for the portion
of the population theoretically able to build a palace. As more of the population is
removed from the sample, the beta term of the fitted growth curve increases. For the 372
households with more than 5,000 florins in investments in 1427 (Goldthwaite’s very
rich), the growth regression equation slope increases to .005 (R-squared .831,
significance .000) (Table 5). For the 50 wealthiest households (taxable investments of
19,119 florins or more), the beta term of the projected growth curve increases to .028 (R
Squared .767, significance .000) (Table 5, Figure 26). I use this 50 households figure
because my palace sample size suggests that roughly 50 palaces were built or massively
renovated per generation.
Table 5. Wealth vs. rank of wealth growth curve statistics, 1427 catasto.
Sample
All households
Wealth greater than 5,000 florins
Wealthiest 50 households

Wealth Curve Beta
Term
.001
.005
.028
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R Square

Significance

.925
.831
.767

.000
.000
.000

Figure 26. Wealth vs. rank of wealth, 50 wealthiest households in 1427 catasto.
To repeat, the magnitude of the difference between the beta term or slope of the
wealth curve and the beta term or slope of the palace cost curve will indicate the strength
of an interpretation that palaces were costly signals or indices. However, in addition to
being distinct from the wealth curve, if palaces were costly signals then the curve for
palace costs will have several steps or tiers in keeping with the predictions of Johnstone’s
error-prone signaling model. In Johnstone’s model, the fitness of signal recipients
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depends on their ability to accurately estimate signaler quality from signaler
advertisements. Signalers therefore benefit from preventing perception errors by signal
recipients. If there is no perception error, the curve of palace cost versus rank of palace
cost is essentially roughly linear and smooth such that signal intensity is a continuously
increasing function of quality. All signalers signal above zero and all signal slightly more
than the next-highest-quality signaler. If error is present, many individuals do not signal
at all or signal at the lowest possible level, creating what Johnstone calls an “initial flat.”
The advertising level of higher quality individuals increases in a series of steps. The
number of steps that can be distinguished decreases as error increases. In addition, the
smaller the number of signalers able to advertise above the minimum “initial flat” level,
the more strongly they advertise. That prediction differs from the normal prediction of
costly signaling theory that the signaling ability of the lowest-quality individual
determines the intensity of higher quality individuals’ signals.
To summarize, I will test condition three (the linkage between signal cost and
underlying quality) by comparing the beta term or slope of palace cost versus rank of
palace cost with the beta term or slope of wealth versus rank of wealth based on the curve
for the 50 wealthiest households in the 1427 catasto. This comparison is best understood
visually (Figure 27). If palaces were indices, they should have a beta term or slope very
similar to the slope for household wealth. This outcome would indicate that all wealthy
households spent an equal percentage of their wealth on their palaces. If palaces were
costly signals, they should have a beta term or slope very different from the slope for
household wealth. If palaces were costly signals they are also likely to have steps or tiers,
although a lack of steps will not definitely falsify palaces as costly signals. I use 10
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percent differences in adjacently ranked palace costs to identify steps or tiers; Johnstone’s
error-prone signaling model suggests that 10 percent perception error is the minimum

Palace Cost or Household Wealth

error rate needed to produce steps or tiers (Johnstone 1994).

Palace cost curve for costly
signals with perception error

Palace cost curve for indices

Household wealth
Rank of Palace Cost or Household Wealth

Figure 27. Distribution of indices and costly signals with perception error versus
distribution of wealth.

Fourth Condition
The fourth condition for costly signals to persist is that signal audiences must use
the information content of signals to modify their behavior in ways that benefit
themselves and the signaler. I test the benefits of palaces as costly signals in two ways.
First, I evaluate the number of sons who appear in the elections data and compare this
figure for palace builders, their relatives, and a control population. The number of sons
who appear in the elections data is used as a proxy for overall reproductive success.
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Second, I evaluate status as reflected by political success, measured in terms of the
number of times drawn for and seated for tre maggiore and guild office. As discussed in
the overview of the election process, being drawn for office meant that a man had been
chosen by men in his neighborhood as somebody worth having in high government
office. Being seated in office meant that these men had been vetted by their political
peers and superiors, that they were considered worthy of office, and that they were
financially solvent. Of particular importance is how reproductive and political success
differs for palace builders relative to their immediate relatives and to the politically active
population as a whole, including non-palace builders. If palaces were costly signals,
condition four indicates that palace builders should have greater reproductive and
political success than other men in my sample. In addition, palace construction should
precede any political or reproductive benefits. If palaces are a form of conservative bet
hedging, then palace builders should have fewer sons than the rest of the politically active
population. Conservative bet hedging will gain additional support if the palaces were
more likely to be constructed during periods of large scale and unpredictable
environmental variability, especially economic variability. Palace construction should
subsequently all but stop during severe downturns.

Summary of Hypotheses
To summarize my hypotheses in the simplest possible terms, if palaces were
costly signals they should be variable over time and within periods in terms of style and
size, have attributes that are costly but have no specific non-decorative function, and
should have a curve for cost versus rank of cost that is very distinct from the curve for
household wealth versus rank of household wealth and that has several steps or tiers. If
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palaces do not have these qualities, it suggests that they were indices, not costly signals.
In addition, if palaces were costly signals they should be built by men who subsequently
had significantly greater reproductive and political success than their peers. If palace
builders had less reproductive success than their peers, it suggests that palaces were a
form of conservative bet hedging.
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CHAPTER 7. ANALYZING THE PALACE RECORD
For palaces to be costly signals, they must be costly in ways that are consistent
with the theory’s predictions. Costliness by itself is not sufficient to rule out alternative
hypotheses. Do these palaces differ from overall housing construction in ways consistent
with costly signals or other functional but ostensibly wasteful behaviors? Do they vary
with each other in ways consistent with costly signaling? In particular, are palaces larger
than necessary for housing, are they costly, is their costliness visible, and is the
distribution of the costliness of individual palaces more consistent with the growth curve
predicted for signals with perception error or with the linear distribution predicted for
indices? This chapter evaluates several measures of palace cost, discusses how those
costs relate to the predictions of costly signaling theory, and summarizes the findings and
their ramifications for the analysis of the data on political and reproductive success. It
evaluates palace costs for the both entire sample and for specific periods and styles. This
chapter also discusses some possible meanings for the palace styles. In other words, if
these palaces were costly signals, what information was being signaled?
As discussed in the previous chapter, my sample includes 206 palaces built
between approximately 1280 and 1600 and representing examples of nine specific styles
(Table 6).
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Table 6. Counts of palaces by style and period.
Style

Pre-Reform
Republic

Medieval
Plain
Medieval
Rusticated
Transitional
Rusticated
Renaissance
Rusticated
Sgraffito
Corner
Ashlars
Stucco
Mannerist
Stucco
Mannerist
Rusticated
Later Styles
Total

19

PostMedici
Late
Medici
Reform
Oligarchy Republic Duchy
Republic
13
0
0
0

Total

32

5

10

0

0

0

15

0

8

2

0

0

10

0

0

11

0

0

11

0
0

2
0

9
4

7
18

2
3

20
25

0
0

1
2

2
3

41
3

2
16

46
24

0

0

0

1

6

7

0
24

1
37

9
40

3
73

3
32

16
206

Palaces and the Built Environment
Although not a strictly necessary component of costly signaling, the theory does
suggest that costly signals will be extravagant, particularly at the upper range of signaler
quality or signal intensity. Spatial analysis shows that the palaces in this sample are
dramatically larger than strictly “necessary” for the needs of housing a family. The
palaces in this sample occupy a significant percentage of the built environment of the
city. The city walls that were largely complete by 1334 and that stood until the 1800s
enclose approximately 4,851,000 square meters of space (Figure 28). Approximately
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1,381,000 square meters of that area (28.4 percent) was the Arno River, pastures,
orchards, and other undeveloped land. Approximately 787,000 square meters, or 16.2
percent, was occupied by roads and squares. Churches, monasteries, convents, and
hospitals and their walled grounds occupied a total footprint (length and width only) of
approximately 791,000 square meters, or 16.3 percent of the city. This figure would have
been even higher for much of my study period. Many of the convents and monasteries
inside the 1334 city walls were founded decades or even centuries before the walls were
built, and they controlled large amounts of land. These religious establishments probably
represented an even greater percentage of the built environment prior to the second half
of the 1400s, when for the first time these organizations were allowed to sell land to
private individuals for development (Goldthwaite 1995; Kent 1987). However, at their
peak monastic houses housed only a few thousand men and women (Goldthwaite 2009;
Strocchia 2009). Small houses, apartment blocks, shops, warehouses, and other mixedused buildings occupied a footprint of 1,240,000 square meters, or 25.6 percent of the
city. In his 1472 Cronaca fiorentina, Benedetto Dei (Dei, et al. 1984) said the city had
270 woolen goods shops, 83 silk shops, 66 apothecary shops, 84 woodworker shops, 54
sculptors and stonecutters, 70 butcher's shops, 8 shops of poulterers and sellers of game,
44 goldsmiths, silversmiths, and jewelers shops, 30 shops of workers in gold leaf and
silver wire, and 33 banks. These shops are included in that 1,240,000 square meter area.
The 174 Palaces in my sample that were built during the republic have a total
footprint of 156,000 square meters, including courtyards but not including gardens. This
figure represents 3.2 percent of the total area of the city within the 1334 walls. The
majority (113, or 65 percent) of these palaces are within the core of the city, defined here
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for analysis purposes as the 1,106,000 square meters enclosed by the 1260 city walls. The
footprint of the Republic-era palaces within the 1260 walls total 96,000 square meters, or
8.7 percent of the city’s core.

Figure 28. Map of the distribution of palaces, religious organizations, and general
purpose built space in 1584.
These figures mean that the majority of the city’s roughly 60,000 residents, their
stores, and their places of work all occupied 1,240,000 square meters of built space.
Assuming that buildings were 3.5 floors high (a ballpark figure arrived at by examining
Buonsignori’s map, standing older buildings, and mid-1800s photographs), translates into
4,340,000 square meters of actual floor space. Assuming a population of 60,000
individuals, that figure translates into 72 square meters of floor space per person
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including housing, shops, warehouses, factories, and other non-religious and nongovernmental space. The 174 Republic-era palaces in my sample total 156,000 square
meters of footprint spread across an average of 3.3 floors and totaling 479,000 square
meters of actual floor space. In the 1427 catasto, the average household was 4.4
individuals, although 52.5 percent of the population lived in households of six or more
individuals and the wealthiest households tended to be much larger than poorer
households, with an average of six residents for the wealthiest (Herlihy and KlapischZuber 1985). Elite households also included servants and slaves, which were not usually
included in the catasto. In the mid 1500s, 45 percent of all households included at least
one servant (Goldthwaite 2009). It is therefore safe to assume that elite households could
have held as many as 10 individuals including servants.
What these figures mean is that palace residents each occupied an average of 275
square meters of floor space. The range is enormous—the residents of the very small
Palazzo Benci probably occupied 107 square meters per person (assuming a six-person
household in keeping with the structure’s small size), while each resident of the much
larger Palazzo Medici rattled around in 883 square meters of space (assuming a 10person household in keeping with the palace’s huge size). As discussed in the previous
chapter, early palaces included shop space, and all palaces probably included warehouse
space for family supplies. However, all of this palace shop and warehouse space was
exclusively for the family’s use or benefit—I can find no evidence suggesting that palace
owners rented out commercial space. The figures are even higher for the ducal period.
The 31 ducal-era palaces have a 40,000 square meter footprint, or 1 percent of city, and
contain 112,000 square meters of floor space spread across an average of 3.2 floors.
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Assuming 10-person households based on evidence of increasing elite household size in
the 1500s (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985), that translates an average of 394 square
meters of floor space per person for residents of ducal-era palaces.
For comparison purposes, cross-cultural samples suggest that individuals occupy
an average of 10 square meters of built space per person (Naroll 1962), although that
figure is the product of some problematic assumptions (Brown 1987). A 2005 U.S.
Energy Information Administration study found that in 2004 the average American house
contained 202 square meters of floor space, or 78.5 square meters per person (Berry
2005). In sum, the average Florentine of the Republic era occupied roughly as much
space at home, at work, and while shopping (72 square meters) as the average American
occupies only while at home. Palace residents, in contrast, occupied an average of 3.5
times as much house floor space as the average American. Arriving at a newly built
palace for the first time would probably have been a revelation, particularly after
traversing the city’s narrow, crowded streets (Goldthwaite 1972). I discuss variation in
palace floor space in greater detail below. The point I wish to make here is that whether
costly signals or something else, Florentine palaces were clearly much larger than
necessary for purely functional reasons.
The colossal size of these palaces may have had functional components, of
course. Contemporary accounts mention that palace space was occasionally used to house
troops, weapons, and food stores, including during the Pitti-Medici conflict (Kent 1987).
Even the decorative Renaissance palaces therefore had a defensive component despite the
lack of towers, crenellations, and other obvious defensive features—their colossal main
doors could be closed and barred against intruders, and their stone and brick construction
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would have been proof against the torches of angry mobs. The huge size of these palaces
may also have reduced the impact of plague on their inhabitants: there is some evidence
that the plague spread more easily in crowded housing conditions (Carmichael 1986).
Finally, palace construction may have had an unintentional altruistic component. The
need for masons and other skilled and unskilled laborers created jobs and prevented elites
from freezing hard currency in static storage or in business investments that did not create
jobs. However, these potential functional reasons for palace construction do not rule out
palaces also operating as costly signals.
Neighborhood Distribution
For the most part, the palaces in my sample are evenly distributed among the
neighborhoods that served as the first step in the process of political office. For the PreReform Republic period, the count of palaces by sestiere (the neighborhood divisions that
existed until 1343) is too high in the Oltrano district (p-value =.027) and too low in the
Porta del Duomo district (p-value =.027). However, this variation may be in part because
of the size of the districts: Oltrano is by far the largest of the sestiere, and Porta del
Duomo is the second-smallest. In addition, small changes in the counts of palaces would
bring all six sestiere into the same range.
After 1343 the city was divided into four quarters, each subdivided into four
gonfaloni. The variation in the number of palaces by quarter does not vary significantly
for the post-reform republic period, the Medici oligarchy period, or the late republic
period. There are statistically significant variations in the number of palaces by
gonfalone, but I am reluctant to give this variation any significance for two reasons. First,
gonfalone vary dramatically in size, with the smallest measuring only 44,000 square
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meters and the largest measuring 586,000 square meters. The small size of some
gonfalone would have made it difficult for individuals to find lots for sale that were large
enough for a palace. Second, the gonfalone boundaries are poorly documented (Herlihy
and Klapisch-Zuber 1985), and moving these boundaries by just a block in any direction
would dramatically change my counts of palaces per gonfalone.
In sum, therefore, palaces are more or less evenly distributed by neighborhood
within the city. This finding makes sense given the neighborhood roots of the political
system—because offices were more or less evenly distributed by neighborhood, highstatus potential office-holders should also be evenly distributed. The even distribution of
palaces by neighborhood also has implications for builders’ business networks. Padgett
has found a statistically strong relationship between living in the same neighborhood and
partnering for business purposes that crosses social and economic ties (Padgett and
McLean 2003). Machiavelli and others mention the importance of palaces, especially
those with benches, as meeting places for public discussions of politics, etc. (Kent 1987).
Palaces may also have been the center of lineage power. Palaces were usually built in
neighborhoods where extended families already had a significant presence, and palace
builders without prestigious kin built near their in-laws (Kent 1987). This emphasis on
neighborhood probably limited interest in building palaces in the undeveloped areas
toward the city walls (ibid.). Unfortunately, my lack of detailed data on family ownership
of non-palace real estate makes any meaningful analysis of family concentration
impossible.
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Ranking Palaces
Palaces were therefore far larger than housing on average. However, to function
as costly signals, palaces have to vary in ways that can be observed to allow them to be
ranked. It is this ranking that allows observers to judge builders and builders’ resource
control. For analytic purposes, I assume that palaces were ranked based on their total size
and degree of elaboration, factors I measure using an estimate of their total construction
cost.
To understand the costs of building these palaces, it is best to think of them as
three dimensional envelopes containing a variable number of floors. Part of the exterior
of each envelope is elaborately decorated, part is only finished but not decorated, and part
is shared with a neighboring structure. This section discusses how palaces vary in terms
of their footprint, height, total volume, number of floors, and amount of decorated façade.
For each variable, I evaluate differences for the entire temporal span of my data, for each
of the four periods of the Republic era and for the ducal era, and for each of the nine
palace styles described in the previous chapter.
Note that the rest of this chapter omits several palaces built during the study
period. For one, I have omitted the Palazzo Pitti in its current form. The palace was
expanded dramatically beginning in 1558 when the Medici dukes purchased the property
to serve as their official residence, and again beginning in 1620. The extent of expansion
made the Pitti palace vastly larger than any other palace in Florence: in the late 1500s it
was more than three times as large as the next-largest palace. However, this expansion
was made using government funds, and the Pitti Palace in its late 1500s form is better
thought of as a government building. Indeed, it was connected to the Palazzo della
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Signoria by the Uffizi corridor to facilitate its use for state functions. I have also omitted
16 palaces that were so modified after 1600 that I cannot with certainty determine their
original style, extent of façade decoration, footprint, height, and other variables.
Footprint
The republic era palaces have an average footprint (length and width, but not
height) of 845 square meters, with a range of 240 to 3,532 square meters and a standard
deviation 569 square meters. Footprint sizes are not normally distributed (KolmogorovSmirnov test significance .001), with a long right tail (Figure 29). Footprint varies
significantly, but not strongly, by period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .061)3 (Figure
30). However, none of the pairwise period-to-period comparisons of footprint are
significantly different when using the Games-Howell method4. Footprint varies
significantly by style (Kruskal-Wallis significance .000), and Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons show that transitional rusticated style palaces have significantly larger
footprints than medieval plain (significance .094) and stucco (significance .079) palaces
and that Renaissance rusticated palaces have significantly larger footprints than medieval
plain (significance .092) and stucco (significance .085) palaces (Figure 31).

3

I use a significance of .1 instead of .05 as a rough cutoff for statistically significant relationships
throughout this analysis. Although this threshold is lower than is conventional for hypothesis testing, I feel
that using the .1 significance level and reporting actual significance best conveys the variation in the data. I
also believe that the .1 level is appropriate given the small sample sizes involved in many of these statistical
tests.
4
My analysis uses the Games-Howell method throughout for pairwise comparisons. The Games-Howell
method is analogous to the ANOVA method. However, it can be used with samples of different sizes and
variances. In addition, it is considered more likely to find significant differences than the Tamhane’s T2,
Dunnett’s T3, and Dunnett’s C methods.
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Figure 29. Box plot of republic-era palace footprint (square meters).
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Figure 30. Box plot of republic-era palace footprint by period (square meters).
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Figure 31. Box plot of republic era palace footprints by style (square meters).
Ducal-era palace footprints vary significantly from palace footprints during the
four republic periods (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .004). Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons show that ducal era palaces have significantly larger footprints than prereform republic palaces (significance .015) and late republic palaces (significance .059).
There are also significant difference in footprint by style (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000), with Games-Howell pairwise comparisons showing that that
Mannerist stucco palaces have significantly larger footprints than medieval plain
(significance .036), medieval rusticated (significance .087), sgraffito (significance .093),
and stucco (significance .017) style palaces.
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Number of Floors
Republic-era palaces have an average of 3.3 floors, with a range of 2 to 5 floors
and a standard deviation of 0.5. The number of floors is not normally distributed
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test significance .000), probably because number of floors falls in
an essentially bimodal distribution, with virtually all palaces having either three or four
floors. The number of floors varies significantly by period (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000), and Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that pre-reform
republic palace have more floors than post-reform republic palaces (significance .001),
Medici oligarchy (significance .000) and late republic (significance .000) palaces.
Number of floors also varies significantly by style (Kruskal-Wallis test significance
.000), with Games-Howell pairwise comparisons finding medieval plain palaces to have
significantly more floors than Renaissance rusticated (significance .000), corner ashlar
(significance .014), and stucco (significance .030) palaces; medieval rusticated palaces
having more floors than Renaissance rusticated palaces (significance .015); and stucco
palaces having more floors than Renaissance rusticated palaces (significance .080).
According to architectural historians, three floors was a defining element of what I have
called Renaissance rusticated palaces; these figures confirm that these palaces were more
likely to be three floors high and that Medieval plain, medieval rusticated, and stucco
palaces were more likely to be four floors high. The number of floors for ducal-era
palaces falls in the same range as Republic-era palaces, and no specific pairwise
comparisons are significant.
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Floor Space
Total palace floor space averages 2,781 square meters, with a range of 643 to
12,184 square meters and a standard deviation of 1,853 square meters. As with all these
statistics, floor space is not normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov significance
.000). Floor space in square meters does not vary significantly by period during the
republic era (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .146). However, it does vary significantly
by style (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .001), with Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons showing that stucco palaces have significantly less floor space than
transitional rusticated (significance .046), Renaissance rusticated (significance .083), and
corner ashlar (significance .077) palaces (Figure 32). If ducal-period palaces are included,
floor space varies significantly by period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .015), but a
Games-Howell test finds no specific pairwise differences. With ducal era palaces
included, floor space still varies significantly by style (Kruskal-Wallis test significance
.000), with Games-Howell pairwise comparisons finding that stucco palaces also have
significantly less floor space than Mannerist stucco palaces (significance .027).
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Figure 32. Box plot of republic-era palace floor space by style (square meters).
Height
The height of republic-era palaces averages 19 meters and ranges from 13 to 36
meters, with a standard deviation of 3.6 meters. What is interesting about this figure is
that towers were limited by a 1250 law to about 29 meters high, and I intuitively expected
palaces to be much closer to that height. Once again, this figure is not normally
distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test significance .001). Height varies significantly by
period (Kruskal-Wallis significance .005) (Figure 33). Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons show that late republic period palaces are significantly shorter than prereform republic palaces (significance .030) and post-reform republic palaces (significance
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.050). Height also varies significantly by style (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000)
(Figure 34). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that sgraffito palaces are
significantly shorter than medieval plain (significance .010), medieval rusticated
(significance .010), Renaissance rusticated (significance .007), and corner ashlar
(significance .041) palaces, while stucco palaces are significantly shorter than medieval
plain (significance .019), medieval rusticated (significance .014), Renaissance rusticated
(significance .014), and corner ashlar palaces (significance .098).

Figure 33. Box plot of republic-era palace height by period (meters).
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Figure 34. Box plot of republic-era palace height by style (meters).
Adding palaces built during the Medici Duchy, height still varies significantly by
period (Kruskal-Wallis significance .000), but Games-Howell pairwise comparisons do
not find ducal era palaces to be differ significantly in height from palaces built during the
Republic periods. Height still varies significantly by style when ducal era palaces are
included (Kruskal-Wallis significance .027), and Games-Howell pairwise comparisons
show that Mannerist stucco style palaces are significantly shorter than Renaissance
rusticated style palaces (significance .038).
The heights of individual floors are probably highly variable at each palace, and I
did not analyze this attribute due to the difficulty of determining true floor height from
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the exterior. However, the average floor is 5.8 m high. Because of this height, the
windows in many palaces are 2 m off the floor and too high to see out of.
Volume
Although height and footprint help to understand how large palaces are, palace
volume is probably a much better measure of these structures’ true size. Among republicera palaces, volume averages 16,468 cubic meters, ranges from 4,080 to 81,236 cubic
meters with a very high standard deviation of 12,927 cubic meters, and is not normally
distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test significance .001). Volume varies significantly by
period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .006), and Games-Howell pairwise comparisons
find that pre-reform republic palaces have smaller volumes than Medici oligarchy period
palaces (significance .095) (Figure 35). Volume also varies significantly by style
(Kruskal-Wallis significance .000) (Figure 36). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find
that transitional rusticated palaces have significantly larger volumes than medieval plain
(significance .080), sgraffito (significance .095), and stucco (significance .030) palaces.
Renaissance rusticated palaces similarly have much larger volumes than medieval plain
(significance .060), sgraffito (significance .060), and stucco (significance .039) palaces.
Adding ducal period palaces, volume still varies significantly by period (KruskalWallis test significance .006), with Games-Howell comparisons showing ducal period
palaces to have significantly larger volumes than pre-reform republic palaces
(significance .049) and late republic palaces (significance .083). The addition of ducal era
palaces also preserves the significant difference in volume (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000), with Games-Howell pairwise comparisons showing Mannerist stucco
places to have significantly larger volumes than stucco palaces (significance .027).
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Figure 35. Box plot of republic-era palace volume by period (cubic meters).
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Figure 36. Box plot of republic-era palace volume by style (cubic meters).
Useable Space
Palaces also vary significantly in the number of cubic meters of volume per
square meter of floor space. This variable ultimately reflects the height of ceilings—
palaces with high ratios of volume to floor space have higher ceilings than palaces with
low ratios of volume to floor space. On average, Republic-era palaces have 6.1 cubic
meters of volume per square meter of floor space, with a range of 3 to 12 and a standard
deviation 1.3; this variable is not normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
significance .001). This “inefficiency” variable differs significantly by period (KruskalWallis test significance .001) (Figure 37). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that
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post-reform republic palaces are significantly less “efficient” than pre-reform palaces
(significance .055), and that Medici oligarchy palaces are significantly less “efficient”
than pre-reform republic (significance .009) and late republic (significance .074) palaces.
Spatial inefficiency also varies significantly by style (Kruskal-Wallis test significance
.000) (Figure 38). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that transitional rusticated
palaces are significantly less “efficient” than medieval plain (significance .081), sgraffito
(significance .024), and stucco (significance .065) palaces, and that Renaissance
rusticated palaces are significantly less “efficient” than medieval plain (significance
.004), medieval rusticated (significance .004), sgraffito (significance .002), corner ashlar
(significance .033), and stucco (significance .004) palaces. In other words, transitional
rusticated and Renaissance rusticated structures have far fewer square meters of usable
floor space per cubic meter of volume than other styles, enough to make the palaces of
the post-reform republic and Medici oligarchy periods less efficient in use of space than
the pre-reform republic and late republic period palaces. Adding ducal-era palaces does
not change these results—while there remains a significant difference in inefficiency by
period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .005) and style (Kruskal-Wallis test significance
.000), Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find no significant specific differences in the
efficiency of ducal era palaces and the Republic periods or in Mannerist palaces relative
to earlier styles.
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Figure 37. Box plot of republic-era palace spatial inefficiency by period (cubic
meters of volume per square meter of floor space).
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Figure 38. Box plot of republic-era palace inefficiency by style (cubic meters of
volume per square meter of floor space)
Decorated Façade Area
Palace envelopes—the complete exterior of the structure--average 2,781 square
meters and range from 926 to 21,344 square meters with a standard deviation of 2,300
square meters. However, about two-thirds of that envelope on average directly abuts
adjacent buildings. The actual portion of republic-era palace façades that are exposed to
view averages 972 square meters and ranges from 180 to 5,267 square meters with a
standard deviation of 770 square meters; this figure is not normally distributed
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov significance .000). Total exposed façade area does not vary
significantly by period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .102) but it does vary by style
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(Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that
medieval plain palaces have less exposed façade area than Renaissance rusticated palaces
(significance .048) and corner ashlar palaces (significance .061). Transitional rusticated
palaces have less façade area than renaissance rusticated palaces (significance .092).
Sgraffito palaces have less façade area than Renaissance rusticated (significance .035)
and corner ashlar palaces (significance .041). Stucco palaces have less façade area than
medieval plain (significance .083), medieval rusticated (significance .021), Renaissance
rusticated (significance .017), and corner ashlar (significance .000) palaces.
When ducal-era palaces are included, façade area remains significantly different
by style (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) but not by period (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .111). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons finds that Mannerist rusticated
palaces have significantly more façade area than sgraffito (significance .081) and stucco
(significance .053) palaces and that Mannerist stucco palaces have significantly more
façade area than stucco palaces (significance .007).
In broad terms, these results mean that Renaissance rusticated and corner ashlar
palaces were more likely than average to be built on lots with long street exposures, such
as corner lots, thereby exposing more of the building envelope to view, while stucco
palaces tended to be located on narrow lots and in the middle of blocks.
The more important variable is the portion of those exposed façades that were
decorated. On average, republic-era palaces had an average of 730 square meters of
decorated façade area, with a range of 158 to 6,515 square meters and a standard
deviation 761 square meters, and non-normal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
significance .000). Decorated façade area varies significantly by period (Kruskal-Wallis
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test significance .042) (Figure 39), and Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that
Medici oligarchy palaces have significantly more decorated façade area than late republic
palaces (significance .098). Decorated façade area also varies significantly by style
(Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Figure 40). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons
find a limited number of significant differences, however—stucco palaces have
significantly less decorated façade area than medieval plain (significance .040), medieval
rusticated (significance .094), and corner ashlar (significance .050) palaces. Surprisingly,
Renaissance rusticated palaces do not have significantly more decorated façade area than
stucco palaces, probably because of the massive range and small number of Renaissance
rusticated palaces.

Figure 39. Box plot of decorated façade area by period (square meters).
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Figure 40. Box plot of decorated façade area by style (square meters).
If ducal-era palaces are also considered, decorated façade area still varies
significantly by period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .034) and by style (KruskalWallis test significance .000). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that Medici
duchy period palaces have more decorated façade area than late republic palaces
(significance .085), but the addition of the ducal era collapses all republic periods into the
same range, such that Medici oligarchy palaces are no longer statistically distinguishable
from late republic palaces. Stylistically, Games-Howell pairwise comparisons of all
republic and ducal era palaces finds that only two differences are significant—stucco
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palaces have less decorated façade area than Medieval plain (significance .036) and
Mannerist rusticated (significance .020) palaces.
Cost Statistics
As discussed in the previous chapter, documented costs for palace construction
indicate that the actual cost in florins of building any specific palace can be estimated
using the following formula:
Cost = (Volume/3.28)+([Decorated Façade Area/.893]*Style Value).
Style values are.5 for stucco palaces, .6 for mannerist stucco and corner ashlar palaces, .7
for sgraffito palaces, .8 for medieval plain palaces, .9 for medieval rusticated and
transitional rusticated palaces, and 1 for Renaissance and Mannerist rusticated palaces.
These cost modification values are deliberately conservative. The range of façade
construction costs was probably much broader in reality. However, experimenting with
other variables (for example, making stucco palace façades one quarter as costly as
Renaissance rusticated façades) did not dramatically alter the results discussed below. As
discussed in the previous chapter, the costs obtained using this formula are close to actual
palace construction costs in the small number of cases where those costs are documented.
The resulting figures have a huge range. The palaces built during the republic era
cost an average of 5,650 florins but range from 1,355 florins to 32,062 florins with a
standard deviation of 4,613 florins and a non-normal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test of normality significance .000). The lack of normality is driven in large part by the
five high-side outliers, palaces with costs of more than 16,223 florins. These outliers are
not surprising—they include the Medici palace, the Strozzi palace, the 15th century core
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of the Pitti palace, and two palaces built by men who were very close Medici allies and
who married Medici wives.
Republic-era palace costs differ significantly by period (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .041) (Figure 41). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that Medici
oligarchy palaces are significantly more expensive than late republic palaces
(significance .088). Palace costs also vary significantly by style (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000) (Figure 42). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons indicate that
transitional rusticated palaces were significantly more expensive than stucco palaces
(significance .026), that Renaissance rusticated palaces were significantly more
expensive than medieval plain (significance .072), medieval rusticated (significance
.096), sgraffito (significance .064) and stucco (significance .041) palaces, and that corner
ashlar palaces were significantly more expensive than stucco palaces (significance .023).
Adding palaces built during the Medici duchy, palace costs still vary significantly by
period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .003); ducal period palaces were more expensive
than pre-reform republic (significance .090) and late republic (significance .058) palaces;
however, the addition of ducal era palaces also eliminates the significance of the
difference between costs for the Medici oligarchy and late republic periods. Palace costs
with the ducal era also remain significantly different by style (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that Mannerist stucco
palaces are significantly more expensive than stucco palaces (significance .016).
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Figure 41. Box plot of republic-era palace cost by period.
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Figure 42. Box plot of republic-era palace cost by style.
Cost and Façade Visibility
Intuitively, I expected palaces to be located on high-visibility lots, especially in
the case of the larger, fancier, and costlier palaces. Filarete’s Trattato di Architectura,
written from 1461 to 1464, says the position of the Medici palace at the head of a major
street and at the intersection of three streets is one of the structure’s most notable features
(Filarete 1965 [1464]). Lindow says visibility was generally considered an important
element in palace design (Lindow 2007). However, my data indicate that visibility was
not a factor in palace location, no matter how the data were analyzed. For example, linear
regressions of palace cost versus street width for all republic-era palaces is statistically
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significant (significance .013) but almost entirely lacking in explanatory power, with an
has an R-square value of only .040.

Costly Signal or Index
This analysis shows that palaces are indeed costly and that their costliness varies
by period and by style. But do palace costs vary in ways consistent with expectations for
costly signals, or do palace costs fit better with expectations for indices? As discussed in
chapter 6, I expected that if palaces were indices then all builders would spend a roughly
equal proportion of their wealth on palace construction. If palaces were costly signals,
builders should spend much more variable proportions of their wealth on palace
construction. As discussed in chapter 6, I used the shape of the distribution of wealth for
the 50 wealthiest households in the 1427 catasto as the baseline for evaluating whether
palace costs were more in line with predictions for costly signals or indices. It is worth
noting here that the 1427 catasto includes three palace-owning households: one Albizzi
household with 17,864 florins in total investments and a palace I estimate to have cost
7,412 florins, one Da Uzzano household with 50,869 florins in total investments and a
palace I estimate to have cost 8,735 florins, and one Strozzi household with an absurd
162,906 florins in total investments and a palace I estimate to have cost 5,941 florins.
These three households were the 60th, 8th, and 1st most-wealthy households in the 1427
catasto.
If palaces are an index of wealth, then the fitted growth curve for palace cost
versus rank of palace cost should match the beta term for wealth versus rank of wealth
(.028). The greater the difference between the beta term for the fitted growth curve for
wealth and the fitted growth curve for palaces, the better palaces fit with an interpretation
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that palaces were costly signals. The smaller the difference between the beta term for the
fitted growth curve for wealth versus rank of wealth and the growth curve for palace cost
versus rank of palace cost, the better palaces fit with an interpretation that palaces were
an index. The key is an indication that expenditures on palaces were not directly tied to
wealth. Basically, I am using the slope of the wealth curve as the expected shape of
expenditure on palace construction. Where the actual slope of the growth curve for palace
construction is above or below that slope it suggests that palace construction expenditure
could be modified by individual signalers and not hardwired to wealth.
For the following figures, intercept for fitted growth curve and wealth growth
curve are the same such that the lowest-ranked palace in each case sets the baseline for
both curves. The Y axis (cost) is the same in all graphs to maximize comparability.
Note that the following analysis are not changed by using log of wealth and log of
palace cost—the beta term in the growth curve equation becomes the slope of a linear
regression equation. The beta term of any particular growth curve equation for the nontransformed data is exactly the same as the slope for any particular linear regression
equation. Moreover, the relative x-y plots remain the same, just not curved. I have chosen
to display these results using growth curves in part to maximize the ease of interpreting
the cost values. Because palace costs have been calculated, albeit roughly, in actual units
of real-world currency, I wanted to emphasize actual values instead of log transformed
values.
For all 189 analyzable palaces in the data set, the beta term of the growth curve
for palace cost vs. rank of palace cost is .012 (R Square for growth .963, significance
.000). The beta term is steeper for only republic-era palaces, at .014 (R Square .957,
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significance .000) (Figure 43). Those results combine more than 300 years of palace
construction and nine palace styles. Comparisons of the wealth and palace cost slopes by
period and by style are more analytically relevant and considerably more interesting.

Figure 43. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, all republic-era palaces.
Index or Costly Signal by Period
Comparing the growth curves for palace cost versus rank of palace cost against
growth curves for wealth versus rank of wealth produces very different results for
different periods (Table 7). These figures suggest that the cost of Medici oligarchy period
palaces are most different from predicted distribution of costs for an index, while the cost
of late republic period palaces best fits with the index prediction.
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Table 7. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost growth curve statistics by period.
Period

Palace Cost
Beta Term

All palaces
Pre-Reform
Post-Reform
Oligarchy
Late Republic
Duchy

.012
.078
.054
.082
.031
.067

Difference from
Rank of
Wealth Beta
Difference
Term
.014
n/a
.050
2
.026
4
.054
1
.003
5
.039
3

R Square, Palace
Cost Growth Curve
.963
.886
.978
.940
.969
.934

During the pre-reform republic period, proportional palace expenditures exceeded
expected expenditures based on wealth by the second-greatest extent of the five periods,
although graphic presentation suggests the degree of difference may be much smaller if
only the less-costly pre-reform republic palaces are considered (Figure 44). This
patterning suggests palaces built during the pre-reform republic period are a better fit
with a costly signaling interpretation.
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Figure 44. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, pre-reform republic-period.
During the post-reform republic period, palace cost versus rank of palace cost has
the second-smallest degree of difference from the wealth curve (Figure 45). This
patterning suggests palaces built during the post-reform republic period are a better fit
with an interpretation that palaces were indices.
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Figure 45. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, post-reform republic-period.
The costs of palaces constructed during the Medici Oligarchy period have the
greatest difference from the predictions of the wealth curve, a difference that is preserved
when presented graphically (Figure 46). This patterning suggests palaces built during the
Medici Oligarchy period are a very good fit with an interpretation that they were costly
signals. The four costliest palaces were built by individuals who were exceptionally
wealthy and enmeshed in behind the scenes power struggles: Cosimo de’ Medici, the
period’s de facto ruler; Filippo Strozzi, who was exiled in 1434 at the return to Florence
of Cosimo de’ Medici but who was allowed to return in 1466, Luca Pitti, who was
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Cosimo’s right-hand-man in the 1450s and early 1460s; and the Tornabuoni family,
which was allied to the Medici through marriage ties.

Figure 46. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, Medici oligarchy period.
Palaces built during the late republic period palaces fit very closely with the
wealth curve both in numeric terms and graphically (Figure 47). This patterning strongly
suggests that palaces built during the late republic were indices, not costly signals. The
two most costly palaces of the period were built by the Da Gagliano family, which left
almost no documentary trace, and by Giovanni Francesco Ridolfi, a member of a very
large lineage that had first served in tre maggiore office in 1287.
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Figure 47. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, late republic-period.
Palaces built during the Medici Duchy fall somewhere in the middle, both
numerically and graphically (Figure 48).
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Figure 48. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, Medici duchy era palaces.
In sum, palaces built during the Medici oligarchy period look most like costly
signals, not indices. Palaces built during the late republic period look most like indices
and least like costly signals. The cost of palaces built during the Medici oligarchy diverge
most from the distribution predicted by the wealth curve in part because of the small
number of very high-profile palaces built during the period—the extremely large,
elaborate, and costly Medici, Strozzi, and Pitti palaces. But the divergence is driven also
by the cluster of palaces in the middle of the period’s palace cost distribution. The late
republic period is dominated by comparatively small, simple, and less-costly palaces that
are all tightly clustered in cost with the exception of two very high outlier values. The
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cost distribution of palaces built in the other periods fall in between the extremes of the
Medici oligarchy and late republic periods, making interpretation of costly signal versus
index more ambiguous.
Index or Costly Signal by Style
A comparison of palace costs and the wealth curve also finds dramatic differences
when evaluated by palace style (Table 8), although the small numbers of palaces in each
individual style mean that some of these comparisons are dramatically skewed by
exceptionally high-cost palaces. The limited utility shows clearly when presented
graphically (Figure 49, Figure 50, Figure 51, Figure 52, Figure 53, Figure 54, Figure 55,
Figure 56, Figure 57). However, two points can be made from the data on the distribution
of palace costs by style. The first point is that several of these styles show noticeable
steps or tiers in their cost distributions. In some cases these steps are an artifact of small
numbers of palaces, as is definitely the case for Mannerist rusticated palaces (Figure 56).
A small sample size may also be driving the appearance of a stepped or tiered distribution
for Renaissance rusticated palaces, but the small sample size does not change the fact that
the gaps in palace costs for the style are quite large (Figure 52). Steps or tiers are also
visible in palace styles with larger sample sizes, for example in the case of the sgraffito
(Figure 53) and corner ashlar styles (Figure 54). I discuss these steps or tiers in greater
detail below to explain how palace construction period and style combine to produce
steps or tiers similar to the predictions of Johnstone’s error-prone signaling model.
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Table 8. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost growth curve statistics by style.
Style

Medieval
Plain
Medieval
Rusticated
Transitional
Rusticated
Renaissance
Rusticated
Sgraffito
Corner
Ashlars
Stucco
Mannerist
Rusticated
Mannerist
Stucco

Palace Cost
Beta Term

Difference from
Wealth Beta
Term

Rank of
Difference

R Square, Palace
Cost Growth Curve

.054

.026

2

.928

.132

.104

6

.978

.150

.122

7

.916

.202
.086

.174
.058

8
4

.905
.934

.082
.036

.054
.008

3
1

.973
.979

.309

.281

9

.874

.089

.061

5

.932

The second point that these figures make clear is that there is a strong consistency
between styles that individually look more like costly signals and the strength of a costly
signal interpretation for the periods during which those styles were dominant. For
example, all Renaissance rusticated style palaces in my data were built during the Medici
oligarchy period, the period whose palaces are most consistent with expectations for
costly signals. Renaissance rusticated style palaces have the second-greatest difference
between their cost growth curve beta term and the wealth growth curve beta term,
suggesting that Renaissance rusticated style palaces are more consistent with costly
signals (Figure 52). The situation is similar for the late republic period. Nearly all the
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stucco style palaces were built during the late republic, the period when palaces were
most consistent with an index interpretation, and stucco style palaces by themselves have
the smallest difference between the growth curve beta term for their costs and the growth
curve beta term for the wealth distribution, suggesting that they are in line with
expectations for indices (Figure 55). In other words, the dominant style in each period is
responsible for much of the strength of a costly signaling or index interpretation for
palace costs for each period.

Figure 49. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, medieval plain style.
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Figure 50. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, medieval rusticated style.
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Figure 51. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, transitional rusticated style.
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Figure 52. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, Renaissance rusticated style.
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Figure 53. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, sgraffito style.
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Figure 54. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, corner ashlar style.
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Figure 55. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, stucco style.
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Figure 56. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, Mannerist rusticated style.
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Figure 57. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, Mannerist stucco style.
Signal Perception Error by Period
The divergence of palace cost from wealth is not the only way to evaluate whether
palaces are more consistent with an interpretation that they are costly signals or indices.
As discussed in the hypotheses chapter, palace size and cost (and thus relative signal
intensity) are probably easily misinterpreted by observers, and this signal perception error
means that palaces should fit better with models of signaling with error than with models
that do not account for error. I predict that if palaces were costly signals, palace cost
versus rank of cost should show steps or tiers in keeping with Johnstone’s error-prone

179

signaling model (Johnstone 1994). This section analyzes palaces by period and style to
evaluate whether these steps are apparent.
For each period, I look at the data in three ways. First, I assume that a difference
of more than 10 percent in the cost of a palace from the next-most-expensive palace
indicates a significant break. I used 10 percent differences as breaks because Johnstone’s
model suggests that 10 percent perception error is the minimum error rate needed to
produce steps or tiers. I then compare graphic plots of palace cost versus rank of palace
cost to see if those steps indicated by 10 percent cost increases are apparent. Finally, I
compare plots of palace cost versus rank of palace cost to see if those same steps are
readily apparent when the cost scale of the plot is on a logarithmic scale under the
assumption that error rates may be a log-scale phenomenon (Teghtsoonian 1971). I also
look at the position in each cost distribution of different palace styles to evaluate how
style contributes to overall patterning in palace costs by period.
There are two caveats that should be kept in mind regarding the following
analysis. The first is that Johnstone’s model discusses “initial flats” where low-quality
signalers do not signal at all or signal at an extremely low level because perception error
makes it impossible for them to signal intensely enough for their signals to be perceived
at all. I assume that the “initial flat” in my data is non-palace housing. This data is
obviously missing from my sample. If plotted, these non-palaces would be a long “initial
flat” that ends where my figures begin.
This issue of missing data raises another caveat: the breaks in the distributions
below that I interpret as steps may actually represent missing data—palaces destroyed or
massively modified since they were built. My response is that it is unlikely that a few
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palaces in fairly narrow cost ranges would be missing. What is more likely is that I am
missing palaces at the low end of the cost distributions. Most of the palaces that I initially
recorded in the field then later removed from the sample because of uncertainty about
their ages were comparatively small and were mostly stucco style palaces probably built
during the late republic period.
Pre-Reform Republic Period
Examination of the costs of the 24 pre-reform republic period palaces finds jumps
of more than 10 percent in palace costs between 5,300 florins and 6,700 florins and
between 7,800 florins and 9,900 florins. These two steps are clear in a plot of palace cost
versus rank of palace cost (Figure 58) and in a plot of log of palace cost versus rank of
palace cost (Figure 59). Below 5,300 florins, palace costs increase in a roughly
continuous distribution. The presence of these steps or tiers reinforces the finding of the
comparison of palace costs versus wealth distribution that pre-reform republic period
palaces are more consistent with the expectations for costly signals than for indices.
Stylistic variation appears to have little significance—medieval rusticated style palaces
are mixed more or less randomly among the medieval plain style palaces.
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Figure 58. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, pre-reform republic period.
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Figure 59. Log of palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, pre-reform republic period.
Post-Reform Republic Period
Examination of the costs of the 36 post-reform republic period palaces finds no
jumps of more than 10 percent in palace costs. Although apparent steps are visible in a
plot of palace cost versus rank of palace cost (Figure 60) and in a plot of log of palace
cost versus rank of palace cost (Figure 61), these steps are less than 10 percent. The lack
of steps or tiers reinforces the finding of the comparison of palace costs versus wealth
distribution that post-reform republic period palaces are more consistent with the
expectations for indices than for costly signals. Stylistically, transitional rusticated
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palaces dominate the high end of the cost distribution, but they are not unique to the high
end.

Figure 60. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, post-reform republic period.
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Figure 61. Log of palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, post-reform republic period.
Medici Oligarchy Period
Examination of the costs of the 32 Medici oligarchy period palaces finds jumps of
more than 10 percent in palace costs between 5,000 florins and 7,000 florins and between
10,900 and 18,500 florins; the four palaces over 18,500 florins include the landmark Pitti,
Strozzi, and Medici palaces. These steps are obvious in a plot of palace cost versus rank
of palace cost (Figure 62) and in a plot of log of palace cost versus rank of palace cost
(Figure 63). Below step 1 and between steps 1 and 2, palace costs increase in a roughly
continuous distribution. The presence of these steps or tiers reinforces the finding of the
comparison of palace costs versus wealth distribution that Medici oligarchy period
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palaces are more consistent with the expectations for costly signals than for indices.
Stylistic variation is not surprising at the very high end—the high-cost examples are all
Renaissance rusticated style palaces—but it is probably significant that the Renaissance
rusticated style is basically absent from the first step and that stucco and sgraffito style
palaces are absent and rare, respectively, in the second step. This pattern confirms my
earlier interpretation of the sgraffito style as a low-cost alternative to the Renaissance
rusticated style.

Figure 62. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, Medici oligarchy period.
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Figure 63. Log scale of palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, Medici oligarchy period.
Late Republic
Examination of the costs of the 69 late republic period palaces finds jumps of
more than 10 percent in palace costs to occur between 11,800 and 16,200 florins; only
two palaces cost more than 16,200 florins and both are among the complete data set’s
outlier values. The late republic period therefore basically lacks steps in palace cost. This
lack of steps is clear in a plot of palace cost versus rank of palace cost (Figure 64) and in
a plot of log of palace cost versus rank of palace cost (Figure 65). Below 11,800 florins,
palace costs increase in a roughly continuous distribution. This near-lack of steps or tiers
is consistent with the interpretation that late republic palaces are a better fit with an
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interpretation that they were indices, not costly signals. Stucco style palaces dominate the
low end of the cost distribution, while corner ashlar palaces dominate the high end. In
contrast to its position during the Medici oligarchy period, the sgraffito style is scattered
throughout the cost distribution.

Figure 64. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, late republic period.
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Figure 65. Log scale of palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, late republic period.
Medici Duchy
Examination of the costs of the 28 Medici Duchy palaces finds jumps of more
than 10 percent in palace costs between 3,200 florins and 3,900 florins and between
11,000 florins and 15,000 florins. These steps are evident in a plot of palace cost versus
rank of palace cost (Figure 66) and in a plot of log of palace cost versus rank of palace
cost (Figure 67). Between these two steps palace costs increase steadily. The earlier
comparison of palace costs versus wealth distribution found the Ducal period to be in the
middle of the ranking of index or costly signal by period, and that ambiguous
interpretation is continued here. Stylistic variation by cost is interesting mostly for the
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distribution of Mannerist stucco palaces throughout the ranking, a pattern that probably
reflects how much actual stylistic diversity I compressed into the Mannerist stucco style.

Figure 66. Palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, Medici duchy period.
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Figure 67. Log scale of palace cost vs. rank of palace cost, Medici duchy period.
Where none of these distributions of palace costs by period fit with Johnstone’s
predictions is at the high end. Johnstone’s model predicts that signal intensity or cost will
flatten out. I expected the same pattern in the palace data because of diminishing returns
with increasing signal cost. I think the reason that costs do not flatten out is partly the
effects of very high levels of perception error at the top end, roughly in keeping with
Johnstone’s model of the effects of scale in compounding perception error. I also suspect
that the individuals who built the most expensive palaces may have been competing on
two levels. In addition to signaling to other Florentines in competition for power within
the city, the Medici, Strozzi, Pitti, and other builders of very high-cost palaces were
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probably signaling to top-level elites in other states as part of their efforts to become
powerful in international terms by assuming control of the city. Although the Strozzi and
Pitti challenged the Medici at various times, the Medici ultimately won this content to
become the unquestionably dominant family in 1533, when the family was named
hereditary rulers of Florence and Caterina de’ Medici was married to the second son of
the king of France, a far more prestigious marriage partner than the son of any Florentine
lineage.

Costly Signaling or Bet Hedging?
The question of whether palaces were part of a conservative bet-hedging strategy
will be addressed in detail in the next chapter, which covers variation in the reproductive
and political success of palace builders relative to other subsets of the Florentine
population. However, one part of the conservative bet hedging or “waste” model can be
evaluated here. The model suggests that palaces should first appear during periods of
large scale and unpredictable environmental variation. Palace construction should
subsequently be more common when productivity is relatively high then all but stop
during downturns in resource availability. Converted into the basically capitalist
Florentine society, this should mean more palace construction during economic booms
and less construction during economic busts. Separately, information is not part of the
conservative bet hedging model. If palace styles convey information, it suggests that
palaces were involved in costly signaling, a conclusion that would gain support if stylistic
change correlates in time with societal changes that alter the signaling environment.
However, the presence or absence of information content in palaces does not rule out bet
hedging or waste, which do not involve information transfer.
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The earliest extant palaces date to the very early years of the republic or possibly
a decade or two before. The late 1200s were arguably unpredictable in political terms, but
the political triumph of guild forces over the aristocracy represents the culmination of
decades of increasing importance of merchants in Florentine politics. The early years of
the republic are therefore best seen as the final stabilization of a shift from noble to
merchant government, not as a period of large-scale environmental variation. The origins
of Florentine palace building are therefore ambiguous on the question of costly signaling
vs. bet hedging. Moreover, the entire history of the Florentine republic can be seen as
unpredictable in economic and political terms. If palaces are a form of bet hedging, after
their original appearance they should be most common during periods of stability in
preparation for periods of instability. My data show that palace construction was much
more common during the politically unstable but economically stable late republic period
than during all other periods, including the politically and socially stable and
economically dynamic Medici oligarchy (Table 9). The rate of late republic palace
construction is even greater when considering the complete lapse in palace construction
between 1494 and 1498, the period of Savonarola’s dominance of the city. For the
remaining years of the late republic period, 2.1 palaces were built per year. This
patterning is therefore ambiguous with regard to conservative bet hedging or waste in that
palace construction rates cannot be directly tied to broad changes in resource
availability—should I assign greater importance to the economic maturity of the late
republic period or to the fact that palace construction continued even in the economic and
demographic wake of the plague years in the mid 1300s?
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Table 9. Count of palaces by period and per year.
Build Period
Early Republic
Medici Oligarchy
Late Republic
Medici Duchy
Total

Date Range
1280-1433
1434-1493
1494-1532
1533-1600

N
N per Year
61
0.4
41
0.7
72
1.9
32
0.5
206
0.6

The presence of stylistic elements on palace façades that clearly convey
information does not rule out palaces as elements in conservative bet hedging, but it does
provide additional support for palaces operating as costly signals. Style can be a very
effective way of conveying information, especially when applied to high-visibility
artifacts such as building façades and especially when the message is simple and easily
understood (Wobst 1977). Several archaeologists have suggested that the style of elite
goods, especially monumental architecture, is particularly useful for conveying messages
related to ideology (DeMarrais, et al. 1996) and for obtaining support from craft
specialists who provide products for elite markets (Baines, et al. 1998). Early Florentine
palaces do not convey much obvious information, ideological or otherwise, save for their
coats of arms identifying their owners. But Medici oligarchy and late republic period
palaces can be interpreted as conveying messages about republican political ideology.
Many Renaissance rusticated palaces have mullioned windows that are not found on any
other palace styles of palace. Where those windows are found is on the Palazzo della
Signoria, the city’s hall of government, the Bargello (the republic’s prison), and on the
state-owned granary-turned church of Orsanmichele. Mullioned windows appear first on
the Medici palace, which was built a decade after the family had assumed de facto control
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of the city. The sgraffito style palaces that appeared immediately after the Renaissance
rusticated style do not have mullioned windows, but they do emulate in stucco the latter
style’s massive rusticated ashlar façades. So where the Renaissance rusticated palaces
evoke architectural landmarks of republican government, the Sgraffito palaces evoke
their larger, costlier Renaissance rusticated neighbors and possibly a tenuous link to the
republican architectural brand.
Palaces’ stylistic elements may have information content that is not obvious to
modern observers. For example, the Pazzi palace may have been deliberately designed to
show anti-Medicean tendencies. The round windows on main Pazzi façade are unusual in
Florentine domestic architecture, but they do appear on the Pazzi Chapel and the Palazzo
di Parte Guelfa, a "symbol of the city's mercantile oligarchy and traditional alliance with
the papacy, [that] had been left unfinished, deprived of funding and attention as a result
of Medicean politics" (Andres, et al. 1988). The palaces of the early Duchy are much
more transparent in their meaning. Many are decorated with Medici coats of arms, busts
of Medici Dukes, and other elements that are clearly intended to demonstrate allegiance
with the ruling family.

Summing Up—Are Palaces Costly Signals?
The analysis of the palace record suggests that the palaces built during the prereform republic and Medici oligarchy periods are very consistent with expectations for
costly signaling. The palaces of the pre-reform republic period are the second-best fit
with expectations for costly signaling based on the difference between the distribution of
palace costs and the distribution of wealth. Pre-reform republic palaces also have two of
the steps or tiers in palace cost that I expected due to the likelihood of signal perception
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error. The early years of the republic were a boom time for merchants and the period of
sorting out what, exactly, the republic meant, a process that included a continuation of the
armed factional strife that plagued the decades prior to the establishment of guild
government. The main elements of these early palaces’ styles—the incorporation of
defensive elements and their multiple ground-floor storefront and warehouse doors—
encapsulate the tension between the bad old days of noble conflict and the businessoriented present, a tension that manifested most clearly in the republic’s marginalization
of the nobility.
The Medici oligarchy period has the best fit with expectations for costly signaling
based on the difference between the distribution of palace costs and the distribution of
wealth. The period’s five palace styles include the most and least costly styles in my
sample, and the differences in the cost of those different styles break the period’s palaces
into two steps or tiers. The oligarchy was a period of economic opportunity, with high
wages even for the poor. With the poorest consumers able to afford costly consumer
goods, costly signaling theory suggests elites would have increased their spending on
palaces as the highest-end signals in order to distinguish themselves from the poor and
middle classes. The result was that the highest-end signalers—especially the Medici,
Strozzi, and Pitti—would have built their vast and colossally expensive Renaissance
rusticated palaces to distinguish themselves from the merely wealthy who built the
period’s sgraffito, stucco, and corner ashlar style palaces.
The post-reform republic period and late republic period fit better with the
expectations for indices. The post-reform republic period has the fourth-worst fit with
expectations for costly signals based on the comparison of palace cost and wealth. No
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steps or tiers are visible in the distribution of palace costs. Election data suggests that the
period was very open socially and politically, in part because of reforms made after the
Ciompi revolt and societal adjustments required by the demographic effects of the
plague. The cost of the period’s palaces fits with that sociopolitical context, although the
appearance of the transitional rusticated style did set the groundwork for the Medici
palace and other Renaissance rusticated style palaces.
The late republic period was the worst fit with the expectations for palaces as
costly signals based on the comparison of palace costs and the growth curve for wealth.
Although one step or tier is visible in the data, it is at the very high end of palace costs
and includes only two palaces. The late republic was politically unstable but
economically mature, with increased concentration of wealth in a smaller number of
families and less opportunity for new families to become wealthy. It was also a period of
increasing efforts by elite families to concentrate wealth in a smaller number of offspring,
a subject I discuss in detail in the conclusion chapter. The period’s elites also began to
abandon direct roles in business. In this context, palaces appear to have lost their role as
signals and instead became an index of wealth.
The analysis of palaces built during the early decades of the Medici Duchy is
ambiguous—the distribution of palace costs relative to the wealth curve can be
interpreted as consistent with costly signals or indices. Two steps are present in the
distribution of palace costs, but one is at the very low end and one at the very high end.
This ambiguous patterning may reflect the small sample size. As noted previously, my
sample of ducal-era palaces biases recognized landmark structures and includes no
palaces observed during survey. However, the mixed results may also reflect a mix of
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elite reactions to the increasing aristocratization of the formerly merchant elite that began
during the late republic period but that became truly entrenched during the duchy.
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CHAPTER 8. ANALYZING THE PALACE BUILDERS
For palaces to be costly signals, they should benefit their builders in ways that
result in improved fitness. My analysis of palace builders and their families uses data
extracted from the Florentine elections data to evaluate political and reproductive
success. Reproductive success is obviously linked to individual fitness. Political success
is linked to fitness for two reasons. First, individuals who appeared in the elections data
had already acquired some measure of status among their peers, who had elected for
those individuals to move into the pool of potential government office-holders. This
status could have been translated into improved resource control and the ability to
provision themselves and their offspring with the benefits of greater resource control. My
sample of palace builders includes 94 individuals identified by contemporary documents
or architectural historians’ research as being the builders of palaces between the late
1200s and 1600. Those 94 individuals built a total of 86 palaces (a small number of
palaces were built by brothers and one was built by two brothers and their uncle). Eight
of those 94 individuals built palaces during the Medici Duchy and therefore have no trace
in the elections data. My sample also includes 25 individuals who purchased a total of
existing palaces (including six men who were active only during the Duchy).
I then used the election records to find palace builders’ and palace buyers’ fathers,
who were identified on the assumption that builders’ and buyers’ second names followed
patronymic conventions. Note that my discussion of fathers in the following analysis
collapses the fathers of palace builders and palace buyers. Builders’ and buyers’ brothers,
sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons were identified following the same logic. Builders’
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and buyers’ first sons were assumed to be the inheritors of their fathers’ palaces.
Inheritance of a palace by the eldest son may not have been immediate—there may have
been a period when siblings negotiated the eventual buyout of shares in a palace by the
oldest son. However, the general pattern in Florence was for the first-born son to
eventually buy his brothers’ shares in their fathers’ palaces. I was able to confirm
inheritance by the first-born son in about a third of the cases using documentary records.
Where first sons died young, second sons were assumed to be their fathers’ inheritors.
Younger sons were classified as “descendants” to distinguish them from likely inheritors.
The control group is all individuals in the election database from the Rucellai
family. The extraction of elections records for individuals was extremely time-consuming
and could not be automated. Producing a list of all individuals, their probable birth dates,
their election results, and their known male offspring would have taken thousands of
hours. The Rucellai family was selected as the control because it was a large family that
survived the Renaissance, included wealthy, middling, and poor households, and was
politically active but not active enough to be exiled or executed. The resulting control
group has 302 individuals. The control group includes 12 individuals for whom year of
birth or years of political or reproductive activity could not be determined. Some
individuals in the control group also appear in the lists of builders, inheritors, fathers, and
descendants. This choice was deliberate—most of the city’s largest lineages included a
small number of palace builders, and I thought the control group should reflect the
complete spectrum of individuals who participated in politics. Note that my data only
includes individuals who appeared in election records. It does not include women or
illegitimate male offspring (unless they were given their fathers’ name as a patronymic).
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My demographic data includes a total of 905 individuals (Table 10). The data
includes 14 individuals who built or bought palaces during the Medici Duchy. These 14
men cannot be analyzed due to a lack of information on their political careers, offspring,
and other events resulting from the end of elections record-keeping with the Ducal-era
cessation of republican government. The remaining 891 individuals who were politically
active during the republic are analyzed below for the entire republic era and for the same
four republic periods as were used for analysis of the palace record. Individuals are
grouped into periods based on the years when they were first politically and
reproductively active, not when they were born. So, for example, individuals born in
1404 are included in the Medici oligarchy period, as they would have been old enough to
hold office in 1434. If one of these individuals survived beyond 1494, the end of the
Medici Oligarchy period, their late-life career will still be included in the analysis of the
Medici Oligarchy period.
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Table 10. Counts of individuals in the demographic data.
Period and Person Type
Pre-Reform Republic
Builder
Father
Inheritor
Descendant
Control
Post-Reform Republic
Builder
Brother
Father
Inheritor
Descendant
Control
Medici Oligarchy
Builder
Buyer
Brother
Father
Inheritor
Descendant
Control
Late Republic
Builder
Buyer
Brother
Father
Inheritor
Descendant
Control
Duchy
Builder
Buyer
Active Period Unclear
Control
Total

Count
24
5
4
3
5
7
142
17
17
28
15
12
53
393
39
9
82
39
38
56
130
320
25
10
38
5
52
00
100
14
8
6
12
12
905
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Reproductive Success
Evolutionary models such as costly signaling and bet hedging often use
reproductive success to measure the benefits of a trait or behavior, especially when
applied to non-human organisms. The following analysis is able to evaluate the
reproductive success for a significant subset of the Florentine population during the
republic. However, the data have several limitations: they include only males who had
their fathers’ first name as a patronymic and who appeared in the election records,
whether in birth records, guild election records, or tre maggiore election records. This
analysis therefore omits several groups: females, males who were never part of the
electoral process, males who only appeared in election records in the years for which the
records are missing or were not coded by Herlihy (Herlihy, Litchfield, et al. 2002), and
males whose names did not follow normal naming conventions, a group that probably
includes unrecognized illegitimate sons. The data also do not include sons who died when
very young unless those sons’ births were registered for electoral purposes.
Age at First Son
Average age at the birth of a first son averages 33.4 years and despite small
differences does not vary significantly by type of person for the entire republic era
(Kruskal-Wallis test significance .663) (Table 11; Figure 68). Palace builders had their
first sons at the same age at their fathers, brothers, descendants, and the control group.
Average age at first son also does not vary across types of individuals for specific periods
of the republic area (Kruskal-Wallis test significance ranges from .420 to .731).
It appears than on average, the men in my sample had their first sons at unusually
early ages. Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber report that their data, especially the 1427 catasto,
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indicate an average male age at first birth of 40.2 years, with a standard deviation of
10.15 years (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985). They also note that wealthy men tended
to be slightly but not significantly older than average at first birth. The men in my data
had their first sons an average of 6.8 years younger than the men in the Herlihy and
Klapisch-Zuber sample.
Table 11. Average age at first son.
Type of Person
Builder
Buyer
Brother
Father
Inheritor
Descendant
Control
Average

Average Age at First Son
35.7
32.1
34.1
32.3
32.5
33.7
33.1
33.4
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Figure 68. Boxplot of age at birth of first son.
Age at Last Son
For the entire republic era, the age at birth of last son averages 40.9 years and
varies significantly by type of person (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .012) (Table 12;
Figure 69). However, Games-Howell pairwise comparison finds only one significant
difference—palace builders have a later last son than inheritors (significance .005). The
average for all groups is well below when males would have lost fertility, at least in
modern populations: a review of research on male fertility, mostly in the United States,
found a significant drop after age 50 (Kidd, et al. 2001). This difference in age at last son
disappears when analyzed by period—no type of individuals has a statistically significant
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later age at last son than any other (Kruskal-Wallis test significance ranges from .060 to
.873).
Table 12. Average age at last son.
Type of Person

Average Age at Last Son

Builder
Buyer
Brother
Father
Inheritor
Descendant
Control
Average

44.8
36.6
41.5
41.8
37.7
40.5
40.0
40.9
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Figure 69. Boxplot of age at birth of last son.
Number of Reproductive Years
The number of years between first known son and last known son is an indicator
of the total reproductive success of the parents. For the entire republic era, the number of
years between the first and last known son averages 8.3 years and varies significantly by
type of person (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .001) (Table 13; Figure 70). GamesHowell pairwise comparisons find that builders have significantly longer ranges between
first and last son than inheritors (significance .047) and that fathers have longer periods
of reproduction than inheritors (significance .003). Analysis of the number of years
between first and last son by period finds no significant variation in the pre-reform
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republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .878) or in the post-reform republic
period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .421). However, there is a significant difference
during the Medici oligarchy period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .015), where a
Games-Howell pairwise comparison found only one significant pairwise difference—
fathers have longer reproductive life than inheritors (significance .020). There is also a
significant difference in the number of years between first and last son during the late
republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .017), but pairwise comparisons are not
possible due to the limitations of the late republic elections data (fathers and descendants
have too few cases to allow for comparisons).
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Table 13. Average number of years between first and last son.
Type of Person
Father
Builder
Brother
Descendant
Control
Inheritor
Buyer
Average

Number of Years
10.6
10.1
8.4
7.8
7.2
6.3
5.5
8.3

Figure 70. Boxplot of number of years between birth of first and last known son.
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Number of Sons
The variable most likely to correspond to total reproductive success is the number
of known sons. The average number of known sons varies significantly by type of person
(Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Table 14; Figure 71). Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons show that palace builders have significantly more sons than brothers
(significance .013), descendants (significance .000), and the control group (significance
.000). Builders’ brothers have fewer sons than builders (significance .013) and fathers
(significance .000) but more sons than builders’ descendants (significance .005). Palace
buyers have fewer sons than fathers (significance .043). Non-inheriting descendants have
fewer known sons than brothers (significance .005), builders (significance .000), fathers
(significance .000), inheritors (significance .000), and the control group (significance
.026). Fathers have more sons than brothers (significance .000), buyers (significance
.043), descendants (significance .000), inheritors (significance .002), and the control
group (significance .000).
Table 14. Average number of known sons.
Type of Person

Average Number of Sons

Father
Builder
Inheritor
Buyer
Brother
Control
Descendant
Average

3.0
2.5
2.1
1.7
1.4
1.2
0.7
1.6
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Figure 71. Boxplot of number of known sons.
Virtually all of the palace builders and buyers in my sample had sons. Only 11 of
the 105 republic-era palace builders and palace buyers in my sample had no identifiable
sons. Of those 11 men, two were bishops. It is likely, although not certain, that those 11
men were unmarried. Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber calculate that about 4.5 percent of men
age 50 or older were probably permanent bachelors, and approximately 12 percent of all
Florentine men never married (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985). In my sample, 10.5
percent of palace builders and buyers had no known sons and may have been permanent
bachelors, a figure roughly in keeping with Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber’s findings.
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The variation in my data may reflect differences in wealth. In the early 1400s,
wealthy women had an average of three children while poor women had an average of
two, in part because of the apparently high cost of raising children in the city (Herlihy
and Klapisch-Zuber 1985). In general, sons were far more common than daughters
(suspiciously so) (ibid.). However, assuming parents had a roughly equal number of sons
and daughters, the palace builders, palace builders’ fathers, and palace builders’
inheritors in my sample had extremely large families by Florentine standards. Crosschecks of men in my sample who also appeared in the 1427 catasto also allowed me to
evaluate whether the number of offspring correlated with wealth. Herlihy and KlapischZuber (1985) found that each child required about 750 florins of investment to support,
suggesting that there was a roughly linear relationship between wealth and number of
children. Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber suggested that this relationship broke down for
extremely large families and extremely wealthy families, and that appears to be the case
with the men in my sample, where the relationship between wealth and number of
offspring is weak (p-value for linear regression of wealth vs. children = .540). My sample
is all drawn from wealthiest roughly 15 percent of the population, and I suspect that my
sample falls into the portion of the population wealthy enough to have much lower perchild incremental costs.
Of course, my data only reflect sons whose names appeared in elections records.
It is entirely possible that, for example, the control group had as many sons as palace
builders but that they did not enter political life. The available data give me no way to
determine whether individuals in my data are missing sons except for men who were
alive and old enough to have families in the 1427 catasto, which contains detailed
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demographic data. Cross-checks of counts of sons from the elections data with counts of
sons from the catasto found that none of my counts of sons are high and that only a small
proportion (approximately 15 percent) had one son listed in the catasto who was not
listed in the elections data. It is likely that many of these “missing” sons died too young
to appear in the elections data.
The numbers of known sons varies considerably within each period. During the
pre-reform republic period, the number of known sons varies significantly by type of
person (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .021) (Table 15).Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons show only that fathers have more sons on average than descendants
(significance .011). The differences are partly the result of the small sample size for the
period—for example, there are only six descendants in my sample during this period.
Table 15. Average number of known sons, pre-reform republic period.
Type of Person
Control
Builder
Father
Inheritor
Descendant
Average

Average Number of Sons
2.7
2.3
2.3
2
0
1.8

The number of known sons also varies significantly for the post-reform republic
period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Table 16). Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons show that fathers have more sons on average than brothers (significance
.017), descendants (significance .014), and the control group (significance .006).
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Table 16. Average number of known sons, post-reform republic period.
Type of Person
Father
Inheritor
Builder
Control
Brother
Descendant
Average

Average Number of Sons
3.1
2. 7
2.5
1.6
1.3
1.2
2.1

The range of pairwise differences in numbers of known sons increases during the
Medici oligarchy period. Again, the number of known sons varies significantly by type of
person (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Table 17). Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons show that fathers have more sons on average than brothers (significance
.000), descendants (significance .000), inheritors (significance .017), and the control
group (significance .000). Palace builders have more sons than descendants (significance
.005) and the control group (significance .009). Inheritors have more sons than
descendants (significance .047).
Table 17. Average number of known sons, Medici oligarchy period.
Type of Person
Father
Builder
Inheritor
Buyer
Brother
Control
Descendant
Average

Average Number of Sons
3.2
2.6
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.1
1
1.7
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The number of known sons continues to vary significantly by type of person
during the late republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Table 18). GamesHowell pairwise comparisons show only that descendants have fewer sons than builders
(significance .028) and inheritors (significance .000) and that inheritors have more sons
than the control group (significance .005) and descendants (significance .000). Note that
fathers and buyers are omitted because they have too few cases for Games-Howell
comparisons. Also note that the small numbers of sons in the late republic period is the
result of data truncated by the end of elections, not by a societal drop in fertility.
Table 18. Average number of known sons, late republic period.
Type of Person
Builder
Inheritor
Brother
Buyer
Father
Control
Descendant
Average

Average Number of Sons
2.3
1.9
1.0
1
1
0.6
0.3
0.9

Summary of Reproductive Success
In broad terms, palace builders and their fathers have a slightly longer
reproductive life and more sons than the overall population. Palace-builders inheritors
had a larger number of sons than average although an average reproductive lifespan.
Because of variations in the data from period to period, it is better to compare the relative
fitness of different types of individuals within period than to compare across periods.
What can be compared across periods is the degree of the difference between builders’,
215

fathers’, and inheritors’ reproductive success and the rest of the population (Table 19;
pre-reform republic period is omitted due to the small sample size). Overall, palace
builders’ reproductive success relative to the control group and to the overall average
increases dramatically over time. Fathers’ reproductive success is even greater than their
sons’ and increases dramatically between the post-reform republic period and the Medici
oligarchy period; the figures for fathers in the late republic period are based on a very
small sample of fathers and are of limited accuracy. Palace builders’ inheritors saw a
sharp increase in reproductive success in the late republic period.
The data suggest that palace builders’ fathers and their grandfathers had
phenotypic qualities (and possibly underlying genetic qualities) that produced sons with
very high fitness. This high level of fitness suggests considerable parental investment—
individuals’ number of offspring can be highly variable for genetic and phenotypic
reasons and because of variations in early life experience (Voland 1998), and research
has found that individual life expectancy at birth determines most of the variation in age
at first birth across cultures (Low 2000). The data further suggest that this level of
investment increased over time. In the case of palace builders, keep in mind that age at
palace construction and age at last sons’ birth are statistically indistinguishable. This
suggests that palace construction may have been a component in parental investment.
Inheritors’ reproductive success improved dramatically between the Medici oligarchy and
late republic periods, possibly due to this parental investment and because of changes in
elite marriage and inheritance patterns: during the late republic, elite families married off
fewer daughters and began giving the bulk of their estates to their eldest sons in place of
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the earlier pattern of partible inheritance. These changes will be discussed in greater
detail in the conclusion.
Table 19. Difference from average reproductive success by period.
Type of Person
Father
Builder
Buyer
Brother
Inheritor
Descendant
Control

Post-Reform Republic
149%
121%
n/a
63%
129%
57%
78%

Medici Oligarchy
187%
151%
106%
96%
117%
59%
67%

Late Republic
111%
249%
111%
111%
213%
32%
69%

Political Success
The number of times individuals were drawn for guild and government positions
and the number of times they were elected to those positions are indicators of those
individuals’ social connectedness and their status. These election data are therefore a
measure of individual viability that is at least partly independent of pure wealth.
Total Number of Draws
The average number of draws for guild and tre maggiore office varies
significantly by type of person for the republic era as a whole (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000) (Table 20; Figure 72). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that
builders were drawn more times than descendants (significance .001) and the control
population (significance .001). Fathers were drawn more often than brothers (significance
.002), buyers (significance .011), descendants (significance .000), and the control
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population (significance .000). Inheritors were drawn more often than descendants
(significance .001) and the control population (significance .001).
Table 20. Average number of draws.
Type of Person
Father
Builder
Inheritor
Brother
Buyer
Descendant
Control
Average

Average Number of Draws
10.4
7.4
7.1
5.7
4.6
3.8
3.3
5.3
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Figure 72. Boxplot of number of election draws.
When analyzed by period, number of seats does not vary significantly during the
pre-reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .829). The number of draws
does vary significantly during the post-reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .001). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find only that builders were
drawn more often than the control group (significance .008).
The number of draws also varies significantly during the Medici oligarchy period
(Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Table 21). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons
find that builders were drawn more often than the control group (significance .003).
Fathers were drawn more than brothers (significance .009), descendants (significance
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.000), and the control group (significance .000). Brothers were drawn more often than the
control group (significance .004). Inheritors were drawn more often than descendants
(significance .006) and the control group (significance .000). The number of draws varies
significantly during the late republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Table
22). However, Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find only that inheritors were drawn
more often than descendants (significance .011) and the control group (significance .000).
Note that the small numbers for seats during the late republic period are due to the end of
elections at the period’s close.

220

Table 21. Average number of draws, Medici oligarchy period.
Type of Person
Father
Inheritor
Buyer
Builder
Brother
Descendant
Control
Average

Average Number of Draws
11.6
9.8
8.3
7.2
6.8
5.5
3.7
6.4

Table 22. Average number of draws, late republic period.
Type of Person
Builder
Inheritor
Brother
Father
Buyer
Descendant
Control
Average

Average Number of Draws
3.8
2.9
2.3
2.2
1.2
1.5
0.9
1.8

Total Number of Seats
The total number of times that individuals were seated for all guild and tre
maggiore offices varies significantly for the entire republic era (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000) (Table 23; Figure 73). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that
builders were seated more times than brothers (significance .012), descendants
(significance .000), and the control group (significance .000). Fathers were seated more
times than brothers (significance .000), buyers (significance .002), inheritors
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(significance .026), descendants (significance .000), and the control group (significance
.000). Inheritors were seated more times than the control group (significance .000) and
descendants (significance .001). Brothers were seated more times than the control group
(significance .016).
Table 23. Average number of seats.
Type of Person
Father
Builder
Inheritor
Brother
Buyer
Descendant
Control
Average

Average Number of Seats
5.2
3.7
3.0
2.0
1.7
1.4
1.1
2.1
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Figure 73. Boxplot of number of election seats.
When analyzed period by period, the number of seats does not vary significantly
by type of person during the pre-reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance
.793). It varies significantly during the post-reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .001), but a Games-Howell pairwise comparison show only that builders had
significantly more seats than the control group (.002). Number of seats also varies
significantly during the Medici oligarchy period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000)
(Table 24). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that builders had significantly
more seats than descendants (significance .040) and the control group (significance .000).
Brothers had more seats than the control group (significance .005). Fathers had more
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seats than brothers (significance .002), descendants (significance .000), and the control
group (significance .000). Inheritors had more seats than descendants (significance .015)
and the control group (significance .000). Significant differences continue during the late
republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Table 25). Games-Howell
pairwise comparisons show that builders had significantly more seats than control (.027)
and that inheritors had significantly more seats than control (.000) and descendants
(.005).
Table 24. Average number of seats, Medici oligarchy period.
Type of Person
Father
Inheritor
Builder
Buyer
Brother
Descendant
Control
Average

Average Number of Seats
5.2
3.7
3.4
3.0
2.2
1.7
0.8
2.2

Table 25. Average number of seats, late republic period.
Type of Person
Builder
Inheritor
Buyer
Brother
Descendant
Father
Control
Average

Average Number of Seats
2.3
1.6
1.2
0.9
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.7
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Number of Tre Maggiore Draws
Evaluation for and election to government offices carried much more prestige
than guild offices, which were responsible only for guild policy. Moreover, the tre
maggiore data are more complete than the guild data. The number of draws only for tre
maggiore offices varies significantly for the entire republic era (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000) (Table 26; Figure 74). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that
builders were drawn for tre maggiore positions more often than brothers (significance
.043), descendants (significance .000), and the control group (significance .000). Fathers
were drawn more often than brothers (significance .013), descendants (significance .000),
and the control group (significance .000). Inheritors were drawn more often than
descendants (significance .000) and the control group (significance .000). Brothers were
drawn more than the control group (significance .001).
Table 26. Average number of tre maggiore draws.
Type of Person
Father
Builder
Inheritor
Buyer
Brother
Descendant
Control
Average

Average Number of Draws
6.5
5.9
5.3
4.9
4.0
2.7
2.3
3.7
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Figure 74. Boxplot of number of tre maggiore draws.
The number of draws for tre maggiore offices does not vary significantly during
the pre-reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .909). It does vary
significantly for the post reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .003),
with a Games-Howell pairwise comparison finding that builders were drawn more often
than the control group (significance .025).
The number of significant differences increases during the later periods. The
number of draws varies significantly for the Medici oligarchy period (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000), during which period Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that
builders were drawn more often than the control group (significance .014), brothers were
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drawn more often than the control group (significance .004), fathers were drawn more
often than descendants (significance .006) and the control group (significance .000), and
inheritors were drawn more than the control group (significance .000) and descendants
(significance .007). Significant variation in the number of tre maggiore draws continues
in the late republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000). Games-Howell
pairwise comparisons find that builders were drawn more often than the control group
(significance .002) and descendants (significance .008), while inheritors were drawn
more often than descendants (significance .002) and the control group (significance .000).
Number of Tre Maggiore Seats
If being drawn and “seen” for tre maggiore offices indicated a certain level of
status, being evaluated for and elected to, or seated in, office translated into much more
status and actual power. The number of times individuals were seated for tre maggiore
office varies significantly by type of individual for the republic era (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .000) (Table 27; Figure 75). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that
palace builders were seated more often than brothers (significance .000), descendants
(significance .000), and the control group (significance .000). Fathers were seated more
often than brothers (significance .003), descendants (significance .000), and the control
group (significance .000). Inheritors were seated more often than brothers (significance
.044), descendants (significance .000), and the control group (significance .000). Brothers
were seated more than the control group (significance .007).
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Table 27. Average number of seats to tre maggiore offices.
Type of Person
Builder
Father
Inheritor
Buyer
Brother
Descendant
Control
Average

Average Number of Seats
3.2
3.1
2.4
2.1
1.5
1.0
0.7
1.5

Figure 75. Boxplot of number of tre maggiore seats.
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The number of seats to tre maggiore offices does not vary significantly during the
pre-reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .856). The number of seats
does vary significantly during the post-reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .001), a period for which a Games-Howell comparison finds only that palace
builders were seated more often than the control group (significance .008).
The number of seats varies significantly during the Medici oligarchy period
(Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000), and the scope of significant differences increases.
Builders were seated more often than the control group (significance .000), brothers were
seated more often than the control group (significance .001), fathers were seated more
often than the control group (significance .000) and descendants (significance .009),
inheritors were seated more often than the control group (significance .000), and
descendants were seated more often than the control group (significance .033). The
number of tre maggiore seats also varies significantly during the late republic period (The
number of seats varies significantly during the Medici Oligarchy period (Kruskal-Wallis
test significance .000). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons show that builders had more
tre maggiore seats than descendants (significance .014) and the control group
(significance .006). Inheritors had more seats than descendants (significance .001) and
the control group (significance .000).
Percentage of Tre Maggiore Draws Resulting in Seat
Individuals in my sample varied significantly in their win rate for tre maggiore
offices, calculated as the number of seats divided by the number of draws (KruskalWallis test significance .000) (Table 28). For the republic era as a whole, Games-Howell
pairwise comparisons find that palace builders had a higher win rate than brothers
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(significance .000), descendants (significance .000), and the control group (significance
.000). Fathers had a higher win rate than brothers ((significance .049), descendants
(significance .013), and the control group (significance .000). Inheritors had a higher win
rate than brothers (significance .018), descendants (significance .003), and the control
group (significance .000).
Table 28. Average percentage of draws resulting in seat, tre maggiore offices.
Type of Person
Builder
Father
Inheritor
Buyer
Brother
Descendant
Control
Average

Average Percent Won
53.1%
47.5%
47.3%
39.4%
31.8%
29.3%
24.3%
35.3%

Percentage of tre maggiore draws resulting in a seat does not vary significantly
during the pre-reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .889) or the postreform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .184). It does vary significantly
during the Medici oligarchy period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000), when GamesHowell pairwise comparisons find that palace builders had a higher win rate than the
control group (significance .000), that fathers had a higher win rate than the control group
(significance .001), and that inheritors had a higher win rate than the control group
(significance .004). The win rate also varies significantly during the late republic period
(Kruskal Wallis test significance .001), although a Games-Howell pairwise comparison
finds only that inheritors had a higher win rate than descendants (significance .006) and
the control group (significance .015).
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Age at First and Last Office
The age at which Florentines in my sample first held office (including both guild
and tre maggiore office) does not vary significantly for the entire republic era (KruskalWallis test significance .073) or for any specific period (Table 29). On average,
Florentines first held office six years after becoming eligible for office on their thirtieth
birthdays.
Table 29. Average age at first office.
Type of Person
Builder
Father
Buyer
Brother
Inheritor
Control
Descendant
Average

Age at First Seat
37.5
36.7
36.3
36.6
36.1
35.2
34.7
36.1

The age at which individuals held their last office varies significantly for the
republic era (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Table 30; Figure 76). Builders were
significantly older at their last seat than brothers (significance .013), buyers (significance
.023), descendants (significance .000), and the control group (significance .000). Fathers
were significantly older at their last seat than descendants (significance .001) and the
control group (significance .001)
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Table 30. Average age at last seat.
Type of Person
Builder
Father
Inheritor
Brother
Buyer
Control
Descendant
Average

Age at Last Seat
56.2
54.2
49.8
48.4
46.6
44.5
44.7
49.2

Figure 76. Boxplot of age at last seat.
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Age at last seat does not vary significantly during the pre-reform republic period
(Kruskal-Wallis test significance .632), but it does vary significantly during the postreform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .001). Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons for the post-reform republic period show that builders were significantly
older at their last seat than descendants (significance .013), inheritors (significance .046),
or the control group (significance .000). Fathers were significantly older at last seat than
descendants (significance .001) and the control group (significance .001). Age at last seat
varies significantly for the Medici oligarchy period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance
.001), when Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that builders were significantly
older at last seat than the control group (significance .006), that fathers were significantly
older at last seat than the control group (significance .042), and inheritors were
significantly older than the control group (significance .027). Age at last seat does not
vary significantly during the late republic, presumably because of the end of republican
government and the resulting truncation of political careers (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .675).
Number of Politically Active Years
The number of years between first and last seat, a measure of political lifespan,
varies significantly for the republic era (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000) (Table 31;
Figure 77). Games-Howell comparisons find that builders had a longer political lifespan
that descendants (significance .003) and the control group (significance .000) and that
fathers had a longer political lifespan than descendants (significance .007) and the control
group (significance .000).
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Table 31. Years between first and last seat, republic era
Type of Person
Builder
Father
Inheritor
Brother
Descendant
Buyer
Control
Average

Years Between First and Last Seat
19.2
18.4
13.4
12.5
10.5
10.2
9.8
13.5

Figure 77. Boxplot of number of years between first and last seat.
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The length of political lifespan does not vary significantly during the pre-reform
republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .883). It does vary significantly during
the post reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .014), but the only
significant Games-Howell pairwise comparison is that builders had a longer political
lifespan than the control group (significance .003). Political lifespan varies significantly
for the Medici oligarchy period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .002), and GamesHowell pairwise comparisons show that builders were in political life for more years than
the control group (significance .031), fathers were in political life longer than the control
group (significance .003), and inheritors were in political life more years than the control
group (significance .028). Political lifespan does not vary significantly during the late
republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .171), probably because political careers
were truncated by the creation of the Duchy.
Rejections for Office
As discussed in the review of the electoral system, individuals drawn for office
could be rejected for several reasons. The most common reasons were the death of the
individual prior to his drawing, insufficient age, and “in speculo” status (Table 32). The
analysis below covers only tre maggiore offices because of the more complete
transcription of those results into the election database my research used.
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Table 32. Reasons for electoral rejection, republic era.
Result
Seated
Minor
In speculo
Dead
Other

Tre Maggiore Offices
40.3%
23.3%
10.1%
16.8%
9.5%

Guild Offices
37.5%
21.0%
29.9%
9.7%
1.9%

Overall
39.1%
22.3%
18.7%
13.7%
6.2&

Rejection for “in speculo” status usually means the individual owed taxes or fines
to the state or other parties as part of legal proceedings (Herlihy, Litchfield, et al. 2002). I
intuitively expected that there would be a relationship between in speculo status and
palace construction if the costs of palaces placed a huge and unsustainable burden on
their builders, buyers, or inheritors. For the republic era as a whole, the frequency of in
speculo status varies significantly by type of individual (Kruskal-Wallis test significance
.004) (Table 33), but there are no significant Games-Howell pairwise comparisons. The
number of in speculo draws does not vary significantly for the pre-reform republic period
(Kruskal-Wallis test significance 1.00), the post-reform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis
test significance .357), or the late republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .104).
In speculo draws do vary significantly during the Medici oligarchy period (KruskalWallis test significance .015), but there are no significant Games-Howell pairwise
comparisons. Some of the variation in the number of in speculo draws is due to the
number of total tre maggiore draws: a linear regression of in speculo draws per person
versus total tre maggiore draws per person is statistically significant (significance .000)
and moderately explanatory (R Square .363). In other words, the more often a man was
drawn, the more likely he was to be in speculo for one of those drawings.
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Table 33. Average number of in speculo tre maggiore draws.
Type of Person
Buyer
Inheritor
Builder
Father
Brother
Control
Descendant
Average

Number of In Speculo Draws
0.71
0.58
0.48
0.40
0.36
0.36
0.27
0.39

Being drawn as a minor appears to have been a reflection of young men being
deliberately entered in the pool of potential office-holders by their parents and therefore
reflects a particular type of status-seeking behavior by parents on behalf of their
offspring. Minor draws vary significantly for the republic era as a whole (Kruskal-Wallis
test significance .000) (Table 34). Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that
members of the control group were less likely to be drawn as minors than brothers
(significance .000), descendants (significance .041), fathers (significance .007), and
inheritors (significance .009). However, the patterning is weak when considered by
period. There is no significant variation in the number of minor draws during the prereform republic period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance 1.00) or the post-reform republic
period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .266). The number of minor draws varies
significantly during the Medici oligarchy period (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000),
when Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that members of the control group were
drawn as minors less often than brothers (significance .024) and fathers (significance
.012). The number of minor draws also varies significantly during the late republic period
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(Kruskal-Wallis test significance .006), but there are no significant pairwise comparisons.
Much of the variation in the number of minor draws per person is due to the number of
total tre maggiore draws per person: a linear regression of minor tre maggiore draws
versus total tre maggiore is statistically significant (significance .000) and has
considerable explanatory power (R Square .524). In other words, the more often a man
was drawn, the more likely that he was under age for some of those drawings.
Table 34. Average number of minor draws for tre maggiore office, republic era.
Type of Person
Father
Buyer
Brother
Inheritor
Descendant
Builder
Control
Average

Number of Minor Draws
1.63
1.57
1.42
1.34
0.89
0.85
0.54
0.97

Summary of Political Success
Measured in terms of total draws for guild and tre maggiore office, total seats for
guild and tre maggiore office, draws for tre maggiore office alone, seats for tre maggiore
office alone, percentage of draws resulting in seats, or length of political career, palace
builders and their fathers consistently outperformed the population as a whole. Palace
inheritors also performed well, although not as well as their fathers or grandfathers. Noninheriting descendants of palace builders and the control group performed much less well
in terms of political success. As with reproductive success, the political success of palace
builders, their fathers, and their probable inheritors in terms of number of times seated in
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tre maggiore office increased over time (Table 35; pre-reform republic omitted due to a
small sample size). Note that the late republic figure for fathers is based on a very small
sample size and may also reflect the period’s truncation by the creation of the Duchy.
Table 35. Difference from average number of tre maggiore seats by period.
Type of Person
Father
Builder
Buyer
Brother
Inheritor
Descendant
Control

Post-Reform Republic
121%
133%
0%
82%
100%
90%
85%

Medici Oligarchy
Late Republic
135%
35%
146%
174%
150%
83%
93%
111%
136%
155%
93%
68%
58%
67%

Palace Builder Life History
On average, all palace builders followed a similar course through their
reproductive and political lives. They had their first son at age 36 (when their wives
would have been roughly 25 years old on average), were seated for their first office at age
38, completed their palaces at age 45 (at least a decade after their fathers’ deaths in all
cases where I have relevant data), had their last son at the same age (45 years old, when
their first wives would have been roughly 34 years old), and were seated for their last
office at age 56. These ages differ significantly (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .000),
and Games-Howell pairwise comparisons find that differences in all stages are
statistically different (alpha less than or equal to .005) except age at first seat and age at
first son, which are not significantly different (significance .830), and age at palace
acquisition or construction start and age at last son, which are also indistinguishable
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(significance 1.000). Age at death is particularly variable but averages roughly 70 years.
Of course, these averages collapse considerable individual variation (Figure 78).

Figure 78. Boxplot of palace builder ages at life history events.
These figures vary slightly by period (Table 36, which combines the pre-reform
and post-reform republic periods to avoid statistical problems caused by the small
number of builders from the pre-reform republic period). Palace builders were seated for
their first office at a significantly earlier age during the late republic than during other
periods. Palace builders were seated for their last office at significantly later ages during
the pre- and post-reform republic periods than during later periods. The very low figure
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for the age at last seat for the late republic is due to the end of elections in 1533 and is not
an empirically significant difference.

Table 36. Palace builder average ages at life history events by period.
Age at
Life
History
Event
First son
First seat
Palace start
Last son
Last seat

Pre- and
PostMedici
Late
Average
Reform Oligarchy Republic
Republic
34.6
36.5
34.8
35.7
36.2
39.3
34.3
37.5
44.0
46.5
42.4
44.7
44.6
45.4
43
44.8
64.1
55.8
43.5
56.2

95% Low
for Mean

95% High
for Mean

33.4
35.0
41.9
41.9
52.7

39.8
40.0
47.4
47.7
59.7

The data clearly indicate that palace builders had greater reproductive and
political success than the rest of my sample population. But the details of their life
histories show that palace builders built their palaces after the end of their reproductive
lives and about half way through their political careers. This timing is very different from
what I expected if palaces were costly signals. Costly signaling theory states that signal
recipients will change their behavior toward signalers in response to signals. If palaces
were costly signals designed to use signalers’ resources to improve their reproductive and
political success, palaces would have been built before the start of builders’ reproductive
and political careers. For example, if builders were attempting to attract high-quality
brides, their palaces would have been completed before they began having legitimate
offspring. Instead, the patterning in my sample shows that palace builders built their
palaces after they had completed their known reproductive careers and about half of their
political careers. Palace builders were on average about 45 years old when their palaces
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were built. Although there is variation in that age by period, it is not significant and is
driven by the small number of palaces built by identified builders during the pre-reform
republic period (Figure 79). At 45 years old, the average palace builder had a nine-yearold son, a second son, and possibly a third son and had first served in office seven years
earlier. His father had almost certainly died—palace builders’ fathers were in theory 80
years old on average when their sons’ palaces were built, but only 5.4 percent of the
individuals in my sample for whom I have an age at death lived to 80 years or older.

Figure 79. Boxplot of builder age when palace constructed.
In other words, the timing of palace construction was a function of the builder’s
age when his first son was born, his age when he first held office, his age when he had his
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last son, and his total number of sons. A linear regression of these four variables is
statistically significant in predicting the age of a builder when his palace was built
(significance .007), and the combination of these variables explains more than half of the
variation in age at palace construction (R Square .514). All four variables and the
constant are statistically significant (significance ≤ .05). Adding age at last seat to this
equation actually reduces its significance (significance .014) and only slightly increases
its explanatory power (R Square .520). In short, a palace builder’s reproductive and
political life history prior to palace construction determined when he built that palace.
Palace construction is a capstone of the builder’s life history.
This timing differs considerably from that of modern consumers. In modern
populations, experiments suggest that men looking for mates spend more on conspicuous
luxury goods (Griskevicius, et al. 2007). This is not to say that Florentine men did not
spend money as part of mate searches, but rather that palaces were not part of that
strategy. Florentine men also differed from modern populations in their age at the end of
their reproductive lives—reviews of research on modern male fertility, mostly in the
United States, found a significant drop after age 50, five years after the average
Florentine palace builder stopped having legitimate sons (Kidd, et al. 2001).

Is Palace Cost a Factor?
When developing my hypotheses, I expected that palace cost would correlate with
benefits to signalers such that individuals who built more expensive palaces would
receive greater reproductive or political success. Counter to my expectations, I was able
to find not a single even remotely significant correlation between palace cost and any of
the variables discussed in this chapter except number of guild draws, but even that
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variable had virtually no explanatory power (Table 38). However, this finding is
consistent with my finding that palace construction followed builders’ reproductive years
and about halfway through their political careers. Analysis of palace inheritors produced
similar results—even for palace builders’ inheriting sons, palace cost did not correlate in
a statistically significant way with any of the variables discussed in this chapter (Table
38). The results are also similar when evaluated for individual periods.
Table 37. Regressions of palace cost vs. success, palace builders.
Variable
Age at palace completion
Age at first son
Age at last son
Number of reproductive years
Number of known sons
Number of tre maggiore draws
Number of tre maggiore seats
Number of guild draws
Number of guild seats
Years of political activity

R Square
.019
.039
.032
.001
.001
.012
.003
.076
.002
.000

Significance
.206
.136
.174
.862
.831
.366
.664
.018
.680
.957

Table 38. Regressions of palace cost vs. success, builders’ inheriting sons.
Variable
Age at palace completion
Age at first son
Age at last son
Number of reproductive years
Number of known sons
Number of tre maggiore draws
Number of tre maggiore seats
Number of guild draws
Number of guild seats
Years of political activity

R Square
.002
.093
.122
.029
.017
.004
.006
.025
.007
.002
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Significance
.721
.080
.043
.333
.404
.637
.575
.256
.540
.794

Summarizing the Benefits of Palace Construction: Is Lineage
Survival the Answer?
If palaces were built after their builders had ended their reproductive lives and
were well into their political lives, what was the real benefit of building a palace? The
answer may be that palaces increased the likelihood that families’ reproductive and
political success would persist across generations.
Florentines defined status on three separate axes: wealth, participation in politics,
and lineage size (Padgett 2010). Although Padgett’s research shows that Renaissance
Florentine elite lineages survived at rates greater than Renaissance and early modern elite
lineages in England, France, Germany, and Holland, Florentine families were still subject
to significant generation to generation variability. Between 1352 and 1480, only about 25
to 40 percent of Florentine families persisted in the top 10 percent of wealth from one 25year period to the next (ibid.). In politics, only 30 to 55 percent of lineages that had at
least one priorate seat every 30 years preserved that status from one 30-year period to the
next (ibid.). In contrast, average lineage size in terms of the number of households per
extended family increased between 1352 and 1480 (ibid.). However, Padgett’s research
found little statistical correlation between these three axes of political participation,
wealth, and lineage size, so a family’s possession of one element of status did not
guarantee its possession of the other two. That lack of linkage is despite the association
between business partnerships and political office holding such that men who had
commercial ties also tended to serve in office together (Padgett and McLean 2003).
Padgett finds that marriage was one way to limit generation to generation losses
of status. About 80 to 90 percent of Florentine families that married same-status spouses
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between 1352 and 1480 preserved their political and or financial status across generations
(Padgett 2010). Padgett’s research provides statistical corroboration for earlier research
finding that elite marriage acted as a buffer against economic and political mobility
(Molho 1994; Padgett 2010).
However, the role of marriage in preserving elite status began to break down in
the early 1500s due to the increasing cost of marriage and increased elite concern about
preserving wealth across generations. With the increasingly mature economy of the
1500s, merchants had lower risks of catastrophic losses but also less opportunity for huge
gains (Goldthwaite 2009). Elites responded by shifting from partible inheritance to
primogeniture (Emigh 2003; Goldthwaite 2009). They also reduced the number of sons
allowed to marry and delayed the age at which those sons married (Johansson 1987).
Meanwhile, dowries paid by Florentine elites increased almost 45 percent over the 1400s
and another 25 percent between 1500 and 1530, the bulk of my late republic period
(Strocchia 2009). This increase in dowries is viewed as the main cause for the huge
increase in the number of nuns in Florence: the percentage of the population in convents
increased from 0.45 in 1338 to 5.2 percent in 1552, and these numbers were dominated
by young women from elite lineages (ibid.). These forces led to reduced fertility among
elite families and eventually to the complete disappearance of many elite lineages during
the 1700s (Litchfield 1969).
Palaces may have acted as a strategy similar to marriage ties in preserving elite
families and as a strategy that functioned over the long term, beyond the years of
republican government. My data show that palace builders’ fathers had the same high
level of reproductive and political success as their palace-building sons. Builders’ fathers
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had even greater reproductive success on average than their palace-builder sons, although
the difference is not statistically significant. After their fathers’ deaths, palace builders
began construction of their palaces, probably using funds inherited from their fathers.
Given that partible inheritance was the rule for most of the Renaissance, palace builders’
brothers probably received a roughly equal inheritance, but chose not to spend that
inheritance on palace construction. Despite their inheritances presumably being equal to
palace builders, palace builders’ brothers had much less political or reproductive success,
and they are statistically indistinguishable from the control group in most measures.
Palace builders’ political and reproductive success persisted to their first-born sons and
their first-born sons’ first-born sons, who despite partible inheritance probably inherited
or eventually acquired their fathers’ and grandfathers’ palaces. Building a palace
therefore preserved a family’s reproductive and political success across multiple
generations starting with the builder’s father.
Men who bought existing palaces had far less reproductive or political success
than men who built their own palaces. Although men who bought existing palaces had
slightly higher than average reproductive and political success, the difference was not
great enough to distinguish them statistically from the control group. However, the
political and reproductive statistics for the probable inheritors of men who bought
existing palaces cannot be distinguished from the statistics for the likely inheritors of men
who built new palaces. So while buying an existing palace did not benefit the buyer, it
did benefit his eldest son—the inheriting sons of men who bought used palaces received
the same benefits in reproductive and political terms as the inheriting sons of men who
built new palaces.
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Losing a palace due to financial difficulty, exile of a family member, or other
causes was not detrimental to the success of palace builders. Compared to men who kept
the palaces they built, the palace builders who lost their palaces had the same number of
offspring (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .481), the same number of reproductive years
(Kruskal-Wallis test significance .502), the same age at first son (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .599) and last son (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .610), the same age at
first seat (Kruskal-Wallis test significance .596) and last seat (Kruskal-Wallis test
significance .194), the same number of total draws (Kruskal-Wallis test significance
.668), and the same number of total seats (Kruskal-Wallis test significance 1.00).
However, the number of men who lost their palaces is very small. Among the 86 families
that built new palaces during the republic era, only nine families lost those palaces before
the end of the republic. Of those nine losses, seven took place during the original
builder’s life, and six of those losses were due to the builder’s exile following their
involvement in anti-Medici plots (including members of the Albizzi, Strozzi, Neroni, and
Pazzi families). These plotters were well into their political and reproductive lives before
they were exiled, which probably explains the lack of damage to their political and
reproductive success.
In general, documentary sources say that plotters’ offspring were not punished
unless they were also guilty of treason. That pattern shows in my data. The probable
inheritors of men who built then lost palaces had the same levels of political and
reproductive success as the inheritors of men who did not lose their palaces. Padgett’s
findings agree—his research found no correlation between exile for political reasons and
lineage survival (Padgett 2010).
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The benefits of palace construction to inheritors led to much greater long-term
lineage survival as measured by persistence through the Medici Duchy era, which ended
in 1737 with the death of the last Medici. A total of 429 families had members who
served as prior at some point during the republic, an indicator of high political status. Of
those 429 families, 220 served in the 48-member ducal senate-era and/or were members
of the Order of St. Stephen, a religious military order of knights founded by Cosimo I de
Medici in 1561. Membership in these organizations was considered an indication of elite
status during the ducal era. These numbers mean that 51.3 percent of families in the
republic era political elite were also political elites during the ducal era. Some of the
families that disappeared from the political elite during the ducal era probably vanished
because they died out. My research identified 102 families that owned palaces at some
point during the republic era, 87 of which that had members who served as prior. Of
those 87 families, 71 had members in the ducal senate and/or Order of St. Stephen, an
81.6 percent rate of preservation of elite political status (and biological persistence) and a
considerably higher rate of political survival than the overall average for families with
high political status during the republic. Of the 36 palaces built between the start of the
ducal period and 1600, 29, or 80.5 percent, were built by families with members in the
Senate and/or the Order of St. Stephen or by families that were nobles in Tuscany or
elsewhere. These figures show that the lineage survival benefits of palace construction
that begin during the Medici oligarchy period become critical during the increased
competition for elite marriage ties during the late republic and into the duchy, when elite
families abandoned partible inheritance for sons and stopped attempting to marry off all
their daughters.
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Costly Signals, Indices, or Bet Hedging?
For an attribute to be costly signaling, it must elicit a response from signal
recipients that benefit the signaler. If palaces had a benefit for their builders, it did not
involve reproduction or entry into politics. Palace builders did have a longer-than-average
political lifespan, part of which occurred after they had built their palaces. However,
palace builders’ fathers and their inheritors had roughly similar reproductive success,
political success, and even number of years in politics.
My results therefore suggest that palaces were part of a multigenerational strategy
(deliberate or otherwise) to preserve families in biological terms and in terms of political
status. In the first generation, high-quality fathers of eventual palace builders have an
average of three sons. One of those sons (the first or only living son in about two-thirds
of the identified cases) choses after getting married, having children, and entering
political life to build a palace, probably using his portion of his father’s estate to help
fund construction. When he builds his palace, that individual already knows that he has
greater success in reproductive and political terms than his brothers. The palace builder’s
probable inheritor (almost always his first son) then inherits a portion of his father’s
wealth but ultimately inherits the entirety of this his father’s palace and has a level of
political and reproductive success nearly as good as his father’s. That level of political
and reproductive success persists through the palace builder’s grandson, great-grandson,
etc., resulting in a family line that is much more likely than its non-palace-building peers
to survive into the Medici Duchy.
Costly signaling theory requires that signals convey information about underlying,
unobservable qualities. As I discussed in the theory section, the specific nature of this
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quality is not important. What is important is that the quality provides its possessors with
greater ability to obtain, control, and use resources. Controlling resources was obviously
necessary for palace construction—cash paid for the labor and materials. However,
controlling resources was not sufficient for palace construction. Many but not all elite
families built palaces. As noted above, the 1427 catasto and its 9,780 Florentine
households includes only three households that definitely owned palaces in the years the
tax assessment was conducted. Given that one of those households was the 60thwealthiest household in the city and the other two were the first and eight-wealthiest
households, it is intuitively likely that another 57 households had the resources necessary
to build a palace. The patterning in the data on the political and reproductive success of
palace builders’ inheritors strongly suggests that the information content of palaces as
signals involved palace building parents’ ability to provision their inheriting sons with
resources essential in ensuring those sons’ ability to marry high-status brides and to
obtain high-status political careers.
What can also be said with certainty is that Florentine palace building was not a
form of conservative bet hedging or “waste.” Palace builders had more offspring than the
control group. This Florentine elite strategy of having many offspring is common in premodern, pre-demographic transition societies undergoing economic development, a
situation that general leads to greater fertility and greater income inequality (Dahan and
Tsiddon 1998). A model of a hypothetical patriarchal society suggests that for human
populations in high variability environments with high mortality (conditions that
characterized Renaissance Florence), one optimal choice is to have many children but to
bias inheritance to a small number of those children, leading to unequal family wealth in
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the next generation (Mace 1998). Florentine elites, with their partible inheritance but de
facto primogeniture for palaces, may be a real-world example of this modeled behavior,
and they fit better with this behavior beginning in the 1500s when they began to abandon
partible inheritance. There is some evidence that conservative bet hedging may have been
practiced by the Florentine poor, who could not afford wet nurses and who documentary
evidence suggests used “fertility reduction” strategies spanning the range from nonreproductive sexual practices to infanticide due to the very high cost of raising children
(Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985). But among the elite, bet hedging took the form of the
diversified strategy, in which parents have as many offspring as possible in the hopes that
one or some will survive and thrive. That said, there is limited evidence in my data that
palace builders did hedge their bets slightly relative to their fathers. Palace builders’
fathers had slightly more sons than palace builders, although the difference is not
statistically significant. Assuming that palace builders had the same theoretical maximum
reproductive capability as their fathers, this finding suggests builders traded off some
portion of their reproductive potential to provision their inheriting sons. Dunnell said that
there was nothing about waste behavior that was necessarily incompatible with costly
signaling, and it looks like both things may be at work here, but support for palacebuilding elites’ use of a conservative bet hedging strategy has only limited support in my
data.
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION: WERE PALACES
COSTLY SIGNALS?
My research started with a single question—does costly signaling apply to human
consumer behavior, specifically the construction of very large houses by Florentine elites
during the Renaissance, or do alternative hypotheses fit better with the data? The answer
is more complex than I expected, and it appears that palace construction was highly
elastic and responded to changes in elites’ social, political, and/or economic context.
During some periods, all elites who built palaces spent similar percentages of their wealth
on their palaces, and the distribution of palace costs lacks steps or tiers; these patterns
suggest that palaces during those periods were indices of wealth and thus of resource
control. But during other periods, elites who built palaces spent highly variable
percentages of their wealth on palaces and the cost of those palaces have several steps or
tiers, consistent with my expectations for costly signals.
Florentine elite residences prior to the republic were assemblages of smaller
houses that were unified by knocking holes in connecting walls to allow members of
extended families to share space and to access towers that were built into the fabric of
these sprawling multi-building residences. Pre-republic elite architecture therefore
appears to have been explicitly functional—their form was dictated by the need to defend
against attacks by rival families and to house large extended families. The only stylistic
elaboration is the presence of family coats of arms on some, but by no means all,
surviving towers. The palaces of the pre-reform republic period, while stylistically severe
compared to later styles, do have purely stylistic architectural elements not found on
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towers. For example, the earliest palaces of the republic have string courses that serve to
enhance their horizontal axes. These palaces would therefore have stood out dramatically
from older neighboring buildings for their width and their unified façades and would
have conveyed information about builders’ resources. Moreover, their functional groundfloor warehouse or storefront openings strongly suggest a move away from defense as a
functional requirement. Instead, these palaces would have been a functional component
in the city’s mercantile economy and therefore a symbol of elite participation in this
economy, conveying a very different type of information from the earlier elite towers and
multi-building residences. However, the palaces of this period are the second-best fit with
an interpretation that they are costly signals, suggesting that reliable information about
resource control was important to elites of the period. I suspect that need for costly
signals was a response in part to the shift from the pre-republic noble elite to the
increasingly merchant elite of the republic era.
The transition from elite houses that were purely functional to elite houses with a
signaling role is consistent with how weapons evolve among non-human animals. A
comparison of weapons across species finds that most weapons are used in competitions
with rivals for burrows or territories that will be used to provision mates and offspring
(Emlen 2008). Weapons often appear first as unimpressive but deadly weapons then
evolve into elaborate, showy weapons used in assessment displays in which individuals
face little risk of physical injury (ibid.). Similarly, the simple but functional towers used
in pre-republic elite ground battles were replaced with republic-era palaces used in noncombat status displays.
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Most palaces built during the post-reform republic period were stylistically very
similar to the palaces of the pre-reform republic period. The minor stylistic changes to
palace architecture were probably part of the broader renovations of façades on several
streets near the Palazzo della Signoria to replace wood buildings with stone and to
harmonize building façades. Florentines may have seen the period’s palaces as part of
this larger reconstruction effort, not as stylistically innovative intrusions into the urban
fabric. The palaces of the post-reform republic period are the second-best fit with an
interpretation that they were indices, not costly signals. It is therefore significant that the
republic in the late 1300s and early 1400s, prior to the Medici oligarchy, has been called
the most open to newcomers to political status (Brucker 1977; Goldthwaite 2009; Padgett
2010). This openness may have meant that there was relatively little need for status
competition, as obtaining political office did not depend on an individual’s status beyond
the basic requirements of being an adult male Florentine who was a member of a guild.
However, the stylistic roots of the much different Medici Oligarchy period had already
appeared in the form of the transitional rusticated style, the style that replaced the
warehouse or storefront doors that defined the first generation of republic-era palaces
with a single monumental entrance. Transitional rusticated palaces anticipate many
attributes of the Renaissance rusticated style and are nearly as good a fit with a costly
signaling interpretation as the Renaissance rusticated palaces.
The palaces of the Medici oligarchy period continue to use several stylistic
elements that appeared in the post-reform republic period, but they are far more
stylistically elaborate and stylistically diverse. The most elaborate palaces of the Medici
oligarchy period, the Renaissance rusticated style palaces, would have been architectural
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landmarks even before their completion and would have been obviously costly.
Contemporary accounts describe crowds stopping to watch construction of the enormous
Palazzo Strozzi (Goldthwaite 2009), and I suspect that all of the larger Medici oligarchy
period palaces drew similar attention. It is the largest of the Renaissance rusticated
palaces that cause the palaces of the Medici oligarchy period to be the best fit with a
costly signaling interpretation. But the specific ways in which the Renaissance Rusticated
style was more elaborate than its predecessors is also important. The palaces of this style
appropriated mullioned windows, deep rustication, and other architectural elements
previously seen only on the Palazzo della Signoria and other buildings owned by the city
government. The stylistic attributes of the Renaissance rusticated style palaces were
coopted in turn by the fake architectural elements of the much less costly sgraffito style.
Meanwhile, a small number of palace builders opted to build in two very simple and
severe styles—corner ashlar and stucco—that were probably less expensive even than
sgraffito. The result was an assemblage of palaces with costs that varied dramatically
across a very wide range and that would have been relatively easy for observers to rank.
I suspect that the good fit of Medici oligarchy period palaces with a costly
signaling interpretation is due in part to the Medici family’s behind-the-scenes control of
government. Under the Medici, political power was harder to obtain, as individuals
eligible for government offices had to survive scrutiny by a panel of hand-picked Medici
supporters in place of the comparatively politically unaffiliated panels of the republic
prior to Medici dominance. Obtaining and preserving the level of status that afforded
entry into the Medici inner circle would have had a huge payoff, creating a need for
status competition that could translate into political power.

256

The palaces of the Medici oligarchy period, as the best fit with costly signaling,
also indicate the analytic utility of Johnstone’s error-prone signaling model. In that
model, the smaller the number of signalers who able to advertise above the minimum
“initial flat” level, the more strongly they advertise. That prediction differs from the
normal prediction of costly signaling theory that the signaling ability of the lowestquality individual determines the intensity of higher quality individuals’ signals. I believe
the costliest palaces may have multiple audiences, including an audience that did not
exist before Medici domination. The Medici created of a role as de facto rulers of the city
and thereby opened a new level of status—firsts among equals. Significantly, the Medici
oligarchy period saw palace construction by the Strozzi, Pazzi, and Pitti, who were at
times in direct competition with the Medici for this role as de facto rulers. These
individuals were competing for status with other elites, but also for broad-based status as
rulers of the city, which would have required buyoff from the entire population and from
foreign rulers. The upper tiers of Medici oligarchy palace construction, the tiers
dominated by Renaissance rusticated style palaces, may have been designed to signal not
to the Florentine elite, but instead to the Florentine populace and to the rulers of other
city-states and nations. I believe it is no coincidence that virtually all Medici Oligarchy
period palaces can still be linked to particular families, while far fewer Late Republic
period palaces can be ascribed to a family. Of the 40 Medici Oligarchy palaces in my
sample, I found documentary evidence identifying the builder in all but four cases. In
contrast, only 45 of the 73 Late Republic period palaces have a known builder. The
inference is that Medici Oligarchy period palaces were built by much higher-profile
lineages.
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The increased elaboration of palaces during the Medici oligarchy suggests that
elite spending on palaces was similar to modern U.S. consumer behavior, where there is a
very strong correlation between the visibility of consumer expenditures and the elasticity
of the proportion of income spent on particular goods (Heffetz 2011, which found
spending on cars to be the most elastic in the categories analyzed). Research on modern
consumption of luxury goods suggests that visibility is critical in understanding the
motivation for consumers’ choices of one product over another (Berger and Ward 2010;
Han, et al. 2010). These studies found that consumers interested in acquiring broad status
tend to purchase conspicuous luxury goods, especially items with obvious logos. The
elaboration of the Renaissance rusticated style is in large part to stylistic elements such as
massive rusticated ashlars and mullioned windows that these palaces share with the
Palazzo della Signoria, a structure they were clearly designed to emulate. The Palazzo
della Signoria and its architectural style may be analogous to a logo—the Palazzo della
Signoria is the logo of the Florentine Republic “Brand,” something recognized at the time
(Machiavelli 2010 [1525]). I believe that the Renaissance Rusticated style is a deliberate
attempt to coopt the attributes of this Florentine brand for use by individual elites, a
process that started with the construction of the Palazzo Medici in 1444. The sgraffito
style, which appeared in 1446, is analogous to modern counterfeits, which tend to copy
brands with high-visibility logos (Han, et al. 2010). This line of inference suggests that
Medici Oligarchy-period builders of Renaissance Rusticated palaces were attempting to
gain status from a broad range of their contemporaries by building structures similar to
the seat of government and that that builders of sgraffito palaces were attempting to
emulate the builders of Renaissance Rusticated palaces.
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This is not to say that the elaborate palaces of the Medici oligarchy period (and
the Renaissance as a whole) were completely non-functional. Windows were placed high
off floors, making them hard to see out of when open; this limited visibility may have
served to guard daughters from view (Perilloux, et al. 2008). Palaces may have helped to
reduce plague mortality, which appears to have correlated with crowding (Carmichael
1986). In addition, palaces often had their own wells, which could have had health
benefits (Goldthwaite 1972). Even after they lost their ground-floor warehouse or
storefront openings, palaces still included warehouse space, including stores of weapons
and food, so the “extra” space was not entirely wasted (Ginori Lisci 1985).
Unfortunately, the period’s architectural theorists and Florentine elites themselves were
surprisingly silent about how interior space they used interior space, making it very
difficult to evaluate the function of the vast rooms these palaces contained (Goldthwaite
1972).
The palaces of the late republic period preserved only the three less costly and
less elaborate styles that first appeared during the Medici oligarchy. Their lack of
elaboration and their relatively continuous distribution in cost across a relatively narrow
range would have made the period’s palaces difficult to rank, and they are the most
consistent with predictions for indices. The lack of tiers and the large number of late
republic palaces suggests a large pool of potential signalers per Johnstone’s error-prone
signaling model. I believe that the change from palaces as costly signals during the
Medici oligarchy period to a large number of palaces as indices during the late republic
period is due to the shift to a large but closed elite, a change seen in the shift from
partible inheritance to primogeniture and in the creation of special schools and other
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measures that would have divided the elite socially from the rest of the population
(Emigh 2003).. In this context, late republic elites would have had a smaller interaction
sphere and may therefore have had less need to signal to large audiences of strangers.
Studies have found that found that consumers interested only in status within their
economic peer group tend to purchase goods with subtle or no logos and will pay a
premium for such goods (Berger and Ward 2010; Han, et al. 2010). The late republic
palaces are dominated by the very simple stucco and corner ashlar styles (57 of 73 late
republic palaces in my sample are stucco or corner ashlar style). These palaces have
simple façades and are palatial primarily in their size, making them much more subtle
than Renaissance rusticated palaces and thus consistent with signals associated with ingroup status competition.
In addition to a change in the environment for status competition, the transition
from the Medici oligarchy to the late republic included a change in the broader economic
climate. The late republic period was a period of economic stability for the population of
Florence as a whole, but elites had less opportunity for the spectacular successes of the
Medici Oligarchy and earlier periods and bore the economic brunt of political instability
and frequent warfare (Goldthwaite 2009). Studies of modern U.S. consumers’
expenditures have found that spending on luxury goods responds more to the economic
climate than non-luxury goods (Ait-Sahalia, et al. 2004). During the global recession that
began in 2008, wealthy consumers shifted spending from luxury collectibles such as
automobiles and boats and luxury consumables such as clothes and art to goods with
greater long-term tangible value, such as houses (Sontag 2009). If Florentine elites had
similar responses to their economic climate, perhaps many elites that during the Medici
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oligarchy would have purchased non-durable luxury goods shifted instead to purchasing
durable palaces, creating the large number of relatively small late republic palaces.
The end of the republic and the creation of the Medici duchy obviously represent
a dramatic change in the social and political environment. I believe that the extensive
stylistic experimentation encapsulated in the Mannerists styles is a reflection of elite
efforts to determine the parameters of appropriate signals in this changed environment.
The period saw the construction of palaces in the old stucco and corner ashlar styles, but
also saw the construction of palaces with highly varied and elaborate decorative
treatments. Perhaps not surprisingly, palaces of the early Ducal era are not a strong fit
with either interpretation—they are at the midpoint in period-by-period rankings of the
relative strength of costly signaling and index interpretations. The palace architecture
experiments of the early decades of the Duchy were a short-lived phenomenon, and
Florentine elite architecture settled by the early 1600s into a homogenous baroque style
that would persist until the 1800s.
This oscillation through time between palaces that have costs more consistent
with costly signaling and palaces with costs more consistent with indices suggests that
these two modes of information transfer may be unstable solutions. Searcy and Nowick
(Searcy and Nowicki 2005) suggest that Maynard Smith’s exemplar of indices—deer
bellowing—is a poor example because individual deer can manipulate their bodies to
increase the volume of their calls. In other words, individuals can learn a phenotypic
good trick that undermines the correlation of body size and the volume of calls. In the
case of palaces, the comparatively index-like palace styles of the post-reform republic
period of the late 1300s are undone by the development of the more costly transitional
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rusticated style and then, in 1444, by the vastly more costly Renaissance rusticated style
that first appeared with the Palazzo Medici. The Medici palace is a phenotypic good trick.
When the Albizzi and other exceptionally wealthy and powerful lineages of the preoligarchy periods built palaces, their palaces represented a very small proportion of the
wealth of their builders. The Medici committed far more resources to palace construction,
creating a competitive environment in which palaces could serve as costly signals. In
other words, I believe it is the most costly, elaborate palaces of the Medici oligarchy
period that forced other palace builders to spend heavily to keep up. This actually makes
palaces as costly signals a better fit with Veblen’s predictions than those of Zahavi and
other costly signaling researchers: Veblen said that it is the highest-quality signalers who
drive signal intensity (Veblen 1973 [1899]), not the lowest-quality signalers as predicted
by Grafen and others (Grafen 1990a, b). However, the Medici oligarchy period’s highly
variable spending on palace construction appears to have been unsustainable over the
long term, and during the late republic period families’ proportional palace construction
costs became more or less fixed, in line with predictions for indices. My suspicion is that
this shift from costly signal to index for specific behaviors such as palace construction is
probably offset by opposite shifts in other behaviors, for example chapel construction,
such that at any time a population has some behaviors that look like costly signals and
some behaviors that look like indices. This possibility is a topic for future research.

Signals of What?
But if palaces were costly signals (to varying degrees depending on the period),
what were they signals of? The fact that the signaling—palace construction—followed
marriage, reproduction, and entry into political office suggests that building a palace did
262

not result in a change of behavior by builders’ contemporaries toward the builders. I
believe instead that palace construction was involved with preserving lineages (both in
demographic terms and in status) across generations. Specifically, I believe that palaces
served as costly signals of the financial support parents were willing to provide to their
offspring to allow them to marry and maximize their reproductive potential and political
careers.
Statistical analysis by Padgett finds that wealthy families tended to marry other
wealthy families, that politically powerful families tended to marry other politically
powerful families, and that large families tended to marry other large families (Padgett
2010). However, the marriage partners tended to differ in other dimensions—for
example, a wealthy couple could differ in political power. The result is that statistical
analysis finds that wealthy families were not the same as large families were not the same
as politically powerful families and therefore that the three dimensions of status in
Florence did not correlate. However, marriage is the most consistent element—couples
rarely married up or down (ibid.) because marriage ties were both a reflection of a
family’s status and a source of that status—marriage confirmed status, it did not change
status (Bender 2009).
As discussed above, palace builders had significantly more sons than my control
population. My data on the number of sons is more precisely a measure of the number of
sons who were entered into the pool of potential office holders. Many of these sons were
registered early in their lives for future eligibility for office. This patterning suggests that
fathers were at least partially responsible for the entry of their sons into political life. As
discussed above, palace builders’ first sons were most likely to inherit fathers’ palaces
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despite the long tradition of partible inheritance among sons—inheriting siblings usually
made financial arrangements to ensure that first sons eventually owned entire palaces
(Goldthwaite 1972). Elites were also more likely than average to have multi-generational
households that included sons and their wives. Sons would also benefit from their fathers’
personal relations that underlay business ventures; these patrilineal business ties were
critical in business (Padgett and McLean 2003).
Palace builders’ sons would also inherit a durable statement of a lineage’s status.
Contemporary documents make it clear that palaces were viewed as critical elements in
the status of lineages that were to remain in family hands if at all possible. Filippo Strozzi
and Giovanni Rucellai both left wills with extensive instructions on steps to ensure that
their palaces remained in family hands (Goldthwaite 1972). These efforts succeeded—the
Palazzo Rucellai is still owned by the family, and the Palazzo Strozzi was in the family
until the 1900s. Michelangelo Buonarroti’s stated purpose in building his palace was to
reestablish his family’s membership in the Florentine elite after generations of absence
from political life (ibid.). In contemporary accounts, palace builders claimed that their
houses were in keeping with their status (Kent 1987). Unfortunately, I have no
information on the role of palace builders’ wives in the decision to build palaces: women
were largely silent in the period’s documentary history, leading many scholars to
question whether women benefited from the renaissance at all (Trexler 1993).
Sons of palace builders were therefore provisioned with entry into political life,
with high-quality housing prior to their parents’ deaths, with business relations, and with
a visible indicator of the family’s possession of sufficient wealth to build and keep a
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palace. Intuitively, these factors would have helped attract high-quality wives for the sons
of palace builders, especially the first sons who would eventually inherit those palaces.
The data actually suggest that there is some multi-generational bet hedging
involved in this offspring provisioning strategy. Builders’ fathers have slightly more sons
than palace builders (p-value .026). Assuming that palace builders had the same
theoretical reproductive capability as their fathers, this finding suggests builders traded
off some of their reproductive potential to provision their inheriting sons with more
resources that otherwise would have to be split among more offspring. Palace builders’
inheriting sons were therefore provisioned sufficiently to have a comparable number of
sons as their fathers (p-value .192). Palace builders’ inheriting sons were seated in office
less often than their fathers (p-value .034), but this difference may an artifact of the
truncation of demographic and political data due to the end of the republic. Palace
builders did have fewer sons on average than their fathers, but the difference is not
statistically significant. More extreme conservative bet hedging may have been in
operation for poor and middle-class Florentines, who had smaller families on average
than the wealthy. Support among non-elites for massive public and religious building
projects may have been involved in variance reduction strategies. This topic is a question
for future research.
I believe that palace builders’ daughters would have been similarly provisioned,
although my evidence is inferential. Data on dowries shows that elites prior to about 1500
took steps to maximize all their daughters’ likelihood of marrying (Kirshner and Molho
1978). Dowries increased sharply after the plague of 1348 and continued to soar into the
early 1500s (Molho 1994), including a 45 percent increase over the 1400s (Strocchia
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2009). The increase in dowries made marriage more expensive and reduced male interest
in finding wives (ibid). Well aware of the need to repopulate the city, the government in
1425 created a state-run dowry fund that guaranteed payment in exchange for an initial
investment. Although the details varied over time, for most of the 1400s if parents
deposited 60 florins in the dowry fund the husband of their daughter would receive a
dowry of 140 florins after a 5-year investment, 250 florins after a 7.5-year investment,
365 florins after an 11-year investment, and 500 florins after a 15-year investment. The
dowry was payable at the consummation of a marriage unless the maturity date had not
been reached, in which case payment was delayed. The initial required investment made
participation impossible for the poor and many middling households—of the 9,780
households in the 1427 tax assessment, 3,033 households, or 31 percent, had taxable
assets of less than 60 florins. The dowry fund was dominated by individuals with family
names, suggesting middling to high status (Kirshner and Molho 1978). Parents did not
pick and choose among their daughters. Instead, they invested equally for all daughters
who survived to about 2-5 years old (ibid). Kirshner and Molho believe that the dowry
data suggests families (at least in the 1400s) tried to marry off all their daughters, not just
some of their daughters. Wives participated actively in these decisions and in finding
appropriate spouses for their sons and daughters (Bender 2009).
Dowries were often very large. For the period 1425 to 1442, dowries paid by the
state dowry investment fund averaged 405 florins, with a maximum of 3,000 florins and a
minimum of 14 florins (Kirshner and Molho 1978). Note that the least costly republic-era
palace in my sample had an estimated cost of 1,355 florins. Dowries were particularly
large among the highest-status elites. In 1444, palace inheritor Piero de Medici received a
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dowry of 1,200 florins from the family of his wife, Lucrezia Tornabuoni. After marrying
Alessandra di Filippo Valori in 1450, Carlo di Salvestro Gondi acquired a 1,600-florin
dowry, only 500 florins of which came from state dowry fund payouts. In 1453, Piero di
Messer Andrea de Pazzi, the brother of a palace builder, paid his future son-in-law
Bartolomeo Valori a dowry of 2,000 florins. Dowries were generally accompanied by
reverse payments in the form of clothes and accessories by husbands to their brides;
usually totaling one third to two thirds of the dowry (Klapisch-Zuber 1987). Marriage
therefore represented a considerable movement of cash from family to family.
In exchange for large investments in dowries, parents were able to marry their
daughters at younger ages. Overall, Florentine girls married at an average age of 17.2 or
18.0. Brides with very high dowries married at about 16.9 years (Bender 2009).
Daughter’s ages were important in the Florentine marriage market: Florentine parents
appear to have lied about daughters’ ages, claiming that daughters were younger than
they really were to make them more marriageable (Molho 1988).
The husbands of brides with high dowries married slightly later than average.
Overall, Florentine men married at an average age of 28.9 or 30.0, depending on how the
age is calculated (Bender 2009; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985). The husbands of
high-dowry wives averaged 29.9 years old (Bender 2009). However, this higher-thanaverage age probably reflects men delaying marriage until they could form their own
households: 75 percent of married men in Bender’s 1425-29 data were heads of
households (ibid.). The sons of palace builders, who tended to live with their parents after
marriage, could have married while still living at home. In my data set, the palaceinheriting sons of palace builders had a lower age at first son, suggesting earlier marriage
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(31.3 years versus 33.4 years, p-value .088). In other words, being the likely inheritor of a
palace builder may have offset the need to delay marriage to a bride with a large dowry.
Building a palace would therefore mean a longer reproductive life for the builder’s first
son.
Building a palace may also have signaled a father’s ability to provision children
from illicit relationships. Prostitution was legal and regulated after 1403, when the
government created a panel charged with finding locations for brothels and attracting
foreign prostitutes to the city. Prostitutes drew clients from all levels of society (Brackett
1993). Although extant records of prostitutes’ customers include few with family names
indicative of relatively high status, it is possible that elite customers’ names were
deliberately omitted (Trexler 1993). In any event, some elite Florentine males almost
certainly fathered some offspring with female prostitutes. Some elite Florentine men also
probably fathered children with their slaves, although probably on a scale orders of
magnitude lower than in other slave-holding complex societies (Betzig 1992). The 1427
tax assessment records 294 slaves living in 261 households (Goldthwaite 2009); these
slaves were virtually all women who worked as household servants in wealthy
households (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985). In either case, data from the dowry fund
shows that fathers of illegitimate offspring provided for dowries, although these dowries
were smaller than average and more illegitimate daughters entered convents than average
(Kirshner and Molho 1978; Molho 1994). However, I do not have data on whether the
palace builders in my sample had illegitimate offspring with their servants or slaves. If
illegitimate sons were recognized by their fathers, they are indistinguishable from
legitimate sons in the election data. For example, Carlo di Cosimo de' Medici (1428 or
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1430 - May 29, 1492) was the illegitimate son of Cosimo de' Medici (the Elder) and a
slave Circassian named Magdalene. Because Carlo’s surname is Medici and because his
name includes a patronymic identifying his father, if Carlo appeared in the election data I
would have no way of identifying whether he was an illegitimate son.
Although inferential, I believe that the data on marriage patterns explains what,
exactly, palace builders were signaling. Palace builders embarked on their construction
projects after their first offspring had survived early childhood—palace construction
starts about a decade after the birth of first sons. Palaces would have been a signal of the
family’s intent to remain in Florence, its status as a lineage, and its willingness to invest
wealth and status in descendants. Unlike palaces and many other forms of wealth,
dowries and counterdowries would not have been directly observable. They Darwinian
payoff was ensuring that offspring were married longer and therefore had more years to
reproduce and that offspring were provided with the benefits of their parents’ acquired
status. This payoff would explain my findings that palace-building lineages were more
likely to survive than non-palace building lineages—palace builders and their inheritors
out-reproduced their contemporaries, filling the massive demographic niche left by the
repeated plague events than began in the 1300s.
The need for parental provisioning increased in the early 1500s. The mature
economy of the 1500s meant that merchants had fewer opportunities for huge business
successes (Goldthwaite 2009). Elites appear to have responded by formally shifting from
partible inheritance to primogeniture (Emigh 2003; Goldthwaite 2009). They also
reduced the number of sons allowed to marry and delayed the age at which those sons
married (Johansson 1987). Meanwhile, after increasing 45 percent over the 1400s,
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dowries shot up another 25 percent between 1500 and 1530 (Strocchia 2009). This
increase in dowries contributed to a dramatic increase in the number of nuns, who
represented just 0.45 percent of the population in 1338 but 5.2 percent of the population
in 1552, numbers were dominated by young women from elite lineages (ibid.). As
discussed above, these factors led to the disappearance of many elite lineages during the
1700s (Litchfield 1969). In this context, elite families that were able to give their
offspring a greater likelihood of reproductive success or a stronger position in
government office would have benefited greatly.
If palaces were an effort to preserve lineage status by signaling parents’
willingness to invest in offspring, do Florentine palaces have a modern analogue? My
research began in part with a hunch that palaces were the ancestors of the so-called
McMansions of the U.S. housing boom that started in the late 1990s. That housing
boom—now viewed in hindsight as a bubble—was accompanied by a huge increase in
the size of American houses. U.S. Census Bureau data indicate that the average U.S.
house in 1973 measured 1,660 square feet, then increased to 2,521 square feet in 2007—a
52 percent increase that was probably driven in part by suburban houses nearly as large
as the smaller Florentine palaces. This increase in size was accompanied by a colossal
surge in the price of American houses between the late 1990s and about 2006. Many
consumers used the increased value of their houses to purchase a huge range of consumer
goods. Many of these goods—granite countertops, stainless steel appliances, and home
entertainment systems—were justified as adding even more value to homes as investment
properties (Mian and Sufi 2010), but consumers also used the perceived value of their
homes to create what market researchers call the near-luxury market typified by goods
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such as Starbucks coffee, Coach handbags, and C-class Mercedes-Benz automobiles
(Gross 2003). When housing values collapsed, consumers stopped spending money on
improvements (White 2009), and by 2011 houses were worth about what they were a
century earlier when adjusted for inflation (Mulbrandon 2011), especially when the
increase in average house size and features is considered (Harrison 2009). However,
during the bubble years, homeowners viewed their houses as having real monetary value
and attempted to convert that monetary value into goods. Florentine palaces, like
McMansions, were large and costly, but there is one extremely important difference:
Florentine elites did not view their palaces as investments and sold those palaces only
under extreme duress for a fraction of their original construction costs. The large houses
of the modern-day United States therefore appear to be a poor fit as modern counterparts
to Florentine Renaissance palaces. However, there is an expenditure common to modern
U.S. upper-income households that shares many attributes in common with both
McMansions and Florentine palaces: sending offspring to expensive colleges and
universities.
As with houses during the real estate bubble, the cost of higher education has
increased dramatically in the past several decades: adjusted for inflation, tuition has more
than doubled over the past 30 years (Gillen 2008). As with the real estate bubble, the
increase in tuition has been made possible in part by the availability of low-interest loans
(Harris 2011). Unlike housing before and after the bubble, however, higher education
does have a measurable payoff in long-term earnings, so the decision by parents and their
offspring to spend large amounts on tuition is economically rational: “The sustained and
widespread increases in tuition indicate that they are, like the rise in housing prices, a
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rational response to the circumstances faced by market participants. Schools charge ever
more because they can, and students and their families pay ever more because the
earnings differential between college–and high school–educated workers leads them to
believe that a college degree is a good investment” (Gillen 2008, p. 8). Because of the
steady increase in the cost of education, economists have recently begun debating
whether higher education is a bubble (Daniel 2011; Lowrey 2011).
But what does higher education have in common with palaces? Like palaces,
higher education has a purely functional ancestry (training individuals for specific highskilled trades such as law and the clergy). Palaces were obviously available only to the
wealthy, a condition that is increasingly true for higher education in the United States
(Leonhardt 2011). And, most important, modern parents’ spending on higher education is
similar to Florentine elite parents’ spending on palaces in that it ensures the preservation
of wealth and status across generations (Goldstein 2011), despite the limited ability of
college degrees to directly improve students’ abilities (Fang 2006; Miller 2009). And, to
an even greater degree than palaces, college degrees are worthless if resold.
The issue of whether higher education is a costly signal of parental investment in
offspring designed to preserve parents’ reproductive success and status across generations
is obviously a subject too large to be examined in detail here. The point I wish to make is
that during some but not all of the Florentine Renaissance, palaces were costly signals of
wealth, and that modern U.S. college degrees may be a very similar phenomenon. This
patterning strongly suggests that costly signaling in market-based complex societies is a
pervasive but highly plastic source of human decision making, one that dynamically
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adjusts signaling behavior to changes in signalers’ social, cultural, and economic
environments.
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